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Dr. janet Norwood 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
Dr. Laurie Bassi 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
January 10, 1996 
To the President and the Congress: 
tel (202) 219-4985 
fax (202) 219-4467 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation submits to you its third 
report, Defining Federal and State Roles in Unemployment Insurance, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Section 908 of the Social Security Act, as amended by 
the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164). 
This report completes the Council's review of the nation's Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) system. We have examined the program carefully and have, I 
believe, produced a series of thoughtful and comprehensive reports and recom-
mendations on the most crucial issues facing the system. We have held public 
hearings in many parts of the country and have considered the views of workers 
and employers, as well as those of state and federal government officials. 
We believe that our analysis of the Unemployment Insurance system is par-
ticularly relevant to the cutTent national debate over federal-state roles in pro-
gram design and execution. The Unemployment Insurance program is one of the 
oldest federal-state programs, and it has been one of the most successful exam-
ples of partnership between the federal government and the states. Because of the 
importance of this successful partnership, we have reviewed the system's gov-
erning structure to develop a coherent, rational basis for defining the future roles 
of the federal and state governments in the UI program. We believe this concep-
tual framework can provide insights for the realignment of governing structures 
for other programs as well. 
In the course of examining federal and state roles, we documented several 
fundamental problems in the Unemployment Insurance system, and have made 
recommendations to cotTect them. We have found, for example, that competitive 
pressures among the states have at times reduced the solvency of their 
Unemployment Insurance trust funds, and we have made a series of recommen-
dations to ensure the forward funding of state programs. Further, we have found 
that these funding problems have frequently resulted in restrictions on worker 
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eligibility for benefits and that these restrictions have often had a disproportion-
ately adverse effect on low-wage and part-time workers. 
The Council proposes several changes to address these problems. In addition, 
in order to put the programs in all states on a more equal footing, we favor an 
increase in the base wage for tax purposes to $9,000, with future alignment to the 
change in average wages, and the elimination of the special temporary 0.2 per-
cent federal administrative tax enacted some years ago. 
The Council made a number of recommendations in its first two reports. We 
believe that those, together with the recommendations in this report, will mod-
ernize the Unemployment Insurance program and improve the efficiency and 
equity with which it operates. 
My colleagues on the Council and I have appreciated the opportunity to share 
our views on the Unemployment Insurance system with you. We hope that the 
findings and recommendations produced by the Council will provide accurate, 
insightful, and useful information to policymakers for years to come. 
Sincerely, 
Janet L. Norwood 
Chair 
Advisory Council on 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
Janet L. Norwood, Chair 
Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute 
Owen Bieber 
President Emeritus, International Union, UAW 
Thomas R. Donahue 
President Emeritus, AFL-CIO 
Ann Q. Duncan 
Chair, Employment Security Commission of North Carolina 
William D. Grossenbacher 
Administrator, Texas Employment Commission 
Leon Lynch 
International Vice-President, United Steelworkers of America 
Robert C. Mitchell 
Retired Manager, Payroll Taxes, Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
Gary W. Rodrigues 
President, Hawaii State AFL-CIO 
John J. Stephens 
Retired President and CEO, Roseburg Forest Products 
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Governor, State of Wisconsin 
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IN NOVEMBER 1991, THE CONGRESS of the United States passed the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Act (P.L. 102-164). The act included a section 
that created the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, which 
was charged with the task of evaluating "the unemployment compensation 
program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, cover-
age, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative 
costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the program and to 
make recommendations for improvement." 
The Advisory Council is made up of eleven members, who represent the 
interests of business, labor, state governments, and the public. Five of the 
members are appointed by the President, three are appointed by the Senate, 
and three by the House of Representatives. 
In carrying out its mandate to evaluate and analyze the Unemployment 
Insurance system, the Advisory Council has relied on diverse sources of 
information. It received regular briefing materials from its staff, and held a 
series of public hearings across the country so that interested individuals and 
organizations might present their views. In addition, the Council convened a 
number of academic conferences to facilitate the exchange of ideas and the 
presentation of research work on the subject of unemployment insurance. 
The latter forums included two economic research conferences (in August 
1994 and August 1995), and a legal symposium (in March 1995) sponsored 
jointly with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. 
This report, the Council's third and final, has two sections. Section I pre-
sents the Council's findings and recommendations on the subject of federal and 
state roles in the Unemployment Insurance system. Section II contains a broad, 
xix 
xxi PREFACE 
background discussion of issues related to the roles of the federal and state gov-
ernments and the administration of the Unemployment Insurance system. 
The chapters in Section II include both original research and syntheses of 
existing information. The primary authors of Section II are Laurie J. Bassi, 
Amy B. Chasanov, Stacey G. Grundman, Eileen Cubanski, and Daniel P. 
McMurrer. The section of Chapter 8 describing the results of the appeals case 
studies was written by Anne L. Gallagher and Sarah P. Ralph. 
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fiNDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

1 / Introduction 
THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION submits this final 
report to the President and Congress in the midst of an ongoing debate about 
the distribution of responsibilities and powers between the federal govern-
ment and state governments. A similar debate has occurred throughout the 
history of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, which was created 
under Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
The Council has been mindful of developments during its final year of 
deliberations. Its work over the past year has revealed both opportunities and 
perils associated with the types of shifts in federal and state responsibilities 
and powers that are under way. It is certainly possible to improve the effi-
ciency of important government programs, and in many ways, the UI pro-
gram can provide a useful model in this regard. At the same time, however, 
the Council's research (summarized in Chapter 4 of this report) indicates a 
basis for concern that competitive pressures among the states to attract and 
retain business will lead to a continued deterioration in the percentage of the 
unemployed who receive benefits. 
Earlier research conducted by the Council showed that this phenomenon 
disproportionately affects low-wage workers. When states experience a trust 
fund solvency problem, they often tighten their eligibility requirements. 
Furthermore, at times the federal government has created incentives that 
have had the effect of causing states to restrict eligibility for the program. 
Both of these developments have had a disproportionate effect on low-wage 
workers. Recommendations in the Council's 1995 report suggested a number 
of changes that would address these problems. 
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The final year of the Council's deliberations on the Unemployment 
Insurance system focused on methods that could be used to rationalize fed-
eral-state relations within that system, thereby contributing to improvements 
in the administration of the program. In brief, the Council finds that in some 
critical respects, the states face political and fiscal pressures to restrict their 
UI programs in a fashion which undercuts important national interests. In 
other respects, the states are subjected to detailed federal oversight which 
does not fully reflect the administrative capabilities of state agencies. The 
findings and recommendations resulting from the Council's deliberations are 
summarized in Chapter 2, and should be considered together with the find-
ings and recommendations that the Council presented in its first and second 
annual reports. (See Appendices E and F in this volume for the 1994 and 
1995 Findings and Recommendations, respectively.) 
The Council is of the view that many important questions about how best 
to administer the nation's UI system can be resolved by establishing a coher-
ent, rational basis for defining the role of both the federal and state govern-
ments in the system. This report's findings and recommendations are 
derived from a conceptual framework that builds upon the insights of both 
political science and economics. This framework is based on the premise 
that the federal government's role should be limited to those areas of policy 
that meet two criteria: (1) an essential national interest exists; and (2) states' 
interests may diverge from those national interests. Responsibilities for 
those areas of policy that do not meet both of these criteria should reside 
with the state governments, and federal oversight in these areas should be 
reduced or eliminated. 
The recommendations that follow from this framework suggest important 
ways in which the U.S. Department of Labor could most effectively exercise 
its responsibilities in administering the Unemployment Insurance program, 
while simultaneously honoring the shared responsibilities and powers of the 
federal and state partners. The implications of the report's conceptual frame-
work can also be applied to programs other than the Unemployment 
Insurance program. 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
Section I of this report includes two chapters. Following this introduction, 
Chapter 2 presents the current findings and recommendations of the 
Advisory Council. Section II, comprising Chapters 3 through 9, then offers 
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more detailed explorations of a number of Unemployment Insurance issues 
related to the findings and recommendations. 
Beginning the second section, Chapter 3 addresses the issue of federal-
state relations in the Unemployment Insurance system. Chapter 4 discusses 
the overall evolution of the system, focusing on some of the components of 
the system that have changed over time and exploring a number of potential 
explanations for those changes. 
Issues in the financing of Unemployment Insurance are addressed in 
Chapter 5. The use of performance standards is the topic of Chapter 6, and 
experience rating is addressed in Chapter 7. Issues in nonmonetary determi-
nations, denials, and appeals are discussed in the final two chapters, with 
Chapter 8 focusing on trends in those areas, and Chapter 9 focusing on an 
analysis of those trends. 
The appendices of the report present the following information: a discus-
sion of technical issues in the analyses contained in Chapters 4 and 9 of this 
report, background tables and figures on financing and benefit issues, the 
1994 and 1995 findings and recommendations of the Council, the charter of 






















2 / Findings and 
Recommendations 
THE NATION'S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system is based on the sharing of 
responsibilities between the federal government and the state governments. 
The Council finds that this framework, which has evolved over 60 years, 
could be made more effective by implementing changes based on a refined 
understanding of the appropriate division of responsibilities between the 
federal and state partners. This finding leads the Council to a formulation 
of the following statement of federal-state responsibilities in Unemploy-
ment Insurance. 
1. Federal-State Responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment Insurance is a federal-state system of shared responsi-
bilities and powers. These powers and responsibilities should be shared 
in the most effective possible manner. Whenever appropriate, state 
governments should assume broad responsibilities for determining the 
elements of their Unemployment Insurance programs. The federal gov-
ernment should assume responsibility primarily in those areas in which 
both an essential national interest exists and states' interests may 
diverge from those national interests. 
The fundamental objective of the system is the provision of insur-
ance in the form of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers 
experiencing involuntary unemployment. Federal involvement in this 
area should limit that competition among states on the basis of 
Unemployment Insurance costs that undermines the integrity of the 
system and the capacity of the program to insure workers adequately. 
A second objective of the system is the accumulation of adequate funds 
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during periods of economic health, thereby promoting economic sta-
bility by maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic 
downturns. The achievement of these fundamental purposes, which 
serve the national interest and transcend the interests of any individual 
state, require federal oversight and action. 
FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS 
Federal Responsibility in Areas of Essential National Interest 
As noted above, there are two primary areas of essential national interest that 
may diverge from state interests: the provision of adequate insurance to 
workers throughout the country and macroeconomic stabilization. The pro-
gram's capacity to meet these two fundamental objectives first depends upon 
the existence of state DI programs, and second, requires the proper function-
ing of a number of specific program components, each of which can be erod-
ed through the dynamics of interstate competition. The components are enu-
merated in this section and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this report. 
The Council finds evidence that escalating competition among some 
states to attract and retain business may result in DI tax rates that are lower 
than they would be without this competition (see Chapter 4 of this report). 
Reduced state DI taxes frequently result in tightened eligibility standards, 
which adversely and disproportionately affect low-wage workers. In addi-
tion, tax competition could result in reductions in benefit levels or in dimin-
ished access to services. 
Consequently, to ensure the achievement of the first national objective-
the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers experienc-
ing involuntary unemployment-the federal government should act to pre-
vent any potentially destructive consequences mising from interstate compe-
tition. Thus, there are two primary areas in which federal involvement is nec-
essary-minimum eligibility and benefit levels, and access to services. 
To assure the achievement of the second national objective-the counter-
cyclical stabilization of the national economy-a unified national strategy is 
required. Thus, it is the responsibility of the federal government to take 
action, as necessary, to preserve the four components that enable the program 
to stabilize the economy during periods of economic downturn. The four 
components follow. First, state programs should be forward-funded with 
independent trust funds in order to ensure that the DI system as a whole has 
the capacity to inject additional money into the economy during recessions 
and in order to reduce the need to raise taxes during economic downturns. 
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Second, state UI benefit levels should be high enough and should be paid to 
a large enough percentage of the involuntarily unemployed to support effi-
cient economic stabilization efforts. Third, the capacity must exist to moni-
tor and analyze national and local labor market conditions consistently and 
quickly. Fourth, any supplemental mechanism for stabilization (for example, 
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding during times of 
unusually high unemployment) should be maintained and coordinated at the 
national level. 
Thus, to protect essential national interests, the federal government must 
take responsibility for protecting specific components of the DI program 
when autonomous state action might adversely affect the national interest. To 
preserve the components discussed above, federal involvement is necessary 
in the seven areas listed in Recommendation 2. In each of these areas, feder-
al requirements should be as clear and as simple as possible. 
2. Recommendation 
To preserve national interests in the UI system, the federal government 
should take an active role in the following areas: (1) ensuring the exis-
tence of a UI system in each state; (2) promoting the forward funding 
of the system; (3) monitoring and coordinating the collection of infor-
mation on labor market conditions; (4) promoting economic stability 
by maintaining supplemental benefit programs that trigger on auto-
matically during recessions, thereby avoiding the need for costly fed-
eral emergency benefits; (5) coordinating the efficient pooling of risk 
by making loans available to states experiencing prolonged recessions; 
(6) assuring that all workers with a given level of attachment to the 
work force are eligible for a minimum level of benefits; and (7) pro-
moting quality and efficiency in program outcomes. 
Federal Oversight in Other Areas 
While taking a role in the areas listed in Recommendation 2, the federal gov-
ernment should avoid involvement in program areas in which essential 
national interests are not at stake. Indeed, in these areas, the federal govern-
ment should take steps to encourage state experimentation and to enhance 
state flexibility. Program details in such areas are better left to the discretion 
of the states, which function more efficiently as "laboratories of democracy" 
and which may be able to provide better service to their citizens. Thus, fed-
eral involvement should exist primarily in those areas in which there are 
essential national interests at stake. 
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A number of current federal laws, federal regulations, and federal over-
sight functions affecting VI do not meet these criteria and should therefore 
be repealed or discontinued. Included are the following: requirements that 
the states must disqualify certain categories of workers (for example, pro-
fessional athletes and school employees who are between terms) and reduce 
unemployed workers' VI benefits if they receive certain other types of 
retirement income; standards that the states must meet in order to qualify for 
full Extended Benefits funding (for example, the imposition of a waiting 
week for benefits and requirements that recipients meet stricter definitions 
of continuing eligibility); and a variety of oversight functions which are dis-
cussed below. 
3. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that states disqualify certain categories of work-
ers (for example, professional athletes and school employees who are 
between terms) should be repealed. 
4. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that certain types of workers' retirement income 
offset UI benefits should be repealed. 
5. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that states meet certain standards in order to 
receive full funding for Extended Benefits should be repealed. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
Measurement of Performance Outcomes 
Performance measures within the UI system should focus on program out-
comes rather than on program processes, since the latter are within the 
purview of the states. In addition, performance requirements should be con-
fined to areas in which there is both an essential national interest and a poten-
tial divergence of national and state interests. There is no need to monitor 
program inputs or state performance in areas in which state and national 
interests coincide. Moreover, these areas involve program processes rather 
than program outcomes, which, as stated, should be the responsibility of the 
states. Some of these areas, including aspects of benefit payment and revenue 
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collection, are currently regulated by elaborate federal quality control pro-
grams (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
By selecting only essential measures of performance outcomes, the fed-
eral government would underscore the importance of state performance on 
those particular measures. Currently, the relative importance of various out-
comes may be obscured by the large number of performance measurements 
required of the states. Further, the elimination of unnecessary performance 
measures should reduce state administrative burdens considerably and would 
ensure that available resources were dedicated to achieving the outcomes 
identified as most essential to the functioning of the system. Finally, the 
selection of clear and easily measured outcomes would promote a better 
understanding of the Unemployment Insurance system. 
The federal government should, however, require the measurement of 
performance outcomes in essential program areas in which national and state 
interests may diverge. Some such areas are not currently subject to perfor-
mance measurement, including forward funding and the ease of claimants' 
access to the system, which is discussed below. 
The Council is aware of the efforts of the Performance Enhancement 
Work Group, which consists of representatives from the state employment 
security agencies (SESAs) and the U.S. Department of Labor. This group has 
been working since 1993 to improve the performance of the ill system by 
improving the measurement of performance within the system. While this 
collaborative effort is commendable, additional work needs to be done on the 
fundamental issues of forward funding and access to the system. 
The Council finds that there would be benefit in undertaking a more fun-
damental re-engineering of UI performance measurement. Such an effort 
should be based on careful consideration of the basic objectives of the UI 
program. Required performance measures, as well as the reports on UI that 
the U.S. Department of Labor requires of the states, should be designed to 
ensure that the basic objectives of the system are achieved. 
The Council finds that four principles should be applied in shaping an 
appropriate set of outcomes to be measured within the Unemployment 
Insurance system. First, the measures should reflect the fundamental purpos-
es of the Unemployment Insurance system. Second, perfonnance measures 
should focus on the system's outcomes, rather than on the amount of input or 
the processes by which outcomes are achieved. Third, those measures of per-
formance outcomes that are identified as essential should be as clear and 
simple as possible. Fourth, the application of these measures of performance 
should ensure equity in the treatment of both claimants and employers. 
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6. Recommendation 
The federal priority in the area of performance measurement should be 
to ensure that required performance measures emphasize the essential 
national interests of the UI system. The national interests that could be 
influenced by the system of performance measurement, but that are 
not currently incorporated in it, include forward funding and access to 
the system. 
The current federal emphasis on benefit quality control measures is 
excessive and should be reduced, because ensuring that benefits are not over-
paid should be a state rather than a federal responsibility. Similarly, ensuring 
that VI taxes are collected when they are due is a state responsibility that can 
be accomplished with minimal federal oversight. Given that employers' tax 
rates form a critical part of the nation's statistical system, some federal over-
sight in this regard is appropriate. 
7. Recommendation 
In cooperation with the u.s. Department of Labor, states should devel-
op, monitor, and report their own measures of the quality of their pro-
cedures for UI benefit payment and revenue collection, using general-
ly accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. 
8. Recommendation 
The u.s. Department of Labor should work in partnership with the states 
to develop measures of access to the UI system. These measures should 
include but should not necessarily be limited to the ease with which indi-
viduals can apply for benefits and the extent to which individuals with a 
substantial attachment to the labor force are eligible for benefits. 
Factors to be considered in developing measures of the ease with 
which individuals can apply for benefits should include the following: 
(1) whether information that clearly explains the application process is 
readily available, (2) how much time is required to complete the appli-
cation process, and (3) whether it is possible to apply for benefits in lan-
guages commonly spoken by those who are served by the program. 
Factors that should be considered in developing measures of access 
to the UI system include whether individuals with a substantial work 
history are excluded for any of the following reasons: (1) they have 
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worked in seasonal jobs, (2) their wages are low, (3) their most recent-
ly completed quarter of wages was not included in measuring their 
monetary eligibility, (4) they quit their job for legitimate family-related 
reasons, (5) they are unable to accommodate an employer's change in 
job conditions, (6) they are seeking part-time work, or (7) they are 
unable to accept shift work. 
Inadequate or incomplete information about the UI claims or appeals 
processes among some claimants may have the effect of restricting their 
access to the DI system. Similarly, a lack of information or understanding 
among some employers may result in their being charged for illegitimate 
claims, resulting in higher UI taxes. In its 1995 report, the Council recom-
mended that states distribute an information packet on eligibility require-
ments to unemployed individuals. Additional state efforts would also help 
guarantee that all parties interact equitably-"on a level playing field"-
within the DI system. These efforts should be directed at ensuring that 
claimants and employers enter the system with a common understanding of 
the nature of relevant proceedings. 
9. Recommendation 
Each state should establish a mechanism, such as an ombudsman's 
office, to provide claimants or employers with any requested informa-
tion on procedures or requirements in the claims or appeals processes. 
10. Recommendation 
The federal guarantee of a fair hearing should be interpreted to include 
the unrestricted right of appeals participants to representation of their 
own choosing. Each state should provide clear notice of this right to all 
claimants and employers. 
11. Recommendation 
Each state should provide information to claimants and employers on 
available sources of advice or advocacy assistance. 
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Data Needs and Reporting Requirements 
Throughout its long history, the UI program has produced a vast amount of 
information. These UI data are used for a variety of purposes, such as admin-
istering the UI program itself, facilitating its interaction with other federal 
and state programs, and contributing information to the nation's statistical 
system. For example, the ill tax records and data collected by the states to 
determine labor force attachment and the earnings of workers cover most of 
the nation's business establishments and almost all of the nation's workers. 
These data constitute a large body of administrative information about the 
labor market and are therefore extraordinarily important. 
Individual states use UI information to operate the program, to evaluate 
efficiencies, and to conduct research on UI issues. The federal ill Service 
uses the data to monitor the work of the states, to carry out ill research, to 
administer the system, and to ensure that federal UI program standards have 
been met. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the statistical 
arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, relies on the state employment and 
earnings reports for survey benchmarks, and it uses the UI tax records to 
form the universe of business establishments for sample surveys. 
In spite of these varied uses, little systematic attention has been given to 
the comparability, accuracy, and completeness of this rich data source. 
Indeed, the Council frequently found it impossible to obtain comparable state 
data for analyzing many of the questions it addressed. Further, only occa-
sional attention has been given to the format, editing standards, uniformity of 
data definition, completeness, and ease of computerized access to the base of 
information that flows from the UI system. 
These conditions are not surprising. Until recently, the informational 
value of administrative data was not universally recognized. Few have under-
stood the need for the precision and quality control that distinguish a statis-
tical database for research purposes from a program database that ensures the 
delivery of services. Today, data are increasingly used to monitor the econo-
my and to evaluate public policy, and the value of administrative program 
records as an efficient and cost-effective source of information with minimal 
need for additional reporting burden cannot be overlooked. To allow fuller 
utilization of this resource, the quality and comparability of these adminis-
trative data should be improved. 
Congress has already taken some steps to meet this need. In 1992, it 
required the BLS to determine procedures for creating a national longitudi-
nal wage record database with information on earnings, establishment and 
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industry classification, and geographic location of employment for all work-
ers covered by the ill system. This improved database will be extremely 
valuable for research, program evaluation, and statistical purposes. 
Nor should other survey-based sources of data about the UI system be 
overlooked. The BLS-sponsored Current Population Survey (CPS) provides 
a rich body of infonnation about the U.S. labor force, employment, and 
unemployment. The UI Service, which has occasionally sponsored special 
supplements of the CPS, should develop a careful plan for regular periodic 
supplements to collect detailed information on UI recipients. 
Another important survey source of data used for ill research is the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) , conducted by the 
Bureau of the Census. The SIPP provides an important longitudinal database 
that includes workers who receive UI benefits, as well as those who partici-
pate in other federal and state-sponsored programs. While the SIPP provides 
much important information about the behavior of UI recipients that is not 
available elsewhere, many researchers find it unwieldy and extremely diffi-
cult to use. It is important that SIPP data be made more accessible. 
In summary, the Council finds a need for a systematic and comprehensive 
system of administrative and survey data about the UI program for use in the fol-
lowing areas: (1) analytical research on the program's outcomes, (2) dev-
elopment of improvements in the program's conceptual design, and (3) enhance-
ment of the country's understanding of the labor market behavior of workers and 
employers covered by the program. In addition, there is significant need to 
improve the quality and timeliness of the ill tax reports, which fonn the universe 
for sample selection and the benchmark for many of the nation's most important 
statistical series. The Council finds that the federal government should be 
responsible for the design and oversight of a comprehensive UI infonnation 
system consisting of administrative and survey-based data that are comparable 
among all states. 
12. Recommendation 
The u.s. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service, with 
advice from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, should design the elements 
of a comprehensive information system of UI data that are comparable 
in definition and format for all states. Some of the elements that should 
be included are data on (1) coverage and eligibility by earnings level and 
by type of worker; (2) the elements of labor market attachment; (3) the 
levels and duration of benefits paid; (4) the extent and causes of non-
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monetary disqualifications; (5) labor market information at the nation-
al, state, and local levels; (6) the extent of forward funding of state trust 
funds; and (7) the quality, efficiency, and cost of program administration 
at both the federal and state levels. Each state should maintain its data-
base in accordance with U.S. Department of Labor requirements so that 
statistical standards, definitional comparability, and easy computer 
access for all users can be maintained. 
13. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service 
should continue to plan and sponsor biennial supplements to the 
Current Population Survey on UI issues. 
14. Recommendation 
Because of the importance of the quarterly report on employment and 
wages (the ES-202 report) to the measurement of the national income 
and product accounts, and because of the importance of UI tax records 
to the nation's system of sample surveys, the accuracy and statistical 
quality of these reports must be improved. Giving consideration to 
costs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with advice from the 
Unemployment Insurance Service, should establish standard proce-
dures that states should follow regarding the development of these 
data; establish magnetic-media format standards for computer com-
patibility and accessibility; and establish minimum requirements for 
editing, data quality, and timeliness. 
15. Recommendation 
As required by law, the Bureau of Labor Statistics should continue its 
work on the development of a National Wage Record Database. The 
Bureau should develop rules to protect the confidentiality of those 
workers and business establishments included in the database for pur-
poses of research and evaluation. Congress should provide legal pro-
tection to ensure this confidentiality. 
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Administrative Funding 
The Council finds that the nation's Unemployment Insurance system is 
subject to downward pressure because of the forces of interstate competi-
tion. It is imperative that the federal government exercise leadership to 
ameliorate these pressures. An important arena for such leadership con-
cerns the method by which the federal government allocates funds under 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) to the states for administering 
the UI system. Indeed, the critical importance of efficient administration 
was cited by the Committee on Economic Security in 1935 as the reason 
for originally assigning the cost of state administration of the UI program 
to the federal government. 
The mechanism for allocating FUTA funds to the states for administrative 
purposes should be as simple as possible, and should provide incentives to 
promote efficiency and quality in state administration. As currently con-
structed, however, the system of allocating administrative funds contains no 
such incentives. Funding levels are based roughly on the expected claims 
workload, on measures of time (generally based on manual processing) for 
administrative tasks, and on overhead costs. Under this formula, states with 
higher costs receive higher levels of reimbursements. 
More importantly, the formula provides no direct link between admin-
istrative funds and improvements in performance, and there are no overall 
quality measures related to funding decisions. In the Council's view, states 
that provide better services to claimants and employers by improving qual-
ity and efficiency should receive financial rewards for doing so. This might 
be achieved through a number of mechanisms, including the tying of 
administrative funding levels to state performance in certain essential areas 
and increasing the federal government's use of challenge or innovation 
grants to states. 
The Council finds that the appropriation of administrative funding on the 
basis of predicted workloads, reflecting economic conditions and increases in 
operating costs, is the method that best serves the needs of claimants, 
employers, and state agencies for reliable and predictable levels of adminis-
trative funding. These appropriations should be automatically adjusted to 
cover the costs of increased workload for claims above the predicted level. 
The Council affirms its concern that adequate amounts of dedicated FUTA 
payroll tax revenues be made available to state agencies and to the U.S. 
Department of Labor for their intended uses, and that appropriations of these 
funds not be limited by budgetary factors external to the VI system. 
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16. Recommendation 
Congress should appropriate FUTA trust funds in amounts adequate to 
fund state and federal UI activities on the basis of workload predictions 
using economic factors, with a contingency reserve provision to cover 
the costs of increased workloads arising during a fiscal year. 
17. Recommendation 
In order to support automation, development of one-stop services, 
and improvements in customer services, added state administrative 
funds beyond those needed for base funding should be provided 
through innovation grants by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
18. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should promptly review its current 
reporting and oversight requirements, in consultation with the states, 
and should reduce or eliminate requirements in areas in which state 
and national interests are not in conflict or in which federal responsi-
bilities are not directly related to a requirement. 
19. Recommendation 
States should be given greater flexibility to identify employers for tax 
auditing. As an incentive for more effective auditing, the federal gov-
ernment should permit states to retain 50 percent of any FUTA rev-
enues that are generated through state's redirected auditing activities. 
EXPERIENCE RATING AND FUNDING 
As the Council noted in its second annual report, the Unemployment In-
surance system's capacity to achieve one of its fundamental purposes-pro-
moting economic stability-rests on two key aspects of its funding mecha-
nism. First, the funding of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employ-
ers who have been responsible for greater demands on the system pay high-
er taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, 
during periods of prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then 
spent during periods of economic decline. 
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Empirical evidence indicates that experience rating helps discourage tem-
porary layoffs, thereby lowering the overall level of unemployment. In addi-
tion, the evidence suggests that experience-rated taxes are more effective 
than are flat taxes in influencing employer behavior in this regard. This may 
be because experience-rated taxes are borne primarily by employers, where-
as flat taxes are more easily passed on indirectly to employees or to con-
sumers. By assigning a greater share of the costs of the system to employers 
responsible for greater demands on it, a system of experience rating allocates 
costs more equitably among employers. Finally, experience rating gives 
employers an interest in ensuring that benefits are paid only to individuals 
who meet the program's eligibility criteria. 
Some members of the Council are concerned, however, with a number of 
aspects of the experience-rating system. First, such a system often imposes 
costs on firms precisely when they are in the weakest economic position. 
Second, under a system of experience rating, some employers might make 
excessive use of the appeals system. There is evidence that employers' 
appeals rates have increased in recent years and that they are losing a higher 
percentage of the appeals they file. Finally, the steady decline in the level of 
the taxable wage base in real dollars may have the effect of reducing the 
degree to which the system is experience-rated and forward-funded. 
Given these differing perspectives, the Council makes no recommenda-
tion with regard to experience rating within the VI system. 
With respect to the second key element of the VI system's funding-the 
accumulation of reserves during periods of prosperity--empirical evidence 
indicates that, holding all else constant, those states with higher taxable wage 
bases have higher VI trust fund reserves. Thus, in order to promote the for-
ward funding of the VI system-a federal responsibility-one of the most 
effective mechanisms is to raise the minimum taxable wage base. 
20. Recommendation 
The federal taxable wage base should be raised to $9,000, with an 
accompanying elimination of the two-tenths percentage point FUTA 
surcharge. The federal taxable wage base should be adjusted annually 
by the Employment Cost Index.* 
*Three members of the Council object to the first sentence of Recommendation 20, and five mem-
bers object to its second sentence. 
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3 / Federal and State Interests 
and Responsibilities 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal government [i.e., federalism] stands for multiplicity in unity. 
It can provide unity where unity is needed, but it can ensure also that 
there is variety and independence in matters where unity and unifor-
mity are not essential ... within this unity there is room under fed-
eralism for each region [state] to govern itself in its own way. This 
exercise in self-government is sufficiently valuable to be worth the 
cost it entails. [Wheare 1964, 244.] 
The appropriate assignment of responsibilities to the federal and state gov-
ernments in the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system has been debated 
since the inception of the system six decades ago. This chapter begins by 
examining some advantages and disadvantages of a federal-state program 
structure and then applies this analysis to the specific case of the UI system. 
Two objectives of the UI system that serve essential national interests are 
identified, and the pursuit of these objectives is then considered in determin-
ing the appropriate division of federal and state program responsibilities. The 
analysis ultimately leads to the identification of specific program compo-
nents that must be in place in order to preserve national interests in the areas 
of those two objectives, and the extent to which these interests are currently 
protected is discussed. 
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SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES IN A FEDERAL-STATE PROGRAM 
STRUCTURE 
Advantages of Assigning Significant Responsibilities to States 
A number of advantages accrue to the nation, to states, and to individual cit-
izens when federal and state governments share responsibilities in a program 
such as Unemployment Insurance. In deciding how best to divide such 
shared responsibilities among levels of government, it is important to con-
sider "the comparative advantage of each level of government" (Peterson, 
1995, 3). For example, among the advantages that derive from the assign-
ment of significant responsibilities to state governments, two are particular-
ly noteworthy. The first is that such assignment may lead to more rapid pol-
icy innovation than would otherwise occur. Thus, states can serve as so-
called laboratories of democracy (Weaver, 1995,2). In large pmt, this oppor-
tunity for more rapid policy innovation and improvement at the state level is 
a result of the likelihood that there are fewer barriers to adopting innovations 
in at least some state governments than there are at the national level. 
Another factor contributing to states' greater capacity for policy innovation 
and experimentation is simply the variety and the number of units (namely, 
states) within which policy experimentation can occur. 
The second noteworthy advantage that occurs from the assignment of sig-
nificant responsibilities to state governments relates to the ability of states to 
respond to local conditions and preferences. In this area, states have the clear 
advantage over a national government because they are more aware of local 
conditions and can usually respond to them more quickly. In addition, state-
by-state policy variations implicitly allow citizens to choose across states 
from a variety of tax and service packages. All else being equal, this allows 
more citizens to receive the particular policy package that they prefer (see 
Weaver 1995). 
Disadvantages of Significant State Policymaking Autonomy 
It is possible that, under some circumstances, the general advantages of sig-
nificant state autonomy in policymaking would be either partially or com-
pletely offset by other, destructive factors. Such disadvantages would most 
likely involve one of the following phenomena, both of which are funda-
mentally linked to the sharing of policy responsibilities. 
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First, there are policy matters in which national interests-that is, desired 
policy outcomes that would benefit the country as a whole-may naturally 
be hindered when states pursue their own interests through independent pol-
icymaking. These are matters in which there is no reason for state and nation-
al interests to coincide. If the particular national interest is determined to be 
essential-that is, if it transcends state interests-then it may be considered 
a matter in which "unity and uniformity" in state policies are indeed consid-
ered essential. Some form of national coordination would be necessary to 
protect the national interest in such a matter. 
Second, the general advantages of state independence in policymaking 
may be offset by disadvantages that arise directly from the interstate dynam-
ics inherent in autonomous state policymaking. Prominent among these 
structural disadvantages is the tendency for states to be forced onto a policy 
path of pernicious interstate competition, which, in its most extreme form, 
has been called a "race to the bottom."1 Weaver (1995, 5) describes this 
dynamic as "perhaps the most serious risk associated with federalism." In a 
benefit program, this path would typically emerge as states responded to 
interstate economic competition by taking actions that result in reduced tax 
rates. In most cases, such actions ultimately cause reductions in benefit 
expenditures.2 Such actions by a state are directed at attracting or retaining 
businesses, but they also create pressures on other, competing states to 
reduce their tax rates and associated benefits or services. 
As an example of this effect, the overall impact of external economic com-
petition with regard to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program has been described as "a powerful convergence factor that shapes 
policy outcomes. If a state's benefits are higher than those of its peers, pres-
sures increase on policymakers to adjust their benefits downward" (Peterson 
and Rom 1990, 81). Oates (1972, 225) suggests that this tendency may 
increase over time: "Public officials are likely to become increasingly sensi-
tive to tax competition among jurisdictions, which ... will result in less than 
efficient levels of output oflocal [state] public services ... inefficiencies asso-
ciated with decentralized taxation may become magnified over time." Thus, 
these pressures are likely to result in gradually increasing erosion of the rele-
vance, efficiency, or vitality of affected government programs.3 
Each state's wish to avoid a position of competitive disadvantage can also 
be seen in the focus of state policy considerations for a given program. 
Peterson and Rom (1990, 33-35) note that the debate about AFDC in one 
state during the 1980s foqused almost exclusively on the "business climate" 
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of the state: "In the debate over what the appropriate benefit levels should be, 
almost never did one hear moral questions concerning, for example, whether 
the poor 'deserve' welfare. Instead, the issues revolved around the conse-
quences for ... economic position." Thus, competitive economic pressures 
may channel state policy making efforts in different directions than they 
would take if interstate competition were not a factor. 
Balancing Responsibilities in a Federal-State Program 
Given the considerations discussed above, the federal government needs to 
pursue two courses of action simultaneously in order to maximize program 
efficiency while also preserving national interests in a given policy area. The 
two courses of action are these: 
1. It should foster the inherent advantages that accrue from assigning 
significant responsibility to the states. 
2. It should seek to minimize or prevent the emergence of phenomena 
that may threaten essential national interests. 
These joint endeavors would enable structural federal-state advantages and 
disadvantages to be balanced as positively and as efficiently as possible. The 
balance could be achieved perhaps most simply and directly by providing 
for significant state policymaking autonomy in most elements of a given 
policy area, but by explicitly limiting state policymaking autonomy in ele-
ments in which federal government coordination is necessary to secure basic 
national interests. 
FEDERAL-STATE ROLES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Throughout its history, the VI program has functioned through the broad 
sharing of powers between the federal government and state governments. 
Discussing the history of the program, Rubin (1990, 207) states that "unem-
ployment insurance thrived as a hybrid federal-state system. In no other fed-
eral program were responsibilities so thoroughly shared between two levels 
of government." He goes on to say, however, that "few public programs were 
as dependent on intergovernmental cooperation, and few generated as much 
intergovernmental discord. Rarely has a public program's organizational 
structure had such an important influence on its direction." 
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The presumption that the federal government should not intervene except 
in matters requiring uniformity has been cited as a foundation of the federal-
state governance of the UI system since its beginning. In establishing the 
program, Franldin D. Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security said: 
"The States shall have broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment 
compensation they wish. We believe that all matters in which uniformity is 
not absolutely essential should be left to the states" (quoted in Rubin 1990, 
208). Implicit in this statement is a recognition that essential matters requir-
ing uniformity should be regulated by the federal government. As discussed 
above, the identification of such essential matters with respect to the 
Unemployment Insurance system requires the identification of those pro-
gram functions (1) in which basic national interests are unlikely to be 
achieved through independent state policies, or (2) in which harmful inter-
state policy dynamics, such as pernicious competition, are likely to develop. 
Essential National Interests 
In a theoretical examination of federalism, Oates (1972) identifies three fun-
damental economic functions that he considers to be primary concerns of a 
national government: economic stabilization, equitable income redistribu-
tion, and the provision of certain public goods (that is, goods or services that 
benefit the entire nation but that are unlikely to be provided by state or local 
governments). The three functions identified by Oates as national interests 
within a structure of federalism relate most directly to two specific functions, 
or objectives, of the Unemployment Insurance system: economic stabiliza-
tion and wage replacement. 
Economic Stabilization 
The stabilization of the macro economy is an objective of the Unemployment 
Insurance system that transcends the interests of each individual state. The 
UI system functions as an automatic economic stabilizer in the American 
economy by increasing consumption during economic downturns (see, e.g., 
Gruber 1994). The UI system represents one of the nation's largest automat-
ic economic stabilizers. 
The statement of purpose for the UI system prepared by the Advisory 
Council on Unemployment Compensation enunciates this function: "the sys-
tem should accumulate adequate funds during periods of economic health in 
order to promote economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing 
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power during economic downturns" (ACVC 1995, 8). The national interest 
in economic stabilization thus encompasses the economic stabilization func-
tion of the VI system-specifically, there is a national interest in maintaining 
the capacity of the VI system to provide countercyclical stimulation at an 
efficient leve1.4 
Insurance and Wage Replacement 
The VI system provides workers with insurance against the risk of involun-
tary unemployment by replacing a percentage of the wages of eligible unem-
ployed individuals.s The ACVC's statement of purpose for the UI system 
cites this as the most fundamental function of the system: "The most impor-
tant objective of the V.S. system of Unemployment Insurance is the provi-
sion of temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right to involun-
tarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior attachment to 
the labor force" (ACUC 1995, 8). 
Insurance principles hold that the provision of insurance requires a capac-
ity to pool risks across individuals.6 Economically efficient levels of insur-
ance and risk pooling cannot be provided when external pressures erode the 
mechanisms through which insurance is provided. Indeed, prior to federal 
actions in the 1930s that changed existing incentives, pressures against the 
provision of such insurance at the state level were so great that only one state, 
Wisconsin, provided even limited insurance against unemployment, and vol-
untary private insurance was extremely limited (Blaustein 1993, 108).7 
Overall, therefore, there is a national interest in the federal government's 
acting to protect the UI system's function of providing insurance through the 
replacement of wages. In the absence of federal action, the insurance nature 
of the system is jeopardized, resulting in the inefficient prov,ision of insur-
ance and/or in insurance benefits being unavailable to a large percentage of 
the unemployed who are covered. 
The Need for Federal Protection of Essential National Interests 
As discussed in the previous section, the functioning of the UI system affects 
two areas in which there is an essential national interest that requires protec-
tion by the federal government. Either the national interests in these areas are 
not fully consistent with independent state interests, or they may be threatened 
by the pernicious effects of interstate economic competition. Some fmID of 
federal government action, such as establishing program standards or creating 
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new incentives, represents the only means of assuring that these basic inter-
ests are not neglected as states pursue their own interests independently. 
Consistency of National and State Interests 
The question of the consistency of national and state interests is primarily rel-
evant in regard to the national interest in economic stabilization, where there 
is little or no theoretical correlation between national and state interests. 
Although the states have no inceh1iVe :fOr-uIldermining the national macro-
economic stabilization function of the UI system, neither have they any 
incentive to take action to promote that goal. Oates (1972) suggests that state 
governments, left to their own devices, possess neither the capacity nor the 
will to achieve any economic stabilization functions effectively. 
By its very nature, state policymaking is a function of state and local inter-
ests. As such, it bears little, if any, relationship to national interests. Thus, 
there is no reason to expect that the outcome of 53 independent sets of poli-
cymaking decisions would resemble the system that would most efficiently 
stabilize the macroeconomy during periods of recession. "Since [residents of 
different states] gain from macroeconomic stability and since their gain is 
ignored by individual states when designing their UI systems, individual 
states are likely to underprovide benefits" (Davidson and Martin 1995, 8). 
Thus, if the UI system is to function efficiently as a national economic stabi-
lizer, significant federal policy coordination is necessary. 
Potential for Pernicious Interstate Policy Competition 
The impact of interstate policy competition is most relevant with regard to 
the national interest in providing insurance through the replacement of 
wages. It is this goal that is most likely to be adversely affected by pressures 
on states to reduce taxes, including UI taxes. Weaver (1995,9) states that per-
nicious competition is most likely to develop in circumstances similar to 
those that exist in the UI system, where "deviation from the norm ... places 
those states at a distinct competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other states with 
regard to tax rates." One theoretical analysis suggests that, as a result of inter-
state economic competition, "inefficiently low levels of UI benefits will be 
provided" (Hoyt 1995, 10). 
As early as 1935, the Committee on Economic Security recognized the 
impact that a UI system would have on a state's business climate. The com-
mittee noted that, in the absence of any federal action, competitive business 
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advantages would accrue to states that did not have an unemployment insur-
ance program in place: "So long as there is danger that businesses in some 
states will gain a competitive advantage through failure of the state to enact 
an unemployment insurance law, few such laws will be enacted" (quoted in 
Rubin 1990, 209). As a result, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
was explicitly structured to ensure that a competitive business disadvantage 
would result for those states that did not enact a UI program. 
Within the structure established by these FUTA provisions, then, compet-
itive business advantages accrue to states in which a UI program exists, but 
in which it also costs the least. Costs can be minimized and UI taxes kept low 
by restricting eligibility or by paying a low level of benefits. Thus, states 
seeking to improve their business climate do have strong incentives to reduce 
UI costs relative to other states. Because these circumstances affect all states, 
simply by pursuing their own interests, states can inadvertently be drawn into 
pernicious competition. 
It should also be noted that the external economic pressures for lower 
state UI taxes have a direct effect even on states generally disposed toward 
maintaining benefit or eligibility levels. All else being equal, if a state 
reduced taxes, its neighboring states would have to lower theirs just to stay 
at the same relative level of competition. Maintaining the status quo in such 
a case would result in the deterioration of a state's competitive position. 
TWO AREAS FOR DIRECT FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE UI SYSTEM 
As discussed, the two primary areas of concern regarding state policymaking 
autonomy in the UI system are (1) that efficient economic stabilization can-
not be achieved without a coordinated federal policy, and (2) that, given the 
nature of the UI system, states could be forced into destructive interstate 
competition in the absence of federal coordination, jeopardizing the provi-
sion of insurance and the replacement of wages. This section focuses on the 
primary components of the Ul system that must be protected in order to pre-
serve essential national interests through UI. 
Elements Necessary to Preserve the System's Economic 
Stabilization Capacity 
To ensure the capacity of the ur system to stabilize the economy during peri-
ods of economic downturn, four components should be in place: 
FEDERAL AND STATE INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES /31 
1. Each state must have an Unemployment Insurance program. 
2. The state programs should be forward-funded with independent trust 
funds to ensure that the national ur system has the capacity to inject 
additional money into the economy during recessionary periods. 
3. State benefit levels should be high enough to support efficient eco-
nomic stabilization efforts. 
4. Systems should be in place for monitoring and analyzing labor mar-
ket conditions, and any existing supplemental fiscal mechanism for 
countering national or regional economic downturns (for example, 
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding) should be 
maintained at a national level. 
These components are discussed in detail below. 
Ensuring the Existence of State VI Programs 
For any national goals to be achieved by a federal-state ur system, all of the 
states must actually have programs in place. The incentive in FUTA for states 
to enact and maintain unemployment insurance laws is the provision that 
gives employers a substantial FUTA tax credit if they pay state ur taxes in a 
state that meets certain minimum federal standards regarding the state's ur 
program. As noted above, before FUTA was passed, all responsibility for pro-
viding unemployment insurance had been left to the states, but only 
Wisconsin had implemented even a limited system. This same FUTA provi-
sion has continued to ensure the existence of ur programs in all states and 
has also provided the federal government with powerful leverage for ensur-
ing that the laws of a state continue to adhere to federal guidelines, including 
those implemented after the creation of the state's ur program. 
Maintaining Forward Funding 
The capacity of the ur system for economic stabilization is dependent upon 
the extent to which it is forward-funded. Under pay-as-you-go financing, 
which prevails today in many state ur systems, few reserves are available to 
stimulate the economy when needed because trust funds are not being built 
up during periods of economic health. Thus, to secure and strengthen the eco-
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nomic stabilization capacity of the system, either standards or incentives for 
states to increase the level of forward funding in the system are necessary. 
The ACVC recommended the adoption of such incentives in its 1995 report. 8 
Maintaining Benefit Levels 
The economic stabilization capacity of the VI system is directly related to the 
actual level of VI benefits. The higher the level of benefits paid out, the 
greater the stimulus to the economy. Thus, any factors that reduce the levels 
of benefits paid to unemployed individuals have a direct impact on the pro-
gram's stabilization capacity. Many such factors are related to interstate eco-
nomic competition, and are discussed in the next major section. 
Monitoring Labor Market Conditions and Maintaining 
Supplemental Stabilization Mechanisms 
To ensure the efficiency of any economic stabilization efforts, there must be 
systems in place for monitoring and analyzing labor market conditions. 
Although states are well suited for monitoring conditions within their bor-
ders, national and regional unemployment conditions can be monitored most 
efficiently at the national level. 
Any supplemental countercyclical mechanisms (such as the Extended 
Benefits program) created to address acute labor market conditions at the 
national or regional level should also be maintained by the national govern-
ment. This allows for more efficient stabilization through the pooling of 
macroeconomic risk. When reserves are combined, lower levels of total 
reserves are required to counter an economic downturn in any given state. 
For example, if the economy in one state-say, Colorado-encounters diffi-
culty, reserves collected from other states and deposited in the Extended 
Benefits fund can be injected into the Colorado economy. In another year, 
funds originating in Colorado may contribute to the stabilization of the econ-
omy of another state. For each state to provide this level of protection for 
itself independently, state trust fund reserves would have to be much higher 
than when risks are pooled across states. Similarly, by providing for federal 
contingency funds for administrative expenses, risks can be more efficiently 
pooled across states than if each state ran its program in isolation. 
For a supplemental system to be effective, the federal government must 
ensure that it is funded sufficiently to allow efficient economic stabilization 
and stimulation during recessions. There is abundant evidence that the 
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Extended Benefits system no longer achieves this function (see ACUC 
1994). The ACUC made recommendations in 1994 for reforming this system 
(see Appendix E in this volume). 
Elements Necessary to Prevent Pernicious Interstate Competition 
As discussed, the ultimate effect of interstate economic competition on the UI 
program, as currently structured, is likely to be a reduction in UI tax rates. Such 
tax rate reductions could come about through reductions in three primary areas: 
eligibility standards, benefit levels, and administrative services (for example, 
the benefit delivery and appeals systems). At the same time, tax reductions 
themselves could necessitate reductions in these areas, as discussed below. 
Maintaining Eligibility Standards and Benefit Levels 
If a state's tax rates were reduced, in the absence of any other change the state 
would ultimately find that its UI expenses also had to be reduced. Since the 
vast majority of UI program expenses are benefit payments, the easiest way 
to reduce costs would be to restrict eligibility in some way or to reduce ben-
efit payments. Restrictive actions in either area would have the same cost 
effect: costs would be reduced. Thus, these two program areas would be 
expected to be affected most directly by interstate economic competition.9 
Reductions in either area would also threaten both of the essential national 
interests in the UI program. To the extent that benefits or eligibility were 
reduced, the economic stabilization capacity of the program would be weak-
ened and the wage replacement function would be eroded. 
The most direct means of protecting these two national interests from the 
threat brought about by interstate competition would be the imposition of 
some form of minimum benefit and eligibility standards, or the establishment 
of incentives for states to protect benefit and eligibility levels. Currently, no 
such federal standards or incentives exist. 
Maintaining Quality Administrative Services 
Interstate economic competition can also affect program components either 
than benefits or eligibility. Benefit delivery, appeals, and other administrative 
services, if left to the states, could be curtailed in an effort to cut UI-related 
taxes. Davidson and Martin (1995,5) suggest that "there are a variety of rea-
sons to expect that states would prefer to offer a system of lower quality than 
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the Federal government would desire-the interests of the states and the 
Federal government are likely to diverge." A recognition of the need to 
"encourage efficient administration, without which unemployment insurance 
will fail" was cited by the Committee on Economic Security as the primary 
reason for assigning the cost of state administrative services to the federal 
government (Rubin 1983,26). 
Thus, administrative funding responsibility rests at the federal level. 
Nonetheless, the quality of services is not necessarily ensured by this arrange-
ment. Davidson and Martin (1995) suggest an alternative system in which 
states are permitted to keep any funds that are allocated but unspent, and in 
which the federal government measures and rewards quality administration. 
CONCLUSIONS: SPECIFIC AREAS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
Currently, the federal government partially shapes policy in numerous ill 
program areas. Some of these areas, as discussed in the chapter, are related 
to the preservation of essential national interests. This discussion identified 
specific program areas in which federal policy coordination is likely to be 
necessary to protect the economic stabilization and wage replacement func-
tions, even in a UI system where many program responsibilities reside at the 
state level. Combining the components necessary for each of the two func-
tions, five general areas can be identified in which state policy alone is 
unlikely to protect the fundamental functions of the system: 10 
1. The federal government should ensure the existence of a UI system. 
This function is currently carried out fully by the federal government. 
2. The federal government should ensure that the system is forward-
funded. This function is not currently being carried out. (The 
Council's recommendations on forward funding from the 1995 
ACUC report are reprinted in Appendix F in this volume.) 
3. Thefederal government should monitor labor market conditions and 
maintain supplemental UI systems. Currently, the federal govern-
ment does monitor labor market conditions. Further, a supplemental 
benefits program, Extended Benefits, exists, but its effectiveness has 
diminished considerably over time. (The Council's recommenda-
tions on Extended Benefits from the 1994 ACUC report are reprint-
ed in Appendix E in this volume, and its recommendations on data 
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needs in monitoring labor market conditions are presented in 
Chapter 2 of this 1996 report.) 
4. The federal government should protect benefit and eligibility levels. 
It does not currently carry out this function. (The Council's recom-
mendations on replacement rates-that is, on benefit levels-and on 
monetary requirements for establishing eligibility from the 1995 
ACUC report appear in Appendix F). 
5. The federal government should ensure quality and efficiency in pro-
gram administration. It partially carries out this responsibility at the 
present time. (The Council's recommendations on this issue are includ-
ed in Chapter 2 of this 1996 report. The issue is also discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.) 
NOTES 
1. Other harmful policy paths that Weaver (1994) suggests may result from federal-state 
responsibility sharing are federal-state competition, policy preemption, and evasion of 
responsibility. The likelihood that anyone of these paths would be followed is a function 
of the characteristics of a specific policy area and relevant institutional an·angements. 
Alternatively, circumstances may dictate that other, positive policy paths emerge from 
federal-state responsibility sharing. In addition to a general trend toward policy experi-
mentation, innovation, and emulation, positive competition may develop between the fed-
eral and state governments, resulting in effOlts to implement policies in a timely manner. 
2. Over the long term, benefit payments and tax revenues must be approximately equal. 
Thus, reductions in benefits would tend to result in reduced taxes, and reduced taxes 
would tend to necessitate benefit reductions. Thus, changes in either benefits or taxes 
would tend to affect the other as well. 
3. With regard to the Unemployment Insurance program, there is evidence that some 
components of the system have eroded over time. See Chapter 4 in this volume for addi-
tional information. 
4. Application of Oates's conceptual framework to the UI system suggests that econom-
ic stabilization is also one component of the public good that the system provides. 
5. While UI is essentially a social insurance program, it does maintain some elements of 
income redistribution through its partial emphasis on "social adequacy principles" (that is, 
its emphasis on providing the unemployed with benefits related to their presumed needs). 
There are a number of examples of this pursuit of social adequacy in the UI program, 
reflecting an assumption that individuals with lower incomes require a higher proportion 
of income for necessities than do workers with higher incomes. For example, in some 
states, benefit formulas are set in order to ensure that lower-wage workers receive a high-
er percentage of their previous wages in benefits than higher-wage workers do. In addi-
tion, all states set a maximum weekly benefit amount, meaning that for all workers at the 
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benefit ceiling, replacement rates are progressively lower as previous wages increase. 
Further, 13 states provide additional benefits ("dependent allowances") for UI recipients 
who have dependents. 
6. In the UI system, risks are also partially pooled across employers through the social-
izing of some UI costs. 
7. By this time, England and Germany had already implemented compulsory unemploy-
ment insurance systems. England's system had been in place since 1911. 
8. See the Council's 1995 Recommendations 2 through 7, reprinted in Appendix F of this 
report. 
9. Weaver (1995) notes that, in programs in which standards are set in nominal dollars 
(which is the case in many states' ill programs), competition may have the more subtle 
effect of states simply not adjusting benefit or eligibility standards for inflation. 
10. Four of the federal responsibilities correspond generally to those identified by the 
Committee on Economic Security in 1935: providing an incentive to create and maintain 
a system of unemployment insurance, protecting UI reserves, ensuring efficient program 
administration, and providing program standards in areas in which uniformity is consid-
ered essential (Rubin 1990,209). 
One additional responsibility might be added: maintaining a supplemental component 
of the Unemployment Insurance system that would act as an additional countercyclical 
mechanism in times of economic recession. It is likely that this responsibility was not 
explicitly addressed by the 1935 committee because the economic theories that suggest 
this as an important federal responsibility had not yet been widely accepted. 
4 / The Evolution of 
Unemployment Insurance 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system's direct capacity to serve workers 
can be measured through a number of varied dimensions. These worker-
oriented dimensions include the percentage of the workforce that is covered 
under the system, the percentage of unemployed individuals who are eligible 
to receive benefits, the percentage of the unemployed who actually receive 
benefits, the percentage of UI recipients' lost earnings that are replaced by 
unemployment benefits, and the potential duration of benefits. 
The system's performance on some of these measures has changed dra-
matically since the inception of the UI system in the 1930s. For example, the 
percentage of the workforce covered by the program has increased signifi-
cantly over time, whereas the percentage of the unemployed who actually 
receive benefits has exhibited a steady decrease over the long term. Still 
other measures, such as the potential duration of benefits, have remained rel-
atively constant decade after decade. 
Taken altogether, these trends reflect the evolution of the UI system. They 
indicate the direction in which it is moving and where it can be expected to go 
in the future. They show the areas in which the system serves the unemployed 
well and those in which its relevance and responsiveness have declined. These 
trends also reveal changes in some areas that can help identify larger forces and 
dynamics that could affect the functioning of the UI system. 
This chapter has two objectives. First, it provides information about var-
ious measures of the generosity and relevance of the UI system and about 
their change over time. Whenever possible, this information is based on 
aggregate time series data. When this is not possible, cross-section informa-
tion is provided from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
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(SIPP), conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The SIPP data are then used 
as the basis for estimating changes in VI generosity throughout the 1980s. 
Second, the chapter explores two possible causes of the system's long-
term decline in some dimensions-particularly the decline in VI recipiency 
(the percentage of the unemployed who actually receive benefits). The first 
of these possible causes is the existence of incentives for states to engage in 
cost-shifting-that is, to shift low-wage individuals from ill (with benefits 
fully financed by the states) to means-tested programs such as AFDC (with 
benefits heavily subsidized by the federal government). The second possible 
cause of the decline in ill recipiency (which could adversely affect other 
measures as well) is the existence of incentives for states to compete with one 
another by reducing VI payroll taxes in an attempt to attract and retain 
employers and jobs. (See the discussion of this problem in Chapter 3.) Little 
empirical research has yet been conducted regarding the existence and the 
effects of these dynamics. 1 
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. The next section discusses trends in 
coverage and eligibility. The section on "Benefit Receipt" then reviews the 
evidence on trends in VI recipiency, briefly summarizes the econometric lit-
erature that has examined these trends, and concludes by providing evidence 
on the magnitude and effect of the cost-shifting phenomenon. The next sec-
tion discusses trends in replacement rates and potential duration of benefits, 
and is followed by a section on trends in VI tax rates that provides empirical 
evidence of the existence of interstate competition in the setting of these 
rates. The final section summarizes the findings of the chapter. Additional 
detail and technical information on the analyses presented in Chapter 4 are 
provided in Appendix A. 
COVERAGE AND ELIGIBILITY 
Coverage 
The percentage of the labor force that is covered under the VI system is 
defined as the percentage of jobs for which an employer pays ill taxes on a 
portion of a worker's wages. An employer who is required to pay ill taxes 
must pay taxes for all employees. Thus, whether or not a worker is covered 
under the VI system is fully dependent on whether or not federal or state law 
requires the worker's particular employer(s) to pay VI taxes, as discussed 
below. If a worker who is covered becomes involuntarily unemployed, that 
worker can receive VI benefits if he or she meets all monetary and nonmon-
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etary eligibility requirements. Coverage is thus a precondition for eligibility, 
since workers who are not covered cannot receive benefits even if they meet 
all eligibility requirements. 
When the VI system was created in 1935 by the Social Security Act 
(amended by the Federal Vnemployment Tax Act in 1939), federal law 
required employers in only industry or commerce to be subject to VI taxes, 
and then only if they employed eight or more workers during at least 20 
weeks of the year.2 Among the effects of the initial federal coverage provi-
sions was the exclusion from coverage of workers in small firms, workers in 
agriculture and the public sector, and seasonal workers.3 
Since the VI program's inception, federal law has been amended on a 
number of occasions, always in the direction of extending coverage to groups 
that had been excluded under the original law. Coverage was first expanded 
in 1954, to include employees of all commercial or industrial employers with 
four or more workers. 
In 1970 the law was amended again, requiring employers to pay VI taxes 
if they employ one or more workers during at least 20 weeks of the year, or 
have a payroll of at least $1,500 in any calendar quarter. The 1970 UI amend-
ments also extended coverage to employees of nonprofit organizations that 
employ four or more workers.4 Through a combination of 1970 and 1976 UI 
amendments, coverage was extended to all employees of state and local gov-
ernments.s In addition, the 1976 amendments extended coverage to some 
agricultural workers.6 A number of other, minor extensions in coverage have 
occurred since the creation of the UI program.7 
Overall, as a result of extensions since the beginning of the program, VI 
coverage today is nearly universal. As Figure 4-1 indicates, coverage has 
been extended to more than 90 percent of all civilian employees in the Vnited 
States. Almost 98 percent of wage and salaried employees are now covered.8 
By this measure, the VI system has clearly become relevant to the needs of a 
larger percentage of workers than it was at the beginning of the program. 
Eligibility 
Eligibility among unemployed workers who are covered under the VI system 
is based on a combination of factors. Monetary eligibility requirements are 
designed to ensure that those who receive VI benefits had a substantial 
attachment to the labor force prior to their unemployment.9 These monetary 
requirements, which vary from state to state, typically have three compo-
nents. First, earnings during the "base period," which is defined in most 
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states to be the first four of the most recently completed five calendar quar-
ters, must exceed some minimum level. Second, most states also have some 
form of a "high-earnings" requirement, which specifies a minimum level of 
earnings that an individual must have within some specified amount of time 
(often this requirement must be met during one calendar quarter in the base 
period).10 Third, most states require that an individual have earnings in at 
least two of the four base period calendar quarters. 
Three nonmonetary requirements are designed generally to ensure that a 
UI recipient is involuntarily unemployed (that is, was laid off from work) or 
voluntarily left work for good cause, is available for work, and is actively 
seeking work. The first of these conditions (along with the monetary eligibil-
ity requirements) determines whether an unemployed worker initially quali-
fies for benefits; the second and third of these conditions must be satisfied on 
a continuing basis throughout an unemployment spell. If they are not satisfied 
in any given week, the worker is ineligible to receive benefits for that week. 
Blank and Card (1991) provide the only information available on what per-
centage of the unemployed meet their state's eligibility criteria. Using repeat-
ed cross-sections from the Current Population Survey (CPS), they calculate 
that 43 percent of the unemployed meet eligibility requirements. Further, they 
conclude that there was little change in eligibility between 1977 and 1987. 
One of the disadvantages of using the CPS to estimate eligibility is that it 
does not contain sufficient retrospective earnings data to allow UI eligibility 
to be calculated with a high degree of accuracy. The Survey of Income and 
Program Participation provides the best available data for this purpose, since 
it includes monthly longitudinal earnings records as well as a number of 
other variables that could affect eligibility. While neither the CPS nor the 
SIPP contains enough detail to simulate nonmonetary eligibility, both data-
bases identify whether or not an unemployed individual was laid off from his 
or her job. It is possible to approximate nonmonetary eligibility with this 
information, since the vast majority of those on layoff would meet their 
state's nonmonetary eligibility requirements (while the majority of those who 
quit their job would not). 
Table 4-1 summarizes the results from eligibility simulations using the 
1990 SIPP.lI Overall, in 1990, 61.4 percent of the unemployed satisfied their 
state's monetary eligibility requirements; percentages ranged from 41.5 per-
cent of unemployed black females to 69.7 percent of unemployed white 
males. The second row of Table 4-1 reports the percentage of the unem-
ployed who lost (rather than quit) their jobs and met their states' monetary 
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TABLE 4-1. Results of SIPP Simulations: Percentage of 
Unemployed Individuals Who Satisfied Their State's UI Monetary 
Eligibility Requirements in 1990 and 1978 
Women Men 
Total White Black White Black 
----- -------------
1990 Monetary Eligibility 
(assumes 1990 demographics) 61.4 58.3 41.5 69.7 56.3 
1990 Monetary Eligibility, 
Job Loscrs Only 50.9 44.4 33.0 60.5 51.1 
1978 Monetary Eligibility 
(assumes 1990 demographics) 63.6 60.9 43.1 71.8 58.0 
1990 Monctary Eligibility 
(assumes 1978 demographics) 55.0 54.0 36.6 62.4 48.1 
Changes in UI Eligibility Between 
1978 and 1990 Resulting from: 
Changes in States' Monetary 
Eligibility Rules -2.2 -2.6 -1.6 -2.1 -1.7 
Demographic Shifts 6.4 4.3 4.9 7.3 8.2 
Net Effects of Changes 4.2 1.7 3.3 5.2 6.5 
NOTES: See the discussion of this table in the text of this chapter and in footnote 1l. Also see 
Appendix A in this volume, thc section entitled "SIPP Analysis." The number of unweighted unem-
ployment spells used in the analyses was 8,158 (32.6 million weighted). This table includes individ-
uals who were simulated as being monetarily ineligible but who were reported as receiving UI ben-
efits. The "total" column includes some individuals whose race was not identified as white or black. 
SOURCE: Analysis of unemployment spells between 1989 and 1992, using the 1990 SIPP Full Panel 
Research File and Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module (described in Appendix A). 
eligibility standards for UI. These figures, which are the most directly com-
parable to Blank and Card's (1991) evidence, suggest that 50.9 percent of the 
unemployed are eligible for VI (a somewhat higher percentage than was indi-
cated by Blank and Card's analysis of CPS data). 
The eligibility simulations were repeated, applying 1978 (rather than 
1990) state monetary eligibility rules to the individuals in the 1990 SIPP. The 
results, which are reported in the third row of Table 4-1, indicate that, hold-
ing the demographic composition of the labor force constant, the percentage 
of the unemployed who met their state's monetary eligibility requirements 
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declined by 2.2 percent between 1978 and 1990. Once again, theSIPP simu-
lations produce higher rates of eligibility than those found by Blank and Card 
(1991), suggesting that the CPS may underestimate UI eligibility. 
A variety of changes in federal law in the 1980s contributed to the decline 
in eligibility between 1978 and 1990. First, prompted by the intense borrow-
ing of many states when their trust fund balances were negative, the federal 
government began to charge interest on loans not repaid within one year. 
Second, states could defer these interest payments if they adopted and main-
tained cost-cutting and tax-increasing measures. In addition, states were 
given other direct incentives, linked to federal Extended Benefits funds, to 
tighten eligibility requirements (ACVC 1994). 
As a result of these changes in federal law, as well as voluntary state 
responses to trust fund insolvency, many states raised their monetary eligi-
bility requirements in the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1987,35 states increased 
the minimum-earnings requirements (in inflation-adjusted terms) needed to 
qualify for UI benefits (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). The average 
increase among these states was 63 percent, whereas the rate of inflation for 
wages and salaries was less than half of that (31 percent). Evidence suggests 
that these changes were linked to levels of state trust funds, because the 
largest increases in earnings requirements were observed in states that had 
the largest decreases in their trust fund balances. 12 As with most changes in 
eligibility standards, these changes were most likely to affect low-wage 
workers, part-time workers, and individuals with sporadic work histories. 
Three changes occurred in the demographics of the unemployed popula-
tion between 1978 and 1990: (1) men were a larger proportion of the unem-
ployed population in 1990 (55 percent) than in 1978 (51 percent). (2) The 
proportion of the unemployed who were white declined slightly (from 76 to 
74 percent), and the proportion of minorities increased slightly (from 24 to 
26 percent). (3) The unemployed population became older between 1978 and 
1990. For example, 49 percent of the unemployed were between ages 16 and 
24 in 1978, and only 35 percent of the unemployed were in that same age 
group in 1990. The fourth row of Table 4-1 reports the percentage of the 
unemployed population that would have been monetarily eligible for VI ben-
efits in 1990 if the demographics of the unemployed population (including 
the age distribution) had been the same in 1990 as in 1978. These calcula-
tions indicate that the demographic changes between 1978 and 1990 con-
tributed to an increase in monetary eligibility. 
The final three rows of Table 4-1 report the changes in UI eligibility that 
result from changes in demographics and changes in states' monetary eligi-
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bility rules. Demographic shifts (the aging and gender/race mix of the unem-
ployed population) contributed to an increase in the percentage of the unem-
ployed who are eligible for UI. This increase, however, was partially offset 
by changes in states' monetary eligibility requirements. 
BENEFIT RECEIPT 
Two statistics have been used most frequently to measure receipt of 
Unemployment Insurance. The fIrst is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment 
Rate (IUR) to the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR),13 and the second is the 
ratio of UI claimants (IU) to total unemployment (TU). Both ratios are based 
on a measure of the number of UI claimants, which is collected by each state 
on a weekly basis. The two ratios, which are highly correlated (see Figure 4-2), 
converge as the percentage of the workforce that is covered by UI increases. 14 
A third measure of recipiency is used for the following reason. The total 
number of claimants includes some individuals who do not receive UI bene-
fits but who are counted among the insured unemployed for any given week. 
These individuals are mostly in three groups: (1) those who are on a one-
week waiting period before the beginning of their benefit spell; (2) claimants 
who are ultimately denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons; and (3) 
claimants who are disqualified from collecting benefits in a given week 
either because they are not able and available to work or because earnings 
from a part-time or temporary job exceed a given level. The inclusion of 
these groups has tended to inflate the measure of UI recipiency by 10 to 15 
percent per year. Thus, the third measure of recipiency-actual weeks com-
pensated as a percentage of total unemployment-excludes claimants who 
do not receive benefits in any given week (see Figure 4-2). 
Trends in Recipiency 
UI recipiency is highly cyclical. The measure increases sharply during reces-
sions, because a higher percentage of the unemployed have lost (rather than 
quit) jobs, and are therefore more likely to meet nonmonetary eligibility 
requirements. In addition to cyclical movements, there have been two note-
worthy trends in the level of benefIt receipt. According to each of the three 
measures of recipiency just discussed, two signifIcant trends emerge with 
respect to the percentage of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits 
under regular state programs. The fIrst is a long-term trend in which the national 
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TABLE 4-2. Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Claimants to Total 
Unemployment, by State, 1995 
State IU!TU State IU!TU 
Rhode Island 65.0 Nebraska 31.5 
Alaska 61.7 Maryland 31.1 
Vermont 58.6 West Virginia 29.7 
Oregon 54.2 Missouri 28.7 
Washington 52.1 Kentucky 28.6 
Hawaii 51.0 Ohio 28.6 
Connecticut 49.0 Michigan 28.3 
Idaho 47.4 South Carolina 28.1 
Pennsylvania 46.1 Colorado 27.9 
Wisconsin 43.6 Tennessee 27.6 
Arkansas 42.1 North Carolina 26.1 
Montana 41.6 Arizona 25.7 
Massachusetts 41.5 Kansas 25.2 
New York 41.3 Mississippi 25.2 
Delaware 41.1 New Mexico 24.3 
Maine 39.2 Florida 23.8 
New Jersey 39.0 New Hampshire 22.5 
California 37.5 Alabama 22.0 
Illinois 37.2 South Dakota 21.4 
Wyoming 35.5 Utah 21.4 
District of Columbia 34.9 Texas 21.1 
Minnesota 34.6 Oklahoma 21.0 
North Dakota 34.5 Georgia 20.6 
Nevada 34.4 Louisiana 20.0 
Puerto Rico 33.7 Indiana 19.4 
Iowa 33.3 Virginia 17.6 
NOTES: Data for the Virgin Islands are not available. Data are for the second quarter of calendar 
year 1995. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995c). 
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TABLE 4-3. Percentage of Monetarily Eligible Job Losers Who 
Receive UI Benefits, by State, 1989-1991 
State Percentage of State Percentage of 
Eligible Recipients Eligible Recipients 
Arizona 32.3 Tennessee 59.1 
Maryland 40.8 Minnesota 61.0 
North Carolina 47.2 California 61.2 
Texas 49.3 Wisconsin 63.9 
Indiana 50.5 Washington 64.0 
Georgia 51.3 Ohio 65.4 
South Carolina 51.9 Virginia 65.8 
Florida 52.0 Oregon 67.1 
Oklahoma 54.5 Massachusetts 69.5 
Michigan 55.1 New York 69.6 
Missouri 55.5 Pennsylvania 73.8 
Mississippi 56.0 West Virginia 78.6 
Illinois 57.9 New Jersey 80.1 
Louisiana 59.0 Connecticut 82.5 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using the SIPP for those states with a sample of at least 30 job losers 
for whom monetary eligibility could be simulated. 
recipiency percentage has declined slowly and consistently since the 1940s-
despite the increase in coverage of workers during that time. The second is a 
more recent trend in which the recipiency percentage dipped dramatically 
between 1980 and 1984. By 1984, the number of ill claimants as a percentage 
of total unemployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded per-
centage since data were first collected in 1947. The ratio increased slightly 
after 1984, but it has remained lower than its historical average. 
Further, as indicated in Table 4-2, recipiency measures vary not just over 
time, but also across states. The ratio of claimants to total unemployed ranged 
from a low of 17.6 percent in Virginia to a high of65.0 percent in Rhode Island 
during the second quarter of 1995. Additional estimates from the SIPP, report-
ed in Table 4-3, indicate substantial variation across the states in the percent-
age of monetarily eligible job losers who actually receive ill benefits. 
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Research on the Long-Term Decline in Recipiency 
Burtless and Saks (1984) suggest that a primary cause of the long-term decline 
in the ratio of VI claimants to the total number of unemployed (IUrrV) before 
1980 was the changing demographic composition of the jobless. Throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s, as many women and young workers from the baby boom 
generation entered the labor force, they also became a higher percentage of the 
unemployed. As a result, men of prime working age, who are statistically the 
most likely to receive VI benefits, declined considerably as a percentage of the 
unemployed. Burtless and Saks find that such demographic changes explain a 
large percentage of the decline in the IUrrv ratio before 1980. The shift of 
workers from manufacturing and other industries with high VI recipiency rates 
was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a primary cause of the long-term 
decline in recipiency, although they report that it is quite difficult to estimate 
with precision the magnitude of this effect. 
Research on the Recent Decline in Recipiency 
While there is still considerable inconsistency in the findings from research 
examining the decline in VI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s, the 
following factors have emerged as the most common explanations of this 
short-term decline: (1) federal and state policy changes, (2) population shifts 
to states with traditionally low VI claims rates, (3) the decline in the union-
ized percentage of the workforce, and (4) the decline in the manufacturing 
sector of the economy. Table 4-4 summarizes the magnitude of each of these 
effects, as found by those who have done empirical research in this area. 
Eyidence on Cost-Shifting 
An additional possible source of the decline in VI recipiency among the 
unemployed is "cost-shifting" by the states. While the states pay for almost 
100 percent of VI benefits, the federal government provides substantial sub-
sidies for means-tested programs. Federal matching rates for the AFDC pro-
gram currently range from 50 to about 80 percent, and the Food Stamps pro-
gram is 100 percent federally financed. These federal subsidies could create 
powerful incentives for states.to shift low-income unemployed individuals 
from VI to AFDC and/or the Food Stamps program. The shifting could be 
done through increases in monetary eligibility requirements (which would 
reduce the number of low-wage workers who are eligible to receive VI) or 
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TABLE 4-4. Summary of Studies Explaining Short-Term Decline in 
Recipiency 
Percentage of Decline Explained by: 
Time Period Policy Population Change in Change in 
Authors Analyzed Changes Shifts Unionization Manufaduring 
Baldwin & McHugh 1979-1990 54 29 16 
(1992) 
Blank & Card 1977-1987 0 50 25 
(1991) 
Corson & Nicholson 1980-1982 21-54 16 4-18 
(1988) 
Vroman 1967-1989 25 
(1991) 
NOTE: The specific measure of recipieucy used by researchers in examining this question has var-
ied. While Corson and Nicholson (1988) examined both the IURITUR and the IUITU, they focused 
primatily upon the IU/TU, which they call the UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined 
this measure, which they call the fraction of insured unemployment. Vroman (1991) focused upon 
the IUITU. Baldwin and McHugh (1992) examine lU/TU, but include Extended Benefits recipients 
in addition to regular state UI recipients. The analysis by Baldwin (1993) found much smaller effects 
from policy changes, but these results could not be readily decomposed into the categories of 
explanatory variables included in this table. 
through changes in nonmonetary eligibility requirements (which also might 
have a disproportionate impact on low-wage workers). 
There is considerable evidence that many states' UI systems do, in fact, 
discriminate against low-wage workers either directly or indirectly (ACUC 
1995; Bassi and Chasanov, forthcoming). In addition, Figure 4-3, which plots 
recipiency rates against the percentage of means-tested expenditures that are 
financed by the federal government, strongly suggests that cost-shifting may 
have occurred. 
For purposes of this report, regression analysis was used on a state panel 
database to test the cost-shifting hypothesis. The panel included data on the 48 
contiguous states from 1979 to 1990. The dependent variable was the IU/TU; 
the independent variables were those other researchers have typically used 
when estimating recipiency regressions. Three additional variables were 
included-the federal AFDC matching rate, per capita federal AFDC expen-
ditures, and per capita Food Stamps expenditures within each state. These 
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NOTE: Means-tested programs considered are Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Food Stamps; Emergency 
Assistance; Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program; and General Assistance. 
SOURCES: Office of Management and Budget, unpublished data (various years); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1995d). 
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three variables were lagged one year. To avoid bias caused by unmeasured 
heterogeneity, the model was estimated in first differences, meaning that 
regression results were based on annual changes in the included variables, 
rather than on the actual levels of the variables. Details on the construction of 
the database and the regression results are reported in Appendix A. 
Overall, the regression results provide evidence of cost-shifting. They sug-
gest that an increase in either per capita Food Stamp receipts or in the AFDC 
matching rate is followed by a decline in the rutru, although theAFDC effect 
is only significant in a first differences modeV5 The AFDC matching rate, how-
ever, has little capacity to explain changes in the rutru, since there has been 
virtually no change in the matching rate over time. Per capita Food Stamp 
expenditures, however, have changed significantly over time. 16 
Figure 4-4 plots the actual IU/TU rate, as well as an ACVC estimate of 
what the IU/TU rate would have been if states had not shifted individuals 
from UI to Food Stamps. The estimates indicate that cost-shifting helps 
explain the long-term decline in UI recipiency. For example, cost-shifting 
behavior appears to account for 64 percent of the decline between 1971 and 
1993. These findings suggest that much of the decline in the IUITU that other 
researchers have attributed to "policy changes" (see Table 4-4) has taken the 
form of states shifting costs to the federal government. 
It should be noted that, during some of this period between 1971 and 
1993, the federal government was inducing states to improve the solvency of 
their VI programs, and the states responded in part by restricting eligibility. 
The growing incentives for states to shift individuals from VI to federally 
subsidized programs may have made states more willing to comply than they 
would have been otherwise. 
REPLACEMENT RATES AND POTENTIAL DURATION OF BENEFITS 
With respect to the actual receipt of benefits under the UI program, there are two 
important measures of the system's generosity-the replacement rate and the 
potential duration of benefits. The replacement rate measures the percentage of 
an unemployed individual's lost earnings that are replaced by UI benefits. The 
potential duration of benefits provides a measure of how long UI recipients can 
expect to be able to rely on the system for partial income replacement. 
Many of the founders of the Unemployment Insurance system argued that 
benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings. They believed that this 
percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic necessities, 
but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work (see Blaustein 1993). 
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TABLE 4-5. Comparison of Replacement Rates Reported by U.S. 
Department of Labor and Actual Replacement Rates, Various 
States and Years 
DOL-Reported Aclual Percenlage of Recipienls for 
Replacemenl Rale Replacement Rate Whom Replacemenl Rate 
State Year (percenl) (percenl) Is Grealer Than 50% 
Illinois 1984-1985 35 62 70 
Michigan 1994 39 52 76 
Pennsylvania 1988-1989 42 72 77 
Texas 1994 38 68 80 
Washington 1988-1989 38 63 90 
Wisconsin 1994 39 71 83 
NOTE: These were the only states for which the ACUC could obtain data on the actual replacement 
rate. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d); unpublished data from Illinois, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
A number of presidents including and following Dwight D. Eisenhower have 
endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the UI sys-
tem. President Richard M. Nixon advocated that the UI system should replace 
50 percent of lost earnings for four-fifths of all recipients (see O'Leary 1994). 
Both the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980) and 
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) endorsed "one 
half for four-fifths" as an appropriate goal. 
Unfortunately, almost no cross-section data are available on replacement 
rates, and no data whatsoever are available on changes in replacement rates 
over time. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) does report what it refers to 
as a "replacement rate," but it defines this measure as the ratio of average 
benefits paid to UI recipients to average wages paid in all of covered employ-
ment. Because this ratio compares data for two different populations, it does 
not measure the extent to which UI benefits replace the wages of those indi-
viduals who are actually unemployed and actually receive benefits. 
Table 4-5 summarizes unpublished data on the actual replacement rate in 
the only six states for which the ACUC could obtain data. When compared 
with the DOL-reported replacement rates for comparable time periods, these 
data indicate that the reported rates significantly understate the actual 
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TABLE 4-6. Comparison of Replacement Rates Reported by u.s. 
Department of Labor and Actual Replacement Rates, Based on 
SIPP Simulations, All States, 1978 and 1990 
DOL-Reported Average Replacement 
Replacement Rate Rate of UI Recipients in 
Year (percent) SIPP (percent) 
1978 36 64 
1990 36 63 
NOTE: SIPP replacement rates are defined as the average weekly benefit amount divided by (base 
period earnings/52). 
SOURCES: Analysis of unemployment spells between 1989 and 1992 using the 1990 SIPP Full 
Panel Research File and Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module (described in Appendix A); U.S. 
Department of Labor (1995d). 
replacement rate in all six states. In five of the six states, the actual rate is 
understated by between 25 and 30 percentage points. Furthermore, all six 
states either exceed or almost meet the goal of replacing 50 percent of lost 
earnings for four-fifths of VI recipients. 
Alternatively, the SIPP can be used to calculate actual replacement rates. 
The average replacement rate of VI recipients in the SIPP (see Table 4-6) is 
comparable to the average of the six states, as discussed above. 17 Thus, the 
replacement rate found in the SIPP is also substantially greater than the offi-
cially reported replacement rate. By calculating what the replacement rate 
would have been in 1990 if the equivalent of 1978 benefit formulas were 
used, it is also possible to assess how replacement rates have changed over 
time. These calculations indicate that replacement rates were decreased by 
only one percentage point in the 1980s. Thus, the replacement rate appears to 
have remained relatively constant over time. It should be noted, however, 
that replacement rate calculations refer to pre-tax income. The subjecting of 
VI benefits to federal income tax in the 1980s reduced the effective replace-
ment rate for VI recipients. 
As noted above, another component of VI benefits besides the replace-
ment rate is their potential duration. The V.S. Department of Labor collects 
information on the number of weeks for which VI claimants are qualified to 
receive benefits. Figure 4-5 indicates that the average potential duration of 
VI benefits increased by a modest amount during the 1950s and has been 
nearly constant since then. 18 
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NOTES: Line denotes the average potential duration of benefits calculated for all UI claimants. The 1979 
figure for duration of benefits was interpolated due to erroneous data. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d). 
56/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Overall, therefore, evidence on both replacement rates and benefit dura-
tion suggests that the system's relevance has remained relatively steady over 
time with respect to the needs of those unemployed workers who actually 
receive benefits. The evidence also suggests that the program's capacity for 
providing income support is substantially higher than is indicated in some 
official statistics. 
UI TAX RATES 
Each of the worker-oriented measures of program generosity described 
above is affected by the other side of the UI system, the collection of taxes. 
When average UI tax rates are relatively high, trust funds can support high-
er benefit levels and/or a larger number of recipients. (Similarly, higher ben-
efits or increased numbers of recipients require higher taxes.) Conversely, 
relatively low tax rates tend to result in pressures to reduce benefit levels or 
to increase eligibility standards. Thus, the framework within which UI tax 
rates are established can be expected to have a direct impact on the worker-
oriented measures discussed in this chapter. 
The current system of financing the federal-state UI system imposes some 
minimal federal standards, but generally provides states with significant dis-
cretion in determining levels of UI taxes, as well as eligibility standards and 
benefit levels. It has been suggested that such a system may be susceptible to 
pressures related to interstate economic competition. If this were the case, 
then tax rates would be expected to be lower than they would without such 
competition, and eligibility and/or benefits would also tend to be tightened as 
a result. This section presents the results of an empirical examination of 
whether such competition has manifested itself in the VI system. 
The tax provisions for financing the UI system are contained in the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Under this law, a federal unemployment 
insurance tax is imposed on employers, with a partial credit provided to 
employers in states that have a UI system that meets minimum federal stan-
dards. Currently, the FUTA tax credit to employers is $378 per worker who 
earns at least $7,000. Since the passage of FUTA, this large financial incen-
tive has ensured that all states have had UI systems that have almost always 
met federal standards. 
As noted above, the federal requirements that states must meet are quite gen-
eral, providing states with a great deal of discretion in making VI policies. In 
order to qualify employers in the state for the FUTA tax credit, a state must 
(1) levy a separate tax that is used only to finance VI benefits; (2) have a taxable 
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wage base that is at least as high as the federal taxable wage base; and (3) have 
a maximum tax rate of at least 5.4 percent, which is adjusted for the individual 
employer only on the basis of that employer's experience with unemployment. 
Prior to the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, only the state of 
Wisconsin had a UI program, which operated on an extremely limited basis. 
Although other states were interested in creating such programs, they could 
not do so, in large part because of concerns that an employer-financed UI 
system would put the employers in their states at a competitive disadvantage: 
"The perceived threat of competitive disadvantage [proved to be] an effec-
tive barrier to individual state action on unemployment insurance" (Blaustein 
1993, 128). The genius of the FUTA tax structure was that it reversed this sit-
uation, creating a competitive disadvantage for employers in states that do 
not have a UI program. 
Nevertheless, relative to other states, states can still gain a competitive 
advantage for employers by only minimally satisfying the federal standards, 
thereby qualifying employers for the FUTA tax credit while minimizing their 
tax burdens. Although concerns about the welfare of involuntarily unemploy-
ed workers may deter a state from reducing its UI program to the minimum 
allowed by federal law, competition among the states to attract and retain 
employers and jobs may put states under considerable pressure to have small-
er UI programs than they would otherwise. Interstate competition could even 
set off a "race to the bottom," with some states cutting UI payroll taxes to 
gain a competitive edge and other states responding, and another round of tax 
cuts ensuing. 
Hoyt (1995) and Weaver (1995) have outlined economic and political sci-
ence models, respectively, that can be used to explore the possibility of per-
nicious interstate competition within the UI system. Principles suggested by 
these models were examined for this report in an empirical exploration of 
state interactions in setting tax rates. This analysis was conducted using a 
state panel database that contains information from 1977 to 1990. Details of 
the construction of the database and the results from the regressions are pre-
sented in Appendix A. 
The basic model for testing the hypothesis used an observed state's UI tax 
rate (measured as a percentage of covered wages) as the dependent vmiable. 
Independent variables included various measures of the UI tax rates in other 
states, lagged by one year, as well as a set of other potentially important 
explanatory variables (for example, the state's unemployment rate, measures 
of state government, and the percentage of workers who belong to unions). 
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The following expected outcomes of a "race to the bottom" were exam-
ined empirically: 
1. The VI tax rates of nearby states should have a larger effect than the 
VI tax rates of states that are farther away. 
2. There should be an asymmetric response to the VI tax rates of other 
states. In particular, an observed state's VI tax rate should respond 
more to those states with lower VI tax rates than to states with high-
er VI tax rates. 
3. The effect of VI tax rates in more populous contiguous states should 
be greater than the effect of VI tax rates in less populous contiguous 
states. 
4. Holding all else constant, more populous states should be able to 
resist the pressures of interstate competition more successfully than 
less populous states can. 
The regression results reported in Appendix A provide compelling evi-
dence in support of these hypotheses. Briefly, the results are as follows: 
1. There is strong evidence that states respond in some way to the ill 
tax rates of all other states. In general, a given state's VI tax rate as 
a percentage of total wages tends to move in the direction of other 
states' tax rates (lagged one year). On average, a contiguous state 
has a much greater effect on the level of a given state's VI tax rate 
than a noncontiguous state does. 
2. An observed state's VI tax rate responds more to lower than to high-
er rates in other states. That is, a state responded more when, in the 
previous year, other states in a given category had, on average, lower 
VI tax rates than its own. It responded less when the other states' 
average VI tax rates were higher. 
3. Additional regressions supply evidence that, on average, the tax rate 
of the most populous contiguous state has a greater impact than 
other contiguous states' tax rates in determining the tax rate of any 
given state. 
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4. Holding all else constant, a state's tax rate is moderately higher 
when its population is relatively large in comparison with that of 
contiguous states. 19 
The coefficient estimates (their signs, significance, and rank ordering) are 
entirely consistent with a priori expectations of theoretical models of inter-
state competition. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The nation's Unemployment Insurance system, which consists of 53 separate 
state programs (in the 50 states and in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands), is both highly complex and dynamic. The complexi-
ty can be seen in the diverging paths of some of the measures of the system's 
relevance to the needs of workers. Measures of coverage clearly suggest that 
the relevance of the system has increased, because numerous workers who 
were once excluded from coverage are now covered under the system. 
Available evidence on the measures of replacement rates and potential dura-
tion of benefits suggest that the system has generally maintained historic lev-
els of generosity in those areas. 
The time trend in the percentage of the unemployed who receive UI, how-
ever, reveals a long history of steady decline-punctuated by occasional 
sharp decline-in the generosity of the program. Available evidence on the 
percentage of the unemployed who are eligible for benefits is also indicative 
of a slight decline in eligibiljty since the late 1970s. 
Of all of these dimensions of generosity, coverage-which has in-
creased-is the only aspect of the UI program that is directly controlled by 
the federal government. All of the rest-replacement rates, potential duration 
of benefits, recipiency rates, and eligibility-are either directly or indirectly 
under the control of the states. This suggests that, while the federal govern-
ment has acted to expand generosity in the one dimension of the program that 
it controls, states' actions have resulted in a decline in generosity in terms of 
eligibility for and receipt of benefits. 
As noted above, however, there does not appear to be a significant dete-
rioration of the benefits (in terms of replacement rates or potential duration 
of benefits) for the shrinking percentage of the unemployed who are eligible 
for and who receive benefits. This suggests that states have cut back instead 
on their UI programs mostly by limiting access to the program rather than by 
reducing the generosity of the benefits that claimants receive. 
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The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that two significant forces 
have shaped the evolution of the Unemployment Insurance system. One of 
these is embedded in the federal-state structure of the program. Although fed-
erallaw effectively forces the states to have a UI program, it does not pre-
vent them from administering only a minimal system, and it provides no sup-
port against competitive pressures that may act upon the states and adverse-
ly affect their ur programs. Other researchers have attributed the decline in 
some elements of the ur system to the effects of changes in state policy as 
well as to demographic and industrial shifts, but the evidence presented here 
indicates that state policies are endogenous to the system. 
In essence, the findings of this chapter suggest that the failure of the sys-
tem to respond to changes in the nation's demographic and industrial com-
position is an outcome, rather than a cause, of the decline in some aspects of 
the system's relevance. Similarly, increasingly restrictive state policy is the 
means by which states respond to the competitive pressures within the sys-
tem. Finally, the decline in ur recipiency that some researchers have attrib-
uted to "population shifts" may well be the result of a broader movement of 
jobs from states with higher employer taxes (of which UI taxes are but one 
component) to states with lower taxes. 
The second force that has driven the evolution of the system is inherent 
in the methods by which alternative social insurance programs are financed. 
Because the federal government provides substantial subsidization for 
means-tested programs, states face an enormous price differential in the pro-
vision of assistance to unemployed, low-income individuals. It is much less 
expensive for them to provide a certain level of assistance through a means-
tested program than through their own ur system. 
The two forces discussed here no doubt interact. As states respond to 
competitive pressures by ratcheting down their VI programs, the easiest way 
for them to do so is by shifting low-income individuals onto means-tested 
programs. If the major means-tested programs (AFDC and Food Stamps) 
were converted to block grants to the states, as is currently being proposed, 
then the financial incentives for states to shift low-wage individuals from UI 
to these programs would be reduced. Nonetheless, the underlying pressures 
from interstate competition would remain. Thus, the evidence presented here 
suggests that fundamental changes in the method by which means-tested pro-
grams are financed might provide, at most, a temporary reprieve to the ur 
system from its inherent tendency to allow its relevance to erode in the face 
of continuous change. 
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NOTES 
1. One exception is the recent analysis by Craig and Palumbo (1994), which documents 
a trade-off between UI and AFDC benefits. The authors do not, however, analyze the 
implications of this trade-off for changes in UI recipiency over time. 
2. Blaustein (1985) suggests that the decision to limit coverage was primarily a practical 
decision, in that it would allow the administrative burden to be lessened during the first 
years of the program while still ensuring that a significant percentage of workers would 
be covered. Blaustein suggests that there was always an expectation that coverage would 
be extended-ultimately to all workers who could be subject to involuntary unemploy-
ment. Others, however, have suggested darker reasons for some of the coverage exclu-
sions; in particular, they argue that the decision to exclude agricultural labor from cover-
age was rooted in discrimination and racism (see Norton and Linder, forthcoming). 
3. Many states, however, chose to adopt more liberal coverage standards from the begin-
ning, particularly in requirements on the size of firm. The existence of more liberal cov-
erage standards in various states has continued throughout the history of the program. 
4. This provision did not apply to employees of churches or other religious organiza-
tions. Nonprofit employers were offered the choice of reimbursing the state for only those 
benefits chargeable to them or paying the state UI tax in the same manner as other cov-
ered employers. Nonprofit employers were also offered the option of forming a group to 
pool their benefit liabilities through a common reserve fund. All nonprofit organizations 
remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax. 
5. The reimbursement option was made available to all state and local government 
employers, and such employers remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax. 
6. Employers with 10 or more agricultural workers in at least 20 weeks of the year or 
with a payroll of at least $20,000 in any calendar quarter were required to pay UI taxes. 
Estimates suggested that at least 50 percent of agricultural workers would be included as 
a result of this change (Martin 1994). 
7. Federal civilian employees were included in the system in 1954, when a separate pro-
gram was created to cover them. Former members of the military were included under 
various pieces of legislation in the 1950s, with a separate program, also created for them. 
Puerto Rico was included in the system as a "state" in 1960, and the Virgin Islands was 
included under the 1976 amendments. 
8. Only two significant coverage exceptions remain. First, agricultural workers who are 
employed on farms that are defined as "small" are not covered in many states. Second, 
workers who are classified as "self-employed" are also excluded from coverage. 
(Ambiguities in the definition of "self-employed," however, have caused some workers 
who should be covered under some other coverage requirement to be excluded because 
they are classified as self-employed independent contractors.) In addition to these two pri-
mary exclusions, groups that include household workers of employers who pay wages of 
less than $1,000 per quarter and employees of religious organizations are also excluded 
from coverage. 
9. Only covered wages are considered in making a determination of monetary eligibili-
ty. Thus, if an individual works in two jobs but only one of them is covered under ur, then 
only the wages from the covered job are considered in determining eligibility (and bene-
fit levels). 
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10. The high-earnings requirement can result in the disqualification of part-time work-
ers, especially those who work at the minimum wage. 
11. Appendix A contains additional details about the SIPP simulations. The estimates 
reported in Table 4-1 understate rrionetary eligibility to the extent that individuals have 
underreported their income in the SIPP. According to the simulations, approximately 3 
percent of the unemployed who are calculated to be ineligible for UI report that they do, 
in fact, receive UI. Thus, either the simulations are incorrect because of underreported 
income, or these individuals are receiving UI in error. Undoubtedly, some additional indi-
viduals who are simulated to be ineligible do, in fact, meet the monetary eligibility rules 
in their states but do not receive benefits. 
An additional source of etTOr results from using the state in which an individual 
resides as the basis for the simulations. To be completely accurate, the simulations should 
be based on the state in which an individual works (although this information is not avail-
able in the SIPP). Unlike underreporting of income, however, this latter source of mis-
measurement is unlikely to cause any systematic bias in these estimates of eligibility. 
12. Those states with the largest drop in their high cost multiple (a measure of trust fund 
reserves) increased their base period earnings requirement during the early 1980s by an 
average of $811 (in 1990 dollars), while states with an increase in the high cost multiple 
during the same time period slightly decreased the requirement (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1993). 
13. The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants divided by the 
average number of people in UI-covered employment over four of the last six completed 
calendar quarters. The TUR is defined as the number of all active unemployed job seek-
ers divided by the total civilian labor force. 
14. The numerator of the IUR is the number of regular UI claimants (A), and the denom-
inator is the number of workers in covered employment. The numerator of the TUR is the 
number of unemployed workers actively seeking work (B), and the denominator is the 
number of workers in the labor force. The IU is A, and the TU is B. Therefore, the 
[(IU/TU)]/[(IURlTUR)] equals the number of workers in covered employment divided by 
the number of workers in the labor force, which converges to 1 as coverage expands. 
15. The AFDC matching rate was shown to be significant at the 0.05 level under afirst 
differences regression model. It was not, however, significant in a model using the actual 
levels of the included variables. The AFDC per capita expenditures variable was also 
insignificant-a result that is not entirely unexpected. These results are discussed further 
in Appendix A. 
16. The annual mean values for these variables and the additional variables used in the 
regression are contained in Table A-I of Appendix A. 
17. Income is known to be underreported in the SIPP, which would tend to cause the 
replacement rate to be overestimated. 
18. The small variations in potential duration are cyclical. During recessions, people 
who are laid off tend to have higher earnings and higher labor force attachment than those 
laid off during nonrecessionary periods. Although the average length of benefits receipt 
has remained fairly constant over time, the length of unemployment spells has increased. 
Consequently, the percentage of VI recipients who exhaust their benefits (which is high-
ly cyclical) appears to have increased slightly over time. Thus, it would not be unreason-
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able to conclude that the potential duration of benefits has become somewhat less gener-
ous in the sense that it has not responded to increases in the duration of unemployment. 
19. For technical reasons discussed in Appendix A, it is difficult to identify the magni-
tude of this effect with precision. 

5 / Financing Unemployment 
Insurance 
THE TAXABLE WAGE BASES and UI tax rates for employers established by the 
federal and state governments directly affect a broad range of policies, pro-
gram goals, and administrative goals in the UI system. The taxable wage 
bases and employer tax rates are directly related to the amount of revenue 
that is available to states to pay benefits and indirectly related to the amount 
available for the administration of the system. 
In addition, the taxable wage bases and employer tax rates affect the level 
of trust fund reserves. Adequate reserves are needed to maintain trust fund sol-
vency and to achieve the advantages of a forward-funded system. During 
good economic times, a forward-funded system accumulates reserves that can 
be drawn on when demand for UI benefits increases during periods of reces-
sion. This capacity helps maintain consumer purchasing power and con-
tributes to economic stability. I Thus, the taxable wage base and employer tax 
rates directly affect the ability of the UI system to meet its two primary objec-
tives, as identified by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(1995): (1) the provision of temporary, partial replacement of wages as a mat-
ter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a 
prior attachment to the labor force; and (2) the accumulation adequate funds 
during periods of economic health in order to promote economic stability by 
maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic downturns. 
While both the taxable wage bases and the employer tax rates may affect 
UI program outcomes, no mechanism currently exists for influencing the 
average employer tax rate in the states on a broad scale. With regard to the 
taxable wage base, however, the FUTA tax credit virtually ensures that 
changes in the federal taxable wage base will have a direct effect on states' 
taxable wage bases. The effects of such changes in the federal taxable wage 
65 
66/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
base on VI program outcomes and the effects of the financing structure of the 
VI system are the focus of this chapter. 
After a brief overview of the financing structure of the VI system, the 
chapter discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the 
taxable wage base. First, it presents empirical research that examines the 
effects of changes in the state taxable wage base and tax rate on various mea-
sures of VI program outcomes. It then looks at changes in the taxable wage 
base and the proportion of covered wages in a historical context and dis-
cusses some of the effects of a low taxable wage base on low-wage workers. 
The chapter next explores the opposition to increases in the taxable wage 
base that stem from the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the federal unified 
budget and the constraints of the budget process. Finally, the issue of evalu-
ating administrative funding levels is addressed, and a framework for linking 
state funding levels to performance is discussed. 
BACKGROUND 
The Vnemployment Insurance system is financed through a combination of 
federal and state payroll taxes. The federal payroll tax, established by the 
Federal Vnemployment Tax Act, is currently set at 6.2 percent of the first 
$7,000 of an employee's salary. Employers in states with Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) programs that meet specified federal guidelines receive a 5.4 
percent credit toward their FUTA tax payment. The resulting net tax rate of 
0.8 percent yields an employer cost of $56.00 per employee earning a mini-
mum of $7,000. FUTA revenues are used to finance the state and federal 
administrative costs of the VI system, the federal portion of the Extended 
Benefits program, loans that are provided to states with insolvent trust funds, 
and other related federal costS.2 
A state sets its own taxable wage base and tax rates, but must meet the fol-
lowing federal guidelines in order for employers in the state to receive the fed-
eral tax credit: (1) a separate tax must be levied that is used only to finance VI 
benefits, (2) the state taxable wage base must be at least as high as the feder-
al taxable wage base, (3) the maximum state tax rate must be at least 5.4 per-
cent and must only be adjusted through experience rating.3 State revenues 
finance the payment of regular VI benefits and the state portion of Extended 
Benefits. In 1995,42 states had taxable wage bases that were above the fed-
eral minimum of $7,000, and 18 had indexed their taxable wage base to the 
average annual state wage. Table 5-1 lists 1995 state taxable wage bases. 
TABLE 5-1. State Taxable Wage Bases, by State, 1995 
--~ ~ .. ~---
Slate Taxable State Taxable 
Wage Base Wage Base 
State (dollars) State (dollars) 
Hawaii * 25,500 Ohio 9,000 
Alaska* 23,900 Texas 9,000 
Idaho * 21,000 Delaware 8,500 
Washington* 19,900 Georgia 8,500 
Oregon* 19,000 Louisiana 8,500 
New Jersey* 17,600 Maryland 8,500 
Rhode Island* 16,800 Missouri 8,500 
Utah* 16,500 Alabama 8,000 
Nevada* 16,400 Kansas 8,000 
Montana* 15,500 Kentucky 8,000 
Minnesota* 15,300 New Hampshire 8,000 
Iowa* 14,200 Pennsylvania 8,000 
Virgin Islands* 13,900 Vennont 8,000 
New Mexico* 13,500 Virginia 8,000 
North Dakota* 13,400 West Virginia 8,000 
Wyoming* 11,900 Arizona 7,000 
North Carolina* 11,300 California 7,000 
Massachusetts 10,800 Florida 7,000 
Oklahoma* 10,700 Maine 7,000 
Wisconsin 10,500 Mississippi 7,000 
Colorado 10,000 Nebraska 7,000 
Connecticut 10,000 New York 7,000 
District of Columbia 10,000 Puerto Rico 7,000 
Michigan 9,500 South Carolina 7,000 
Arkansas 9,000 South Dakota 7,000 
Illinois 9,000 Tennessee 7,000 
Indiana 9,000 
NOTE: An asterisk (*) denotes that a state has indexed its taxable wage base to average wages. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995a). 
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Most states also use a series of tax rate schedules that allow them to shift 
from one schedule to another, based on factors such as trust fund solvency 
and economic conditions. For example, during periods of low unemployment 
when trust fund reserves are generally high, a favorable tax schedule (with 
lower tax rates for all experience-rating levels) would be used. Some states 
assess solvency surtaxes when trust fund reserves decline. As a result of the 
range of state taxable wage bases across states and the range of tax rates 
across and within states, the amount of state VI taxes paid by individual 
employers varies greatly. 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN TAXABLE WAGE BASE AND TAX RATES 
Program Outcomes 
Empirical research was conducted by the ACVC staff to examine systemati-
cally the effects of changes in a state's taxable wage base and tax rate on var-
ious program outcomes, including trust fund solvency, receipt of benefits, 
and benefit levels. The results indicate that increases in a state's taxable wage 
base can produce increases in the state's reserve ratio;4 also, increases in the 
taxable wage base are associated with slight increases in VI benefit levels. 
Following is further discussion of the model and the results. 
Five regression equations were used to examine each of these VI out-
comes: (1) the reserve ratio as a measure of trust fund solvency; (2) the per-
centage of the unemployed who received VI benefits (that is, the actual ben-
efit recipiency rate);5 (3) the percentage of the unemployed who were VI 
claimants (IU/TU);6 (4) the maximum weekly benefit amount; and (5) the 
average weekly benefit amount. In the analysis, the state taxable wage base 
is measured as the difference between the state taxable wage base and the 
required federal wage base. The employer tax rate is measured as the ratio of 
total employer taxes paid to taxable wages. The means for each of these mea-
sures, for the states and years included in the model, are presented in Table 
5-2.7 The analysis used a fixed effects regression model and a database that 
included annual, state-level data for the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia from 1978 to 1990.8 
Taxable Wage Base 
The analysis revealed that the primary effect of increasing the state taxable wage 
base is a significant increase in a state's reserve ratio. Results also suggest a 
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TABLE 5-2. Means of Key Varia~les from Regression~ ____ _ 
Variable 
Explanatory Variable 
State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level 





Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount 









NOTE: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the 50 states and the District of Columbia. All dollar-
value variables are in 1993 dollars. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using a database compiled from the following: Council of State 
Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c); U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993). 
small but positive relationship between the taxable wage base and both mea-
sures of benefit generosity (see Table 5-3). Overall, the results indicate that, 
holding all else constant, a $1,000 increase in the taxable wage base increases a 
state's reserve ratio by an average of 0.14 (see column 1 of Table 5-3.) This find-
ing supports the view that increases in the taxable wage base would help states 
increase trust fund reserves, thereby improving the UI system's capacity to 
achieve one of its fundamental goals-economic stabilization. 
Results of the analysis also indicate that increases in the state taxable wage 
base would be expected to result in slight increases in benefit levels. 
According to the model, a $1,000 increase in the state taxable wage base 
would, on average, increase the maximum weekly benefit level by $3.70 and 
the average weekly benefit level by $1.80 (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 5-3). 
Equations examining the effect of state taxable wage base changes on the 
receipt of benefits produced some unexpected results. The results suggest that 
increases in the state taxable wage base produce slight decreases in both actu-
al recipiency and the Iu/TU ratio. A $1,000 increase in the state taxable wage 
base would be expected to decrease the percentage of the unemployed who 
file for and receive benefits by 0.38 and 0.39 percentage points, respectively 
(see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5-3). The negative relationship is counterintu-
TABLE 5-3. Generalized Least Squares Regression Results, 1978-1990 
Dependent Variables 
Maximum Weekly Average Weeldy 
Reserve Ratio IU/TU Recipiency Benefit Amount Benefit Amount 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level 0.00014 (.00) -0.00038 (.02) -0.00039 (.01) 0.0037 (.00) 0.0020 (.00) 
Employer Tax Rate -0.19 (.00) -1.96 (.00) -0.018 (.00) -0.43 (.74) -2.15 (.Ol) 
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized -2.95 (.00) 54.19 (.00) 33.40 (.00) 31.71 (.24) 13.94 (.44) 
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit 0.47 (.01) -1.41 (.30) -1.94 (.13) 22.19 (.00) 18.10 (.00) 
Disqualification for Refusing Suitable Work -0.18 (.14) -1.16 (.23) -0.98 (.29) -5.98 (.10) -2.88 (.23) 
Disqualification for Misconduct -0.11 (.41) -2.28 (.04) -1.18 (.26) 5.41 (.19) -1.64 (.56) 
" 0 State Government 0.027 (.55) 0.38 (.30) -0.011 (.98) 1.44 (.29) -0.54 (.55) 
Required Base Period Wages for Benefits -0.000071 (.22) -0.0027 (.00) -0.0022 (.00) -0.000075 (.96) -0.0029 (.01) 
Total Unemployment Rate -0.26 (.00) -0.44 (.00) -0.18 (.17) -1.04 (.04) 0.64 (.06) 
Denial Rate per Initial Claim -0.22 (.63) -18.30 (.00) -20.62 (.00) 7.70 (.58) -0.83 (.93) 
Percentage of Employment Covered by UI 0.74 (.30) -3.09 (.59) 4.47 (.41) ....fJ6.27 (.00) -31.14 (.03) 
Average Weekly Wage 0.00038 (.73) 0.028 (.00) 0.030 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 0.32 (.00) 
R" Statistic .35 .20 .18 .14 .25 
NOTE: Significance levels are reported in fixed effects regression analysis that was used on data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia for the years 
1978-1990. Missing data for the required base period wages for Michigan in the years 1982 and 1983 were estimated on the basis of data from 1981 and 
1984. The state government variable for Nebraska was based on the political party of the governor, because the state has a unicameral legislature. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1995a, b, c); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993). 
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itive; if taken at face value, however, its small coefficient would suggest that 
the impact of state taxable wage base changes on recipiency are minimal. 
Employer Tax Rates 
The empirical analysis also revealed statistically significant relationships 
between employers' tax rates and four of the five outcomes examined.9 The 
relationships, however, are negative-contradicting the expectation that 
increased revenues would increase reserves, recipiency, and benefits. The 
most likely explanation for these unexpected results is that the average tax 
rate may be an endogenous variable. That is, because the tax rate is partially 
determined by the dependent variables, it is difficult to isolate its effects on 
those variables. In addition, the tax rate is highly cyclical, which further com-
plicates the task of isolating its effects. 
National Effects 
The regression results were then used to simulate the effects of increases in 
the federal taxable wage base on the national average of the reserve ratio. 
State reserve ratios were weighted by total state wages to produce the nation-
al averages presented in Table 5-4. The calculations assume that an increase 
in the federal taxable wage base would produce increases in states with tax-
able wage bases below the new federal level. For example, a $1,000 increase 
in the federal taxable wage would result in increases in the taxable wage 
bases of the 11 states currently at the federal level. The calculations suggest 
that increases in the states' taxable wage bases resulting from a new federal 
taxable wage base set at $8,000 would increase the reserve ratio by 0.05 and 
that a federal taxable wage base of $10,000 would increase the reserve ratio 
by 0.22. The effects of incremental increases in the federal taxable wage base 
are greater at higher wage base levels because more states would be required 
to raise their taxable wage bases in order to match the federal level. (For 
example, the effects of a $1,000 increase in the taxable wage base from 
$8,000 to $9,000 would be greater than the effects of a $1,000 increase from 
$7,000 to $8,000 because the former would affect more states.) 
Trends in Taxable Wages as a Percentage of Total Wages 
For reasons discussed later in this chapter, it is difficult to evaluate whether 
the FUTA tax generates enough revenue to fund the administration of the UI 
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TABLE 5-4. Estimated Effects of Different Federal Taxable Wage 
Bases on National Average of the Reserve Ratio 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State 
Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c); U.S Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993). 
system sufficiently. The proportion of covered wages subject to UI taxes and 
the per worker cost of the FUTA tax over time, however, are known. The 
trends with respect to these two matters indicate that, contrary to some per-
ceptions, an increase in the taxable wage base would not produce a histOli-
cally high tax burden. 
There have been only four changes in the federal taxable base in the more 
than 60-year history of the UI system. These increases have not kept pace 
with the increases in total covered wages and, as a result, the proportion of 
wages on which taxes are paid has declined, as illustrated in Figure 5-l. 
The original unemployment provisions contained in the Social Security 
Act of 1935 called for a federal tax on employers equal to 1 percent of total 
payroll beginning in 1936. That percentage was to be increased to 2 percent 
in 1937 and to 3 percent in 1938. Employers could receive a credit of up to 
90 percent of their federal tax obligation for their contributions to approved 
state unemployment compensation funds. 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 amended those provisions 
of the Social Security Act, reducing the taxable wage base from total payrolls 
to the first $3,000 paid to each employee. 10 At the time, this change reduced 
the total amount of covered wages by only 8 percent. Over time, however, the 
impact of the $3,000 taxable wage base limit on FUTA tax revenues 
increased. As total wages increased, the proportion of taxable wages to total 
wages decreased. In 1948, about 82 percent of all covered payrolls were sub-
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d). 
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ject to the FVTA tax; by 1969, however, only half of all payrolls were cov-
ered. Federal legislation increased the taxable wage base to $4,200 in 1972; 
to $6,000 in 1978; and to $7,000 in 1983. In 1994, the ratio of taxable wages 
to covered wages had eroded to 36 percent, its lowest level in history. 
In addition to increases in the federal taxable wage base, increases in the 
net federal tax rate have been adopted periodically to cover administrative 
costs that grow because of inflation, to support the Extended Benefits pro-
gram, and to maintain funds for loans to state trust funds. II Table 5-5 depicts 
the changes in the FUTA tax rate and wage base, as well as the inflation-
adjusted, per worker cost over time. 
The inflation-adjusted per worker cost of VI captures the fluctuation of 
employers' federal VI tax burden as the federal tax rate and federal taxable 
wage base have changed over time. This employer cost measure has declined 
substantially from $93 per worker in 1978 (when the taxable wage base was 
increased from $4,200 to $6,000) to $56 per worker in 1993. 
Effects on Low-Wage Workers 
The federal and state taxable wage bases also affect the relative tax costs to 
employers of low- versus high-wage workers. When a taxable wage base is 
low in comparison to the average annual wage, employers with a high per-
centage of low-wage workers are required to pay taxes on a higher propor-
tion of their total payroll than are employers with higher-paid workers. 
Further, research suggests that the incidence of a flat rate payroll tax (such as 
the FUTA tax) is often passed from the employer to the worker in the form 
of lower wages (Anderson and Meyer 1994). Thus, the FVTA tax is likely to 
represent a greater burden for low-wage workers than for higher-paid work-
ers, because the FUTA tax burden that may ultimately be paid by workers 
represents a larger percentage of the total earnings of low-wage workers. 
UI TRUST FUNDS IN UNIFIED FEDERAL BUDGET 
The preceding discussion suggests that increases in the federal taxable wage 
base would generate a wide variety of improvements in program outcomes 
and would reduce the inequitable tax costs borne by low-wage workers with-
out creating a historically high tax burden for employers. This approach, 
however, is complicated by the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the federal 
unified budget-which severely limits the use ofFUTAfunds despite the fact 
that they are specifically earmarked for the financing of the VI system. Thus, 
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TABLE 5-5. Changes in FUTA Tax Rate and Wage Base, by Year of 
Fede~~I~~,:,employment Tax Act Provisions, 193~~ 1994 
Gross FUTA Offsetting Potential Net FUTA Inflation-Adjusted 
Year Tax Rate Credit Tax Rate Wage Base per Worker Cost 
Effective (percent) (percent) (percent) (dollars) (1994 dollars) 
1939 3.00 2.7 0.30 3,000 96 
1960 3.10 2.7 0.40 3,000 61 
1970 3.20 2.7 0.50 3,000 57 
1972 3.20 2.7 0.50 4,200 74 
1973 3.28a 2.7 0.58 4,200 81 
1974 3.20 2.7 0.50 4,200 64 
1977 3.40b 2.7 0.70 4,200 72 
1978 3.40 2.7 0.70 6,000 95 
1983 3.50 2.7 0.80 7,000 83 
1985 6.20 5.4 0.80 7,000 77 
1994 6.20 5.4 0.80 7,000 56 
SOURCE: Blaustein (1993); ACUC calculations using data from Council of Economic Advisors 
(1995). 
U Reflects a 0.08 percent increase in federal unemployment tax rate in 1973 to pay for additional ben-
efit costs. 
b A temporary surtax was enacted in 1977 for the Extended Benefits program; it was extended in 
1987, 1990, and again in 1993. It is due to expire at the end of 1998. 
an increase in the federal taxable wage base (without some corresponding 
decrease in the FVTA tax rate) would increase the flow of funds into the fed-
eral accounts in the VI trust fund without any guarantee that these funds 
could be used in a timely manner for VI purposes. Predictably, this has 
sparked opposition to any increases in the federal taxable wage base. The 
genesis of this situation is discussed below. 
The Federal Budgeting Process 
Funding levels for the federally financed portion of the UI system are deter-
mined by the federal budget and appropriations process. The current budget-
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ing system is workload-driven, based on the number of UI claimants and the 
number of covered employees. There are two categories of federal UI fund-
ing. Base funding includes all costs associated with the collection of taxes 
and an estimate of the minimum costs associated with the distribution of UI 
benefits. Contingency funding is provided when the actual claims workload 
exceeds the base estimates. 
The minutes per unit (MPU) that it takes for states to perform specific 
tasks, average state salaries, and national economic assumptions are used to 
estimate state costs for administering state UI programs. 12 Contingency work-
loads are funded at lower salary levels than are those used for base funding, 
under the assumption that an additional workload is performed by temporary 
help with lower pay rates and benefit costs. The sum of the estimates for each 
of the states, theoretically, provides the basis for the annual federal budget 
request for funds for administering state UI programs. 
The funding that is available for administration of the UI system is limit-
ed to the level that is appropriated through legislation. It is largely unrelated 
to the balance of the federal UI accounts. 13 This violates the principle that 
holds that trust fund balances are accumulated and held in trust solely for a 
specified purpose. The inclusion of the UI trust funds in the federal unified 
budget creates an additional incentive to limit federal funding levels for UI, 
because federal budget offsets must be identified before additional FUTA 
funds can be appropriated for program administration in order to maintain 
budget neutrality. 14 
For the system of UI administrative funding, there are two primary impli-
cations of this inclusion of the UI trust funds in the federal unified budget. 
First, the system cannot respond to a justifiable demand from the states for 
increases in their administrative funding grants even if there are sufficient 
funds available in the trust fund account. Second, the system loses its capaci-
ty to increase spending automatically during recessions. As a result, one of the 
principal functions of the UI system-economic stabilization-is threatened. 
Revenues and State Administrative Funding Levels 
The relationship between states' FUTA contributions and the funding they 
get back in administrative grants has varied over time. 15 As shown in Figure 
5-2, 85 percent of states' FUTA contributions were returned in the form of 
administrative grants in 1975; in 1988, this figure was only 43 percent; in 
1992, it rose to 63 percent. Typically, a higher percentage of states' FUTA 
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contributions are returned during periods of high unemployment. The years 
1982 and 1983, however, represented an exception; a relatively low percent-
age of FUTA revenues was returned to the states despite very high unem-
ployment levels. 
The portion of FUTA contributions that states receive back from the fed-
eral government as state UI grants (the subset of administrative grants that 
only include UI funding) also varies greatly across states (see Table 5-6). For 
example, in Fiscal Year 1993, the percentage ranged from 22 percent in 
Hawaii to 121 percent in Alaska. When total state administrative grants 
(including those for the Employment Service and other programs financed by 
TABLE 5-6. Administrative Grants and UI Grants as Percentage of 
Each State's FUTA Contributions, 1993 
Administrative Grant! UI Grant! 
FUTA Contributions FUTA Contributions 
State (percent) Rank (percent) Rank 
Hawaii 28.6 22.0 
Indiana 41.7 2 25.3 3 
Florida 41.9 3 25.2 2 
Tennessee 42.2 4 26.6 4 
Georgia 42.5 5 27.4 6 
North Carolina 43.1 6 27.5 7 
Virginia 43.7 7 26.8 5 
Ohio 47.3 8 29.9 8 
Texas 47.4 9 30.0 9 
Kentucky 49.0 10 31.0 11 
Arizona 51.8 11 35.7 19 
Massachusetts 51.8 12 38.2 22 
South Carolina 52.2 13 34.5 16 
Colorado 53.0 14 36.5 20 
Louisiana 53.3 15 32.8 14 
New Mexico 54.7 16 30.6 10 
Alabama 55.3 17 36.8 21 
Iowa 56.5 18 34.9 18 
Minnesota 56.7 19 38.3 23 
Missouri 58.4 20 40.7 25 
(continued) 
TABLE 5-6. (continued) 
Administrative Grant! VI Grant/ 
FVTA Contributions FVTA Contributions 
State (percent) Rank (percent) Rank 
Oklahoma 59.2 21 32.5 13 
Nebraska 59.4 22 31.9 12 
Wisconsin 61.2 23 43.6 29 
Mississippi 61.4 24 39.9 24 
Arkansas 61.4 25 41.1 26 
Maryland 62.0 26 45.0 30 
Illinois 63.9 27 46.0 31 
New Hampshire 65.2 28 43.3 28 
Delaware 66.2 29 47.4 33 
Nevada 66.5 30 48.2 34 
West Virginia 70.2 31 43.1 27 
Kansas 71.0 32 34.7 17 
Michigan 75.5 33 55.5 38 
New Jersey 75.7 34 58.2 40 
New York 77.2 35 58.6 41 
Pennsylvania 79.2 36 59.8 42 
Oregon 81.0 37 61.7 44 
Puerto Rico 83.8 38 52.5 36 
Washington 85.3 39 65.6 45 
District of Columbia 85.9 40 56.6 39 
California 86.2 41 68.6 48 
South Dakota 86.3 42 34.5 15 
Utah 87.8 43 46.9 32 
Vermont 98.2 44 65.7 46 
Maine 99.1 45 73.4 50 
Connecticut 101.8 46 82.9 51 
Wyoming 105.7 47 55.2 37 
Montana 107.5 48 52.0 35 
Idaho 112.3 49 69.4 49 
Rhode Island 122.3 50 98.7 52 
North Dakota 125.7 51 60.2 43 
Virgin Islands 155.0 52 66.8 47 
Alaska 186.7 53 120.6 53 
NOTE: State FUTA revenues are estimates. 
SOURCE: Unpublished data from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service, 
Office of Actuarial Services. 
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FUTA) are considered, the percentages increase to 29 percent in Hawaii and 187 
percent in Alaska. The variation in this ratio can be attributed both to the size of 
the grants and to the amount of revenue generated by FUTA in each state. 
The level of administrative funding relative to a state's claims workload 
has also varied over time. Historically, there appears to be an inverse rela-
tionship between funding per claim and the overall unemployment rate (see 
Figure 5-3). That is, funding per claim is lower during periods of high unem-
ployment. This is due, at least in part, to the decrease in fixed overhead costs 
per claim when the number of claims increases. The level of VI administra-
tive funding per claim also varies significantly across states (see Table 5-7). 
In 1993, funding ranged from a low of $101 per claim in Puerto Rico to a 
high of $490 in Alaska. 
These factors represent some of the basis of opposition to increases in the 
federal taxable wage base. Most states contribute significantly more in FUTA 
revenues than they receive back in administrative grants. In 1993, for example 
(as shown in Table 5-6), half of the states had less than 65 percent of their 
FUTA contributions returned in the form of administrative grants. In addition, 
skepticism may affect even the states that receive more money than they con-
tribute. They, too, would recognize that the total amount of funding available 
for administration in any given year is influenced heavily by national eco-
nomic constraints and by the politics of the federal budget. As a result, there is 
little they can know about how any additional contributions would be used. 
An Alternative Option 
The inclusion of the VI trust fund in the unified federal budget creates a num-
ber of constraints on the funding of the VI system. In particular, it limits the 
use of FUTA revenues that are collected and held in trust for the administra-
tion of the VI system. As a result, it may be difficult to justify policies that 
increase FVTA revenue collections from the states by placing an additional 
tax burden on employers. Included among such policies would be a propos-
al to increase the federal taxable wage base in order to increase state taxable 
wages bases, thereby improving state VI program outcomes. 
It is possible, however, to create a revenue-neutral increase in the federal 
taxable wage base by implementing a corresponding decrease in the net 
FUTA tax rate. A revenue-neutral adjustment would bring about higher tax-
able wage bases in some states, but would not create additional revenue for 
the federal trust funds-money that would then also be included in the fed-
eral unified budget. One example of a revenue-neutral adjustment would be 
~ 
FIGURE 5-3. UI Administrative Funding per Claim, 1973-1993 
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TABLE 5-7. UI Administrative Funding per Claimant, by State, 
1993 
Claims State UI Grant State UI Grant/Claim 
State (no., in thousands) (dollars, in thousands) (dollars) 
Puelto Rico 167.0 16,867.9 101 
Tennessee 24l.6 28,837.6 119 
Georgia 287.7 40,932.2 142 
Alabama 204.6 29,22l.5 143 
Kentucky 151.3 21,884.5 145 
South Carolina 170.2 24,83l.8 146 
Arkansas 116.4 18,723.3 161 
North Carolina 26l.3 42,728.7 164 
Iowa 104.2 18,836.3 181 
Missouri 245.1 44,427.6 181 
Ohio 368.9 68,723.3 186 
Florida 373.8 70,330.5 188 
Virginia 185.5 35,545.2 192 
Indiana 160.7 30,878.9 192 
West Virginia 64.4 12,442.5 193 
Louisiana 123.8 24,075.4 194 
Mississippi 91.9 18,094.9 197 
Texas 544.7 107,38l.7 197 
Michigan 529.7 104,773.2 198 
Illinois 531.8 113,866.7 214 
Oklahoma 83.5 17,997.4 215 
Wisconsin 211.9 46,380.5 219 
Montana 30.8 6,914.0 225 
Kansas 74.2 16,991.3 229 
California 1831.3 430,950.7 235 
New Jersey 39l.6 92,870.2 237 
Pennsylvania 538.4 133,749.6 248 
Washington 265.6 66,711.3 251 
Oregon 151.0 38,228.5 253 
Arizona 106.4 27,470.2 258 
Massachusetts 261.9 69,359.6 265 
New Mexico 38.6 10,404.2 269 
Nebraska 36.7 10,214.0 278 
New York 696.8 202,054.9 290 
(continued) 
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TABLE 5-7. (continued) 
Claims State Ul Grant State Ul Grant/Claim 
State (no., in thousands) (dollars, in thousands) (dollars) 
Hawaii 41.8 12,201.7 292 
Colorado 101.1 29,609.1 293 
Maine 56.2 16,664.4 296 
Maryland 154.5 46,485.1 301 
Vermont 23.8 7,228.2 304 
Connecticut 192.3 58,757.8 305 
Delaware 24.1 7,441.8 308 
Minnesota 116.5 36,183.1 311 
Rhode Island 58.2 18,158.8 312 
New Hampshire 31.8 9,948.8 313 
Nevada 60.4 18,979.0 314 
Idaho 44.4 14,167.2 319 
Virgin Islands 4.0 1,336.2 338 
South Dakota 11.8 4,278.3 362 
Wyoming 15.3 5,801.1 378 
North Dakota 16.9 6,563.4 388 
Utah 39.4 16,124.9 409 
District of Columbia 26.9 11,208.7 417 
Alaska 38.9 19,049.6 490 
UNITED STATES 10,521.9 2,384,000.0 227 
NOTE: Administrative funding is based on state UI grants. The number of claims represents new 
initial claims. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b). 
a $2,000 increase in the federal taxable wage base (to $9,000) and a decrease 
in the net FUTA tax rate to 0.6 percent. This would produce FUTA revenues 
that would be approximately 5 percent lower than they currently are, based 
on ACUC calculations from unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY 
Another issue related to federal ur taxes is how the level of state adminis-
trative funding should be determined. If the constraints of the budget process 
were removed, should additional federal funds be provided to the states for 
the administration of their ur programs, or are current levels of funding suf-
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ficient to achieve desired performance outcomes? 
The current absence of incentives for efficient behavior in VI program 
administration makes it impossible to determine whether current outcomes 
are a function of funding levels or of other factors that may shape adminis-
trative performance. This section discusses the current process for allocating 
administrative funds to the states, suggests the need for efficiency incentives 
in the allocation process, and presents some general principles for develop-
ing a set of administrative-outcome measurements that could be linked to 
state administrative funding levels. Such measurement systems are needed to 
prevent efficiency incentives from threatening program quality. 
Allocating Administrative Funds 
The budget for administrative funds is determined, as discussed above, by a 
formula based on estimated workload and is subject to the federal budget 
appropriations process. A lack of efficiency incentives for states is character-
istic of the current administrative funding process. State performance out-
comes are not considered when the overall funding levels for the VI system 
are determined, nor are they considered in the allocation of funds to the 
states. Furthermore, the formula used to distribute administrative funds to the 
states lacks incentives for efficiency, because more funds are provided to 
states that were determined to require more time to perform administrative 
tasks. The lack of efficiency incentives in the current administrative funding 
process makes it difficult to determine whether funding levels are sufficient 
for states to perform at desired outcome levels. 
Some believe that higher-quality programs must be more expensive to run 
because, they assume, improving accuracy, timeliness, or other aspects of 
performance requires costlier staff, computer equipment, and other 
resources. Thus, decreases in funding would produce declines in some 
aspects of program performance. However, in a study of the relationship 
between program costs and quality, Vroman (1993) concluded that there is no 
statistical evidence to support the view that administrative costs are positive-
ly related to performance. 16 Other studies have examined the implications of 
a funding system based on average costs per unit of workload in high-
quality or high-performance states. 17 The results suggest that many states that 
administer high-quality programs have relatively low costs. 
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linking Performance, Efficiency, and Administrative Funding 
Besides reducing wasteful spending and program costs, efficient program 
administration is necessary to determine whether administrative funding lev-
els are adequate. The relationship between funding and performance is 
unclear. No research to date has addressed the key question of whether addi-
tional funding can improve poor performance. (This same question arises 
with respect to many publicly-provided services-for example, whether 
investing more money in school districts with poor performance records will 
improve education for children in those schools.) It is apparent, however, that 
if funds are being spent wastefully and programs are not run efficiently, there 
can be no basis for evaluating this question. 
Davidson and Martin (1994) and Parsons (1994) have proposed similar 
conceptual frameworks for an allocation system that would promote effi-
ciency. Both studies recommend that states be allowed to keep the savings 
generated by cost-cutting innovations in the administration of their UI pro-
grams. The stll<;lies refer to this provision as a residual contract. Allowing 
states to keep unused funds rather than requiring that they be returned to the 
federal government would encourage efficient behavior. 
For a residual contract to be effective, the allocation of funds cannot be 
based on costs (which would undermine states' incentives to devise and 
implement cost-cutting techniques). Consequently, both Davidson and 
Martin (1994) and Parsons (1994) suggest the use of a "pay-for-perfor-
mance" system in conjunction with the residual contract. Under such a sys-
tem, funds would be allocated on the basis of state performance, and states 
would be allowed to keep any residual savings. "If a state chooses not to 
adopt some cbst reducing innovation it forgoes revenue. By the same token, 
any state that chooses to overlook some quality enhancing opportunity will 
receive a lower allocation of administrative funds than it would have 
received had it pursued the opportunity" (Davidson and Martin 1994,24-25). 
It is likely that a pay-for-performance method would also encourage states to 
align their goals and efforts with federal performance priorities, which, in 
turn, reflect national interests in the UI program. 
Outcome Measures 
Any administrative funding system that promotes efficiency requires a viable 
outcome-measurement system that the federal government can use to ensure 
that efficiency incentives do not encourage states to sacrifice program quali-
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ty. An appropriate outcome-measurement system could help prevent the ero-
sion of program quality that can occur when states are faced with incentives 
to cut costs. The current "system" for outcome measurement is actually an 
extensive collection of federal programs that monitor, evaluate, or impose 
requirements on the states. As discussed in the next chapter, the primary pur-
pose of this "system" is to direct and inform program improvement efforts. 
In most cases, there is little threat of sanctions or other consequences if states 
fail to meet standards or if performance inadequacies are uncovered. 
According to the discussion in Chapter 3, federal efforts to measure state 
VI programs should be limited to those areas that affect the fundamental goals 
of the VI system and in which there is a potential divergence of national and 
state interests. There is no need for federal monitoring of state performance in 
areas where national and state interests coincide. Further, the capacity of states 
to focus their administrative efforts on areas identified as being the most cru-
cial to the national interest would increase if the federal performance-review 
system limited itself to only the most important program outcomes. 
Thus, the federal government should measure essential program out-
comes in areas in which national and state interests may diverge. This frame-
work would support federal monitoring of eligibility guidelines and other 
program areas where states may respond to interstate economic pressures to 
enhance their business climates by adjusting policy in ways that may under-
mine national objectives. For example, performance measures could be used 
to guard against the following means of state cost reduction: unreasonably 
high eligibility standards; inappropriately low benefit levels; the provision of 
limited administrative services, which may make it difficult for individuals 
to collect benefits; and other reductions in services. Outcome measures could 
also be used to monitor state levels of forward funding, and ensure that indi-
viduals have adequate access to the VI system, including the ability to enter 
and fully participate in the system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical research presented in this chapter suggests that a strategy of 
increasing the taxable wage base could be quite effective in increasing state 
trust fund solvency. Further, increasing the taxable wage base could have the 
added effect of reducing the inequities that result from the current low tax-
able wage base. 
Because of the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the unified federal bud-
get, however, any increases in the federal taxable wage base would have the 
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effect of generating additional FUTA revenues without guaranteeing that 
additional funds would be made available to the states for administration. 
Removing the trust fund from the unified budget is one solution to this prob-
lem, although it is unlikely to be a viable option in the current political and 
economic environment. Alternatively, the problem could be remedied more 
easily by simultaneously enacting a decrease in the FUTA tax rate and an 
increase in the wage base, offsetting the federal tax revenue effects of the 
wage base increase. 
NOTES 
1. For additional information, see Chapter 3 in this report and Chapters 3 and 4 in 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995). 
2. FUTA revenues are also used for the following purposes: the Employment Service 
(ES), the collection of labor market information by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
and the collection of FUTA taJi.es by the U.S. Treasury. 
3. Experience-rated taxes are based on an employer's use of the benefits in the UI sys-
tem. In principle, an employer that has many former workers collecting UI benefits will 
be assessed at a higher tax rate than the rate for an employer with few former employees 
collecting benefits. In practice, however, experience rating is far from perfect. For addi-
tional information, see Chapter 7 in this report and Chapter 6 in ACUC (1995). 
4. The reserve ratio represents net trust fund reserves as a percentage of total covered 
wages. 
5. This measure ofrecipiency is calculated as follows: (number of first payments of ben-
efits times average actual duration) divided by total annual unemployment. 
6. The IUITU is the ratio of the number of UI claimants (the insured unemployed) to the 
number of unemployed job seekers (total unemployment). The distinction between the 
IUITU ratio and recipiency is that the IUITU ratio measures the percentage of the unem-
ployed who have filed for UI benefits-it does not consider whether or not benefits were 
received. Recipiency only includes claimants who actually receive benefits. For addition-
al information, see Chapter 4 of this report, and Chapter 4 of Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1994). 
7. The other variables included in the model were these: disqualification penalties for 
voluntary quits, refusal of suitable work, and misconduct; base period wage requirements 
to receive minimum benefits; the percentage of initial claims that were denied; the total 
unemployment rate; the average weekly wage; the ratio of covered employment to total 
employment in the state; the percentage of state workers who were union members; and 
the relative power ofthe Democratic and Republican political parties in the state govern-
ment. The means of these variables are also included in Table 5-2. All dollar value vari-
ables are expressed in 1993 dollars. 
8. A fixed effects model was used in order to accommodate the panel data (for example, 
multiple observations for each state over a given number of years). Unlike ordinary least 
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squares (OLS) regression, the fixed effects model does not assume that all observations 
are independent of one another, and therefore, it provides more reliable estimates of 
regression coefficients, standard errors, and the model's explanatory power. 
Due the nonavailability of data for a number of variables in various years, the analy-
sis was confined to the years 1978 to 1990. 
9. Results did not indicate the existence of a significant relationship between the taxable 
wage base and the maximum weekly benefit amount. 
10. Originally, this was done to match the tax base used for old-age insurance contribu-
tions, in order to simplify federal employer tax collections and payment procedures for 
both programs (Blaustein 1993). 
11. Tax rate adjustments included a 0.2 percent tax increase enacted in 1977 to generate 
revenues to repay a loan from the Federal Treasury to the Extended Benefits account, 
which had been depleted. The increase was intended to be temporary-once the loan was 
repaid, the increase was to terminate. In May 1987, the advances had been repaid and the 
0.2 percent surcharge was due to expire at the end of the year. The Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987, however, extended this tax component through 1990 to offset some of the 
federal budget deficit. The surtax was extended again in 1990 to help finance the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation program that was passed that year. A 1993 act 
extended the surtax through 1998 for budget reconciliation purposes. 
12. Until 1985, periodic studies were conducted to estimate the MPU for each of 17 spe-
cific tasks within each state. Since then, no studies have been performed. 
13. While there is no direct link between trust fund balances and administrative funding 
levels, administrative funding may be threatened by competing budget priorities when 
account balances are low. 
14. Inadequate levels of administrative funding may cause states to dive11 funds desig-
nated for the payment of benefits from their state bust funds to pay for administrative 
expenses, further eroding the financial integrity of the system. 
15. State administrative grants include funding for UI, the'Employment Service, some 
activities of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and some services for veterans. State UI grants 
are a subset that only include UI funding. 
16. Vroman's model tested the ability of cross-state variation in administrative costs to 
explain the changes in several measures of quality in processing UI claims. The measures 
of quality were promptness of first payments, promptness of higher- and 10wer-authOlity 
appeals, and benefit quality control payment error rates. Cost measures were based on 
state salaries and workload mix. 
17. Fu Associates (1994) calculated a national unit cost using data from 15 high-quality 
states for benefits and 20 high-quality states for taxes, Cook and Kirchner (1995) devel-
oped a measure of relative administrative efficiency and examined the relationship 
between efficiency level and a state's ability to meet specitled standards for the timely 
delivery of UI services. Using these results, they calculated alternative allocations of 
funds that would enable all states to meet the performance standards if they adopted the 
behavior patterns of states which demonstrated high-quality administrative performance. 
The results suggest that total allocations could be reduced if all states were funded as ade-
quately as the states that actually did meet the standards. 
6 / Performance Measurement 
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES have been in place since the inception of the 
Unemployment Insurance program. The current system of state UI perfor-
mance measurement is an extensive collection of federal programs that mon-
itor, evaluate, and/or impose requirements on the states. The federal Quality 
Appraisal (QA), and Quality Control (QCY programs collect data and review 
work samples from the state ill programs to assess state performance against 
dozens of measures for various components of program quality. States are also 
evaluated to ensure that their laws conform to federal law and that their poli-
cies and practices comply with federal law. Conformity and compliance are 
necessary for them to receive certification to receive the administrative grants 
and the FUTA tax credit from the federal government, as discussed in Chap-
ter 5. In addition to the QA and QC programs, other federal programs verify 
reported workload data, investigate incorrect benefit payments and fraud, and 
measure cash management. This chapter describes these various programs. 
QUALITY APPRAISAL 
The Quality Appraisal (QA) program/ begun in 1978, assesses the quality of 
state ill program activities. Assessments are based on either promptness or 
performance. There are two categories of measures: (1) Secretary's 
Standards (SS), established by regulation before the inception of the QA pro-
gram, measure the compliance of state programs with federal law in their 
timeliness in processing lower-authority appeals and in delivering intrastate 
and interstate first benefit payments. (2) Additional Desired Levels of 
Achievement (DLA) , established in 1978 and revised periodically, supple-
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ment the SS with performance measures in other program areas,4 although in 
practice there is little difference between the SS and DLAs. 
Overall, the activities evaluated under the Quality Appraisal program are 
initial claims, nonmonetary determinations, combined wage claims, appeals, 
status determinations, field audits, collections, and employer accounts (see 
Table 6-1). Samples of documents and/or transactions from each of these 
areas are measured against the established standards. QA results for each 
state are published annually by the Unemployment Insurance Service. State 
staff review the results and make the quality determinations for two consec-
utive years, with federal review of the results. During the third year, federal 
regional office staff make the quality determinations. If, in any year, defi-
ciencies are detected, states must develop a "Corrective Action Plan" to 
address them. This plan must be filed with the federal regional UI office, 
which has the authority to approve or reject it.5 
The QA program uses data compiled from in-depth reviews of work per-
formed in specified program areas and from various UI Required Reports 
(UIRRs). The UIRRs represent a substantial body of reports that states sub-
mit to the federal government for use in calculating economic indicators, 
budgeting purposes, charting the status of programs, and measuring perfor-
mance. A 1993 internal review by the Unemployment Insurance Service cat-
alogued 38 such reports, one of which has since been eliminated.6 
QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAMS 
The Benefit Quality Control (BQC) program,7 which was begun in 1988, is 
used to measure some aspects of the accuracy of benefit payments and to 
assist states in developing program improvement plans to correct problems. 
It reviews and analyzes a randomly selected sample of Unemployment 
Insurance payments to estimate eligibility and benefit payment error rates, 
and it collects data on the cause of errors and the party responsible for error.S 
The results for each state are published annually by the Unemployment 
Insurance Service. In 1993, an estimated $1.9 billion (8.8 percent) of the total 
$21.1 billion in UI payments were overpayments, and an estimated $182 mil-
lion (0.9 percent) were underpayments (U.S. Department of Labor 1994b). 
Payments for interstate claims and for Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation are not evaluated under the BQC program. In addition, neither 
denied claims nor appeals decisions are included in the BQC sample. As a 
result, the BQC program underestimates the rate of underpayment, because 
erroneously denied claims are never examined. 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT /91 
States have the primary responsibility for implementing and administer-
ing BQC, based on methodology established by the federal Unemployment 
Insurance Service. No sanctions or funding incentives are available for the 
federal government to use for encouraging any specific level of achievement 
in state programs. The 1993 National Performance Review conducted by the 
Office of the Vice President recommended that the UI Service reduce BQC's 
emphasis on error measurement and focus instead on constructive use of the 
results in order to improve quality (Gore 1993). 
The Revenue Quality Control (RQc) project is intended to provide objec-
tive information on the quality of state revenue operations.9 This information 
could be used both by state UI agencies in improving operations and by the 
U.S. Department of Labor in line with its oversight responsibilities. RQC pro-
gram development began in the late 1980s, with input from state UI repre-
sentatives. Pre-testing and pilot programs took place in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively. It was expected that the computed-measures component of the 
RQC program could be used in 1995 and that the complete program would be 
implemented in 1996. The program will review the timeliness, accuracy, and 
completeness of the following tax functions: status determinations, cashier-
ing, report delinquency, collections, field audit, and account maintenance. 
When it is in operation, RQC will use three methodologies to measure 
quality. First, computed measures based on data reported by the states, 
including the tax measures used in DLA, will provide information on the 
timeliness and completeness with which UI tax transactions occur. Second, 
program reviews will examine tax systems for internal controls and will 
check a small sample of transactions to verify the effectiveness of the inter-
nal controls in producing accurate results. Third, surveys will gather infor-
mation on best state practices, and these will be compiled in a report and dis-
tributed by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Overall, the federal QC programs maintain their own data collection and 
state reviewing operations, independent of the QA and UIRR processes. They 
are also budgeted separately from the regular state administrative funding 
system. 10 Funding for QC was approximately $35.2 million for FY 1993. This 
represents approximately 1.4 percent of the $2.4 billion in state UI grants that 
year.lI The BQC program was allocated 533 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff 
positions for FY 1994, representing just over 1 percent of the total number of 
PTEs in the Unemployment Insurance program. The RQC program current-
ly receives 1 PTE staff position per state. 12 
TABLE 6-1. State UI Activities Measured by Secretary's Standards (SS) and Desired levels of 
Achievement (DlA) 
Category 
State Activity Being Measured (55, DLA) Performance Measure 
-----------------------------------------
Initial Claims Promptness-Intrastate SS In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of 
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent 
of fITst payments made within 21 days of fITSt compensable-week ending date. A minimum 
of 93 percent of fITSt payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date. 
Initial Claims Promptness-Interstate SS In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of 
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent 
of fITSt payments made within 21 days of first compensable-week ending date. A minimum 
of 78 percent of first payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date. 
Initial Claims Promptness-UCFE 









In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent of first payments made within 14 days of 
fITst compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent 
of fITst payments made within 21 days of fITst compensable-week ending date. A minimum 
of 78 percent of fITSt payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date. 
In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of 
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent 
of first payments made within 21 days of fITSt compensable-week ending date. A minimum 
of 93 percent of fITst payments made within 35 days of first compensable week ending date. 
For Separation Cases: A minimum of 75 percent of cases having acceptable scores. For Non-
separation Cases: A minimum of 80 percent of cases having acceptable scores. 
A minimum of 80 percent of determinations made in a timely manner. 
Combined Wage Claims 
Appeals Perfonnance 
Appeals Promptness-Lower Authority 
Appeals Promptness-Higher Authority 






Benefit Payment Control 











A minimum of 75 percent of wage transfers made in a timely manner. 
A minimum of 80 percent of cases scoring 80 percent of points or more. 
A minimum of 60 percent of appeals decisions made within 30 days. A minimum of 80 per-
cent of appeals decisions make within 45 days. 
A minimum of 40 percent of appeals decisions made within 45 days. A minimum of 80 per-
cent of appeals decisions made within 75 days. 
A minimum of 80 percent of determinations of employer liability made within 180 days of 
liability date. 
A minimum penetration rate for contributory employer audits of 4 percent. A minimum pen-
etration rate for large employer audits of 1 percent of the number of audits required for total 
audit penetration rate. 
A minimum of 95 percent of employers fIling reports by end of quarter. 
A minimum of 75 percent of delinquent accounts with some monies obtained within 150 
days from end of quarter. 
A minimum of 90 percent of collected taxes deposited in Clearing Account within 3 workdays 
of receipt. A maximum of 2 business days for transferring funds on deposit in Clearing Account 
to Trust Fund. Withdrawal from state account in Unemployment Trust Fund an amount suffi-
cient to maintain in benefit payment account a balance equivalent to not more than 1 day's ben-
efit payment requirement from the account. 
A minimum recovery of 55 percent of regular state UI fraudulent overpayments. A minimum 
recovery of 55 percent of regular state UI nonfraudulent overpayments. 
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WORKLOAD VALIDATION PROGRAM 
The Workload Validation Program was initiated in the late 1970s to stan-
dardize the workload definitions used by states for budget items. This stan-
dardization was needed primarily for use in the budget allocation process. 
Workload items are validated for quantity and quality. Quantity validation, 
which measures accuracy, applies to workload items in the following cate-
gories: initial intrastate claims (new and additional claims), continued weeks 
claimed, agent and liable (interstate) initial claims, nonmonetary determina-
tions, lower- and higher-authority appeals, active employers, and wage items. 
Quality validation is required for all of these categories except for that of 
agent and liable (interstate) initial claims and that of wage items. 
States are responsible for planning, implementing, and reporting the val-
idation program according to federal guidelines. The federal regional UI 
office audits and oversees the validation process and supplies technical assis-
tance when requested by the states. 
CONFORMITY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEWS 
Conformity and compliance reviews are intended to ensure that state laws 
and procedures conform to and comply with all federal UI requirements in 
the Social Security Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1993a). (Conformity refers to agreement of state law 
with federal law and with the Secretary of Labor's interpretations of the law. 
Compliance refers to the consistency of state policy and practice with feder-
allaw.) For disbursements from the federal UI trust fund and for administra-
tive grants to be released to a state, the Secretary of Labor must certify to the 
Secretary of the Treasury that the state is in conformity and compliance. 13 
Most conformity or compliance issues are resolved informally. To resolve a 
conformity issue, a state must indicate that it will change its law or its interpre-
tation of the law. To resolve a compliance issue, it must correct its practices. 
If informal attempts to resolve such issues fail, the state is notified in writ-
ing by the U.S. Department of Labor of a final opportunity to take corrective 
action before a hearing process is initiated. If the proceedings determine that 
the state is out of conformity or compliance, it can lose certification and, as 
a result, the FUTA tax credit and part or all of its administrative grant. 
Substantial nonconformity or noncompliance is required before certification 
is withheld. (In fact, certification for the FUTA tax credit has never been 
withheld.) Certification decisions may be appealed through the U.S. Court of 
Appeals to the Supreme Court. 14 
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT REVIEW 
The Performance Measurement Review (PMR) project was initiated in 1988 
to "examine, evaluate and improve the mechanisms for performance mea-
surement in the VI Service oversight of state VI programs" (Macro 
International, Westat, and The Urban Institute 1991). The project aims to 
coordinate and improve the various VI oversight systems. 
In its first phase, PMR proposed new timeliness and quality measures that 
would be field-tested, including timeliness measures for aspects of the pro-
gram that were not previously measured. 15 Timeliness is an important com-
ponent of state compliance with the provision in the Social Security Act that 
requires the use of "such methods of administration as are found by the 
Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of 
unemployment compensation when due."16 
The PMR project also proposes to improve other quality measurements 
by including all forms of adjudication (including benefit payment denials), 
rather than only examining selected categories. 17 When fully implemented, 
the PMR measurements will replace the benefit standards currently in the QA 
program, and the revenue components of QA will be absorbed by the new 
Revenue Quality Control program. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, the primary purpose of the various performance measurement pro-
grams in the Ul system is to direct and inform state program improvement 
efforts. In most cases, there is little threat of sanctions or other consequences 
if states fail to meet standards or if other inadequacies are uncovered by per-
formance measurement programs. Indeed, even the sanctions for conformity 
and compliance requirements, which are statutorily determined, are rarely 
imposed. These sanctions, which include the loss of administrative funds or 
loss of the FVTA tax credit, are so severe that every effort is made to correct 
deficiencies or to negotiate compromises before they are enforced. In theory, 
however, various forms of performance measures and standards could be 
used to help ensure that national objectives in the VI system are preserved. 
NOTES 
1. The Performance Measurement Review, a project initiated by the u.s. Department of 
Labor in 1988, is revising the QA performance measures and benchmarks. Also see Fu 
Associates (1994) and Cook and Kirchner (1995) for additional information. 
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2. Quality Control includes two separate programs-Benefit Quality Control and 
Revenue Quality Control. 
3. See U.S. Department of Labor (1994a) for additional information and results. 
4. Cook, Brinsko, and Tan (1993). 
5. After approval from the federal regional UI office, state agencies generally submit 
Corrective Action Plans as part of their Program and Budget Plan (which represents their 
application for administrative funds). The Program and Budget Plan is then submitted to 
the national Unemployment Insurance Service office, which reviews the package and 
notifies the regional office of any concerns. 
6. The UIRRs include two weekly reports, nine monthly reports, eight quarterly reports, 
and three annual reports, as well as additional reports that are submitted when specific 
programs (such as Extended Benefits) are activated in a state. 
7. See U.S. Department of Labor (1994b) for additional information and reports on state 
performances. The BQC program grew out of a test study conducted by the National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation that revealed that the actual error rate for 
UI payments was higher than reported. 
8. Each state received resources to investigate an average of 785 cases in 1993. 
Individual state sample sizes varied, with the smallest states receiving resources to inves-
tigate 475 cases, and the largest, 1,754 cases. Some actual state sample sizes varied slight-
ly from resource allocation targets, but it is required that the sample size fall within min-
imum and maximum limits specified by the federal government. 
9. See U.S. Department of Labor (1993b) for additional information. 
10. Funds for VIRR and QA are included in the regular VI base and contingency admin-
istrative budget, whereas QC has a separate budget line item. 
11. Federal VI Service staff indicate that FY 1993 funding for QC included $34.4 mil-
lion from the state administrative budget, and $0.8 million from the national activities 
budget. In FY 1994, the totals were $36.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively. 
12. Federal UI Service staff indicate that there are currently 19.5 FTEs in Quality 
Control who are assigned to the national office (4 of them are assigned to RQC). The 
workers in these FTEs do not, however, work exclusively on QC; conversely, there may 
be other staff members who work on QC but are not assigned to that program. 
13. Certification requirements exist in three areas: Section 3304 of FUTA (for the 5.4 
percent FUTA tax credit), Section 3303 of FUTA (which requires experience rating), and 
Section 303 of Social Security Act (which provides state administrative grants). 
14. Procedures for withholding payment and certifications are codified at 20 CFR 601. 
15. The timeliness measures selected for field testing included the timeliness of the fol-
lowing: first payments (initial claims), continued-weeks payments, adjudications, adjudi-
cation implementation, adjudication redetermination, lower-authority appeals, lower-
authority decision implementation, higher-authority appeals, combined wage claims and 
wage transfers, combined wage claims and billing, and combined wage claims and reim-
bursements. 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT! 97 
16. The "when due" provision is contained in Section 303(a)(l) of the Social Security 
Act of 1935. 
17. The quality measures selected for field testing included the quality of the following: 
adjudication, lower-authority appeals, combined wage claims and wage transfers, com-
bined wage claims and billing, and combined wage claims and reimbursement. 

7 / Experience Rating 
IN MOST STATES, benefits under the Unemployment Insurance system are 
financed through employer payroll taxes that are assessed by the states.' 
States are currently required by FUTA to finance program benefits through 
an "experience-rated" tax structure-that is, the rate of taxation under a 
given tax schedule2 varies with an individual employer's experience with 
unemployment. In other words, employers who create the most cost for the 
system are assessed the highest tax rates.3 
CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS 
It is often argued that experience-rated UI taxes allow state governments and 
the federal government to influence employers' behavior in socially benefi-
cial ways. For example, experience-rated taxes can influence firms to reduce 
layoffs and to participate actively in the process by which the eligibility of 
claimants is determined. 
Economists, however, often assert that the entity (in this instance, employ-
ers) on which a tax is legislatively imposed may be different from the entity 
that actually pays the tax. Thus, it is possible that some or all of the ultimate 
burden of UI taxes could be shifted from employers to workers in the form of 
lower wages or benefits, or to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
Recent research by Anderson and Meyer (1994) focuses specifically on 
this question with regard to experience-rated UI taxes. Their estimates indi-
cate that a firm is able to shift a flat tax (for example, the minimum tax rate 
within that firm's industry) to its employees, but that it is much less able to 
shift the portion of its taxes that are experience-rated. Thus, according to this 
study, a significant percentage of experience-rated taxes actually are paid by 
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the individual finn. Overall, the research by Anderson and Meyer (1994) sup-
ports the belief that experience-rated taxes do, in fact, influence firms' deci-
sions and behavior. 
Thus, an experience-rated UI tax (rather than a flat tax) is likely to sup-
port several VI program goals. First, experience rating provides a financial 
incentive (in the fonn of reduced tax burden) for individual employers to sta-
bilize their employment and avoid layoffs. Second, it charges the costs of VI 
to those employers who are responsible for unemployment. Third, it provides 
an incentive for employers to police the VI program by protesting ineligible 
claims for benefits. 
Assigning costs through experience rating, however, may also have neg-
ative consequences. First, finns may choose to limit future exposure to VI 
costs by increasing the hours of current workers rather than by hiring new 
workers when the firm's workload increases. Such decisions would have the 
effect of increasing the level of unemployment in the country. Second, if too 
large a percentage of VI costs is charged back to firms, employers would bear 
costs for which they should not be held exclusively responsible (for example, 
in the case of unemployment not caused by the employer, but in which work-
ers are still found to be eligible for VI). Third, experience rating may result 
in inappropriate employer involvement in the eligibility determinations and 
appeals processes if some employers contest legitimate VI claims in an effort 
to minimize their VI tax burden. Additionally, the timing of the experience 
rating financing structure can result in an increase in employers' tax rates at 
a time when employers are already facing financial hardship. 
Each of these positive and negative implications is discussed below, fol-
lowing a general discussion of the level of experience rating-that is, of how 
much employers actually pay toward VI benefits for fonner employees. The 
potential outcomes of experience rating would be expected to vary depend-
ing largely on the actual level of experience rating. 
LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE RATING 
Vnder a "perfectly" experience-rated system, employers would pay doIIar-
for-dollar the actual UI benefits generated by all previous employees (regard-
less of the employee's particular reason for separation). In practice, experi-
ence rating is far from perfect, with some employers incurring little or no 
additional cost for an additional layoff. 
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Impedect experience rating occurs for numerous reasons, including the 
following: low maximum tax rates, minimum tax rates set at zero, partial for-
giveness of charges for employers with negative-balance reserve accounts, 
disqualifications for separation issues, dependents' benefits, net overpay-
ments, financing of Extended Benefits, assignment of tax rates to new 
employers, firms going out of business, special industry rates, caps on 
changes in annual employer tax rates, solvency surtaxes, and low state taxable 
wage bases (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General 1985). 
Perfect experience rating is not considered the optimal level, because 
noncharges are generally deemed to be reasonable in circumstances that are 
beyond an employer's control or when unemployed workers are engaged in 
activities that are considered socially desirable-such as training. Ad-
ditionally, some charges are ineffective because an employer is inactive and 
has a negative account balance, or because states have made decisions to cap 
or write off large negative balances. Although it is generally recognized that 
"pedect" experience rating is not the appropriate goal, there is no agreement 
about the specific level of experience rating that would be appropriate. 
Indeed, it is difficult even to measure the degree of experience rating that 
currently exists. Although it has a number of limitations, the Experience 
Rating Index (ERI) calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor's 
Unemployment Insurance Service is the only overall measure of experience 
rating.4 The ERI is defined as the benefits paid in a one-year period (less the 
amount of noncharges, ineffective charges, and inactive employer charges) 
divided by total benefits. This ratio measures the percentage of benefits 
charged to individual employers. The ERI provides a limited picture for a 
number of reasons. For example, it does not account for changes in trust fund 
balances, and it incorporates only tlle current year's data. 
Table 7-1 provides the state and U.S. average ERIs from 1988 through 
1994 (the only years for which the ERI is available). The ERI can be used to 
make within-state and national comparisons over time, but it is considered 
misleading to make strict comparisons across states because of differences in 
state laws and in the timing of charges made to employers. Between 1990 and 
1994 the ERI declined in 35 states and increased in 18 states, and between 
1990 and 1992 the U.S. average dropped from 66 to 56. This change, how-
ever, was probably most atuibutable to the recession of the early 1990s, dur-
ing which more employers were at the state maximum tax rate; this would 
have caused an increase in ineffective charges. 
TABLE 7-1. Experience Rating Ind~x-,--by State, 1988-1994 
State 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Alabama 71 78 74 56 49 64 52 
Arizona 80 80 83 78 69 76 81 
Arkansas 48 47 56 60 58 53 NA 
California 65 67 68 64 52 53 53 
Colorado 45 53 60 65 64 62 68 
Connecticut 62 64 58 47 42 49 59 
Delaware NA 51 71 70 N.A. 82 83 
District of Columbia 47 56 72 72 62 N.A. 64 
Florida 68 66 50 56 53 67 75 
Georgia 61 65 62 65 52 58 75 
Hawaii 47 56 66 63 32 36 33 
Idaho 55 64 58 53 44 54 50 
Illinois 83 86 85 80 79 76 71 
Indiana 81 91 94 84 78 75 75 
Iowa 78 77 67 70 74 67 66 
Kansas 64 73 69 69 57 58 59 
Kentucky 79 79 75 72 58 66 72 
Louisiana 42 87 85 88 83 77 75 
Maine 62 60 60 52 41 50 60 
Maryland NA 72 62 62 65 NA N.A. 
Massachusetts 55 54 50 40 43 47 58 
Michigan 80 67 72 70 63 73 77 
Minnesota 67 66 69 62 58 64 69 
Mississippi 40 54 53 42 51 53 50 
Missouri 61 58 59 61 55 63 70 
Montana 54 58 62 61 55 73 63 
Nebraska 61 57 63 60 57 56 55 
Nevada 66 67 68 63 41 59 72 
New Hampshire NA NA 81 72 55 68 77 
New Jersey NA 78 75 70 63 51 38 
New Mexico 61 59 63 63 62 62 67 
New York 80 73 61 55 51 60 84 
North Carolina NA N.A. NA 50 44 42 31 
North Dakota 62 65 57 64 60 56 64 
Ohio 70 74 74 70 65 65 73 
Oklahoma 50 64 60 48 31 37 66 
(continued) 
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TABLE 7-1. (continued) 
State 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Oregon 59 63 56 60 51 50 48 
Pennsylvania 66 69 65 62 56 57 64 
Rhode Island 75 69 68 58 55 64 75 
South Carolina 58 62 65 61 54 52 58 
South Dakota 59 38 48 45 49 44 47 
Tennessee N.A. 69 66 68 71 73 73 
Texas 53 58 55 52 51 49 N.A. 
Utah 61 70 70 69 66 61 66 
Vermont 70 66 63 58 54 48 51 
Virgin Islands N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Virginia 65 68 70 61 51 66 77 
Washington 60 63 63 61 57 48 39 
West Virginia 83 51 56 58 56 62 59 
Wisconsin 90 82 78 66 65 70 70 
Wyoming 38 62 N.A. 55 63 60 N.A. 
U.S. Average 63 66 66 62 56 N.A. N.A. 
NOTE: "N.A." indicates data are not available. The ERI is not applicable for Alaska and Puerto Rico. 
Alaska uses the payroll decline method; Puerto Rico had a flat tax until 1993. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. 
PRIMARY EFFECTS 
This section discusses the four primary effects of experience rating-stabi-
lization of employment, allocation of costs, employer participation, and tim-
ing of tax adjustments. The following subsections discuss the theory that 
underlies each effect, the extent to which desired goals have been achieved, 
and the extent to which related negative effects may also occur. 
Stabilization of Employment 
In theory, financing VI through an experience-rated system of employer 
taxes should discourage layoffs and, as a result, stabilize employment by 
reducing the number of individuals who lose their jobs. There are, however, 
limits on the extent to which experience rating can affect employers' layoff 
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decisions. First, any increased Dr cost associated with a layoff is often more 
than offset by the labor cost savings (in wages and benefits) from the layoff. 
Second, layoff decisions are frequently based on major external economic 
conditions beyond the control of employers (for example, business cycles, 
demand changes, technology changes). Third, Dr taxes represent only a small 
percentage of total employee costS.5 Finally, to the extent that experience rat-
ing is imperfect, the full effects of stabilization will not occur. 
Major research findings indicate that the current system of imperfect 
experience rating does stabilize employment and that perfect experience rat-
ing would reduce labor turnover even more (see Table 7-2). Most research 
has used analytic techniques to estimate the amount of unemployment that 
could be avoided through higher levels of experience rating. The research 
indicates that approximately 30 to 50 percent of the unemployment that is 
attributable to temporary layoffs (rather than to permanent job loss or to leav-
ing jobs) could be avoided with perfect experience rating. This would result 
in a decrease in the overall unemployment rate of between 0.8 and 1.5 per-
centage points during the time of the studies.6 Some researchers suggest that 
these estimates are likely to be overstated because of a number of limitations 
in the available data. 7 
These gains may be offset, however, if fear of future costs due to experi-
ence rating discourages employers from hiring new workers, and they rely 
instead on existing employees to work longer hours. Further, some employ-
ers-especially small ones-that need to layoff workers may find that their 
tax rates increase so dramatically as a result of those layoffs that additional 
layoffs then become necessary. No research has been done on these possible 
negative effects of experience rating. 
Allocation of Costs 
Financing Dr through an employer experience-rated tax system allows the 
costs of unemployment to be attributed to the employer who created those 
costs. The extent to which this objective is achieved depends on the state's 
taxing structure. For example, when states have low maximum Dr tax rates, 
many individual employers may be at the maximum tax rate and would face 
no additional costs associated with a layoff. rn addition, states often shift to 
higher tax schedules when their Dr trust fund balances decline. For employ-
ers that already have relatively high maximum tax rates, these shifts fre-
quently result in little additional burden if a firm is a negative-balance 
employer (that is, an employer whose workers consistently receive more in 
EXPERIENCE RATING /105 
benefits than the employer pays in taxes): Instead, a disproportionate share of 
the burden resulting from the shift in tax schedules is passed on to positive-
balance employers (those employers who pay more in taxes than their work-
ers receive in benefits). 
As discussed above, there are valid reasons for a state to decide that some 
VI benefits should be socialized (that is, subsidized by all employers in the 
VI system rather than being paid for by a specific employer). For example, 
most insurance mechanisms offer protection against large losses. Similarly, 
under ill, most states offer protection to firms when they incur large VI costs; 
this takes the form of writing off portions of balances for firms with large 
negative reserves and placing a cap on the annual increase in the tax rate that 
a firm pays. In addition, in those instances in which the unemployment 
occurred through no fault of the employer (for example, when individuals 
quit their jobs and receive benefits after a temporary disqualification), 
employers should not be financially responsible for the associated ill 
expense. States do socialize costs in many of these cases. 
While the level of the ERI in a state indicates the general extent to which 
costs are attributed directly to the employer creating the cost, it masks any 
inequitable relationships across firms or markets. Research indicates that some 
firms are receiving a subsidy from imperfect experience rating, while others 
are paying the cost. Table 7-3 presents four research efforts that addressed this 
issue. The extent to which such subsidization occurs across firms and indus-
tries reflects the extent to which costs are misallocated to firms. 
The research indicates that there is significant interindustry subsidization 
of VI benefit costs, as more stable industries, such as finance, insurance, and 
retail, provide large subsidies to less stable industries, such as construction. 
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of the Inspector 
General (1985) found that, in 1983, negative-balance employers contributed 
only $1.00 for every $3.10 in benefits that were paid. The study also found 
that when a higher tax schedule was in effect (usually in periods of a state's 
experiencing lower ill solvency), a disproportionate burden of the increased 
cost was passed on to positive-balance employers. Some researchers (Becker 
1972b, and Anderson and Meyer 1993) have found that, in addition to these 
industry differences, some researchers have found that small employers are 
somewhat more likely to have a negative balance than are large employers. 
This may be because any change in employment represents a much larger 
percentage change in a small employers' labor force. 
While appropriate allocation of costs is a goal of experience rating, 
imperfect experience rating may result in less-than-optimal cost allocation, 







Current Population Survey data of 
almost 25,000 observations, 1971. Data 
included demographic and employment 
characteristics, but not variables on UI 
tax system, UI benefits, or industry 
information. 
Survey of Income and Education data of 
more than 40,000 individuals in 30 
reserve ratio states, 1976. Data included 
UI tax rate variables, earnings, and 
demographic characteristics. 
Employer-level data of over 20,000 
New Jersey manufacturing employers, 
1975-1977. Data included UI tax infor-
mation, number of employees, industry, 
and turnover. 
UI-related data for all 52 states, 1967-
1975. Data included UI benefit vari-
ables, experience-rating variables, and 
covered employment. 
Research Results Using Quantitative Data Analysis 
Layoff unemployment rate of 1.6 percent would have been reduced by 
roughly half if employers were fully experience rated.* This result is not 
based on any information regarding UI taxation, but instead on the 
author's hypothesis. 
An increase in experience rating brought about by a 1 percentage point 
increase in the effectiveness of the maximum tax rate (i.e., the tax rate that 
a negative-balance firm would receive if benefits and taxes were equal) is 
estimated to result in a decrease of 0.14 percentage point in layoff unem-
ployment (a 10 percent drop in the rate for the 1976 sample). 
Over half of employers were assigned to the minimum or maximum tax 
rate which did not change with marginal changes in benefit levels. 
Employers at the maximum tax rate have layoff rates that are 2 to 3 times 
higher than the layoff rates of those in the middle of the tax schedule. 
An increase in the maximum tax rate or a decrease in the minimum tax rate 
was found to increase the degree of experience rating and to reduce unem-
ployment. 
Brechling and Jebn 
(1978) 
Topel (1986, 1990) 
Card and Levine 
(1992) 
UI -related data for reserve ratio states, 
1962-1969. Data included information on 
UI taxes and coverage (but not UI benefits) 
for the manufacturing industry. 
Current Population Survey data of more 
than 76,000 males, 1977-1981. Data includ-
ed demographic and em-ployment informa-
tion, and state-specific UI information. 
Current Population Survey data of more than 
185,000 individuals in 35 states, 1979-1987. 
Data included demographic information, and 
focused on 5 major industry categories. 
NOTE: An asterisk (*) indicates the model had low explanatory power. 
An increase in experience rating by doubling the relevant tax rate applied 
to firms with a negative reserve ratio would result in a 50 percent lower lay-
off unemployment rate. An increase in experience rating by increasing the 
maximum tax rate by 10 percent (e.g., from 3.40 to 3.74 percent) would 
reduce layoff unemployment as much as 7 percent from its existing leveL 
Imperfect experience rating fails to prevent about 30 percent of all unem-
ployment spells, the majority of which are from temporary layoffs. The 
unemployment rate would have been 1.5 percentage points lower than its 
level of 5.2 percent if experience rating were perfect. 
A perfectly experience-rated system would reduce the temporary layoff 








Munts and Asher 
(1980) 
Data 
Benefit-cost rates for 11 states by indus-
try,1957-1967. 
Data submitted for 21 states by industry 
on contributions, benefits, taxable and 
total wages, and em-ployees, 1968-1978. 





Data for 6 reserve ratio states from the 
Continuous Wage and Benefit History 
(CWER) project, 1978-1984. Data 
included a sample of records for cov-
ered workers (100,000-200,000 per 
state) and their VI benefit status, as 
well as firm's industry, employment 
level, U1 tax rate, and payrolL 
Results 
Industry: Due to imperfect experience rating, a number of industries have benefit 
payments larger than tax collections. For example, agriculture, mining, and con-
struction have large ratios in most states, and transportation, trade, finance, insurance, 
real estate, and services have small ratios in most states. In addition, there is a much 
larger percentage of negative-balance firms in industries such as construction, min-
ing, and agriculture than in industries such as manufacturing, transportation, trade, 
finance and insurance and real estate, and services. 
Firm Size: Looking at only 4 ofthe 11 states, small firms are more likely to have neg-
ative balances than large firms are; however, there is not a large difference between 
the tax rates of small firms and large finns. 
Due to imperfect experience rating, there are subsidies across industries: construc-
tion, manufacturing, and agriculture receive large positive subsidies; service and min-
ing receive smaller subsidies; and trade and finance, insurance, and real estate receive 
negative subsidies (i.e., contribute more than paid out in benefits). 
Employers with low unemployment subsidized employers with high unemployment 
by $1.6 billion in the 12 states in 1983. Stable industries (e.g., financing, retailing, 
services) subsidize more unstable industries (construction, manufacturing). Negative-
balance employers were charged $3.10 in benefits for each $1 contributed. 
Industry: Due to imperfect experience rating, there are large subsidies to construction 
in all 6 states and subsidies to manufacturing and mining in most states. Finance, 
insurance, and real estate; retail and wholesale trade; services; and transportation 
receive negative subsidies. The results for agriculture are mixed. 
Firm Size: There is some weak evidence which suggests that large firms have larger 
subsidies. 
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because of cross-industry subsidization and socialization. Many researchers 
believe that experience rating should be increased, primarily through the use 
of higher maximum tax rates and broader ranges in tax schedules, to amelio-
rate these problems (see, for example, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of 
the Inspector General 1985; Vroman 1989; and Topel 1990). This would 
increase the degree of experience rating and would reduce reliance on high-
er tax schedules and surcharges.s 
Employer Involvement 
An experience-rated tax provides employers with a clear financial incentive 
to increase the level of their involvement in the UI system. Such involvement 
could include a firm's scrutinizing former employees' UI claims, protesting 
claims that are ineligible, reviewing charges to the firm's account, participat-
ing in the appeals process, and participating in the legislative process. 
Because the system is financed by employers although the benefits generat-
ed go directly to workers, most resistance to the program is likely to arise 
from employers. 
Employers have an incentive to contest UI claims, since their ill taxes are 
directly related to the extent to which their former employees receive UI ben-
efits. In 1994, employers were responsible for 26 percent of lower-authority 
appeals (approximately 256,000 employer appeals) and 32 percent of higher-
authority appeals (approximately 57,000 employer appeals), according to 
Unemployment Insurance Required Reports submitted by the states to the 
U.S. Department of Labor. Both levels of employer appeals have grown more 
rapidly than claimant appeals. Increasingly, employers are turning directly to 
the large number of service companies that manage UI costs in order to mon-
itor UI costs generated by former employees more closely. 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which employers appeal even 
those UI claims that are legitimate. The U.S. Department of Labor, Office of 
the Inspector General (1985) offers some evidence that employers who pay 
the maximum possible tax rate in each state (and therefore incur additional 
costs from benefit claims by former employers) file appeals less frequently 
than do other employers, whose tax rates increase when their benefit costs 
increase (see Table 7-4). This reflects the reduced incentive for employers at 
the maximum tax rate to contest UI claims, since they face no additional cost 
associated with each additional layoff.9 ACUC staff calculations using 
appeals data in two states also indicate that employers at the maximum tax 
rate are less likely to file appeals than are employers at other tax rates.1O 
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TABLE 7-4. Research Results on Experience Rating: Its Effect on 











In 12 audited states, up to $1.1 billion (or 17 per-
cent of total benefits) of "savings" were generated 
because claimants were disqnalified as a result of 
employers or states identifying separation issues 
that made them ineligible for benefits. 
Employers at the maximum tax rate were roughly 
two times less likely to file benefit appeals than 
were variable-rated employers. 
This finding does not necessarily indicate that employers are making 
excessive use of the appeals system. Such a conclusion might be valid if there 
were evidence that employers' (or claimants') win rates vary systematically 
with an employers'}evel of experience rating. Data from Wisconsin and Texas 
(see note 10) do not, however, provide any evidence of such variation. 
Alternatively, one might conclude that employers were making excessive 
use of the appeals system if they won a substantially lower percentage of the 
appeals that they filed compared to the percentage of appeals won by 
claimants who file. Once again, there is no evidence that this is the case. 11 
Timing of Tax Changes 
The temporal relationship between prevailing economic conditions and the 
assessment of experience-rated DI taxes andlor tax schedules can take three 
forms. First, there can be a cyclical relationship: DI taxes and schedules can 
be highest when revenues are most needed. Second, DI taxes can be levied at 
a steady rate each year. Third, there can be a countercyclical relationship: UI 
taxes and schedules can be highest when benefit drain is the lowest. 
State tax schedules are determined, in general, by state economic condi-
tions and by the solvency of the state UI trust fund. Individual tax rates are 
usually calculated once a year. They take the average costs of only the pre-
vious three years into account. Consequently, experience rating typically 
results in a tax structure that cycles one to three years later than does the 
economy. Both the cyclical assessment of individual employers' DI taxes and 
the cyclical assignment of a state tax schedule may have the effect of requir-
ing employers to pay higher DI taxes when they can least afford them (that 
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is, when the firm's financial position has required layoffs or when state eco-
nomic conditions are poor). The cyclicality of experience rating may be even 
greater in states with low taxable wage bases, since a low level of taxable 
payroll can significantly constrain the amount of taxes collected during peri-
ods of prosperity. (This assumes that tax rates in these states have not been 
increased enough to offset the low taxable wage base.) 
Most researchers believe that a countercyclical system of experience rat-
ing individual employers (that is, the system in which tax schedules are kept 
constant or reduced during times of recession and increased during periods 
of economic growth) would be preferable to a cyclical assessment of costs. 
However, the current level of solvency in most states' trust funds and states' 
frequent use of solvency surtaxes and shifting tax schedules indicate that 
many states are not currently in a position to move toward countercyclical 
funding. A state's trust fund must be healthy in order to adopt countercycli-
cal funding strategies, because low reserve levels often necessitate triggering 
higher tax schedules or solvency surtaxes during economic downturus sim-
ply to remain solvent. For example, in the most recent recession, 15 states 
had reserve ratios below 1 percent; between 1990 and 1992, these states 
experienced an average change in tax rates of 51 percent, compared to a 
change of 21 percent in all other states. While it is the low level of forward 
funding (not the experience-rating system) that is primarily responsible for 
the poor timing of employer tax increases, experience rating may compound 
the timing problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A number of possible costs and benefits are associated with experience rat-
ing. Research indicates that the benefits in terms of reduced unemployment 
are substantial. The research also indicates that increases in experience rat-
ing, brought about through higher maximum tax rates and broader ranges in 
the tax rate schedules, would decrease the unemployment rate and improve 
the allocation of costs to the employers and industries that generate those 
costs. This would also decrease the current level of subsidization across 
industries. There is no evidence that experience rating causes increased costs 
to the VI system as a result of employers appealing a significant number of 
legitimate VI claims. However, it is likely that experience rating, in con-
junction with a low taxable wage base and low levels of solvency, contributes 
to the cyclical funding of VI, thereby directly detracting from the system's 
capacity for forward funding. 
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NOTES 
1. In addition to employers, employees also help pay payroll taxes in four states. See 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995,51) for more information. 
2. The tax schedule in effect in a given state will vary depending on (1) state trust fund 
solvency and (2) economic conditions. 
3. See Chapter 6 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) for addi-
tional background information on experience rating, as well as a detailed discussion on 
the types of experience rating. 
4. While there were earlier estimates of the degree of experience rating in the 1970s and 
1980s, the studies were based on a small number of states and calculated very different 
trends in the ERI (Wandner and Crosslin 1980; U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the 
Inspector General 1985). 
5. In 1993, employer UI taxes were 0.9 percent of total wages (U.S. Department of Labor 
1995d). 
6. Three studies provide estimates of this decline-Feldstein (1978), Topel (1986), and 
Card and Levine (1992). 
7. For example, the research usually (1) does not include individual employer tax rates 
and instead usually focuses on industrywide averages, (2) does not have information on 
which individuals actually receive UI and often assumes that all individuals on layoff 
receive UI, and (3) may assume the economy is in equilibrium even if the study period 
includes significant changes in the economy (Vroman 1989). 
8. As noted in the report of the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector 
General (1985), higher tax schedules and solvency surtaxes often decrease the level of 
experience rating. 
9. As noted in technical comments to U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector 
General (1985, 131), these employers may have failed to participate in the appeals 
process, which led to higher benefit charges and higher tax rates than those for other firms. 
10. In Wisconsin, employers were the appellants in 19 percent of all appeals that 
involved employers at the maximum tax rate and in 31 percent of all appeals that involved 
employers not at the maximum. In Texas, employers were the appellants in 45 percent of 
all appeals that involved employers at the maximum rate and in 55 percent of all appeals 
that involved employers not at the maximum. 
11. According to ACUC staff calculations, nationwide, employers win 34 percent of the 
appeals that they file and claimants win 31 percent of the appeals that they file. See 
Chapter 9 in this report for additional information. 
8 / Trends in Determinations, 
Denials, and Appeals 
THE DETERMINATION OF monetary eligibility is a straightforward process that is 
based solely on the employment and earnings history of the VI applicant.) In 
contrast, the determination of nonmonetary eligibility is frequently a more 
complex process, involving three general steps. First, the state agency must 
define and impose a set of nonmonetary eligibility requirements. Second, in 
each individual case, the state identifies whether or not there are nonmonetary 
eligibility issues that need to be investigated. Third, in cases where nonmone-
tary issues are investigated, the state makes what is called a "determination" of 
eligibility, based on information assembled from the employer and claimant.2 
A number of nonmonetary eligibility requirements are applied when the 
state is deciding whether an individual claimant will be awarded VI benefits. 
In general, it is required that the individual demonstrate an ability and will-
ingness to seek and accept suitable employment (be "able and available"), 
and there must be no disqualifications related to the individual's most recent 
job separation. 
States disqualify individuals from receiving benefits for a number of rea-
sons, including the following: voluntary separation from work without "good 
cause" (a "voluntary quit"), discharge from employment due to misconduct 
related to the job, refusal of suitable employment without "good cause," unem-
ployment as a result of a labor dispute, or fraudulent misrepresentation to 
obtain or increase VI benefits. These restrictions are designed to limit payment 
to those workers who are unemployed primarily as a result of economic caus-
es (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a).3 Because almost all eligibility require-
ments for receiving Unemployment Insurance are determined by the states, the 
definitions of nonmonetary eligibility vary significantly across states. 
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This chapter presents overviews of the determination, denial, and appeal 
processes, followed by a discussion of trends in the numbers of determina-
tions, denials, and appeals. Chapter 9 then presents quantitative analysis of 
the causes of the trends in denials and appeals, and it concludes with addi-
tional discussion of the appeal system. 
OVERVIEW OF THE DETERMINATION PROCESS 
The extent to which nonmonetary eligibility requirements actually have an 
effect on claimants depends largely on the extent to which nonmonetary eli-
gibility violations are discovered. Just as there is significant variation across 
states in the definitions of nonmonetary eligibility, there is also variation in 
the processes used to detect determination issues (that is, primarily, the ini-
tial decision to pursue additional information on a separation issue or on a 
claimant's continuing availability for work). Consequently, the process of 
identifying and evaluating individual cases is an important step that ulti-
mately determines the extent to which benefits are denied on the basis of 
nonmonetary eligibility provisions. 
Although a complete description of the methods used in each state to 
detect and decide separation and nonseparation issues is not available, some 
general information is known. The process varies depending on whether the 
issue involves the initial separation from employment or a claimant's ongo-
ing eligibility for VI benefits (that is, a nonseparation issue). Each of these 
processes is described below. 
Determination Process for Separation Issues 
Determinations with respect to separation issues (that is, issues related to an 
individual's separation from employment, such as voluntary separation from 
work without "good cause," and misconduct) are made primarily on the basis 
of the claimant intake process and of information obtained from employers. 
The nature of intake procedures may have a direct effect on the number of 
determinations. Areas of possible variation in intake procedures that could 
have such an effect include the following: (1) when information on nonmon-
etary eligibility requirements is provided to claimants (either before or after 
the intake process), (2) whether the filing of additional forms is required at 
intake if a separation issue arises, and (3) how questions are posed to 
claimants (for example, whether a request is made for a claimant's submis-
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sion of fact or whether a claimant's judgment call is acceptable on the mat-
ter of whether the separation action was with "good cause").4 
With regard to the information obtained from employers, the procedures 
used to solicit this information may significantly affect both the level and the 
type of employer participation. Areas of possible variation in the processes 
for obtaining employer information include the following: (1) when and how 
information is gathered from employers (for example, whether a form is sent 
out automatically with every application for ill benefits or whether all 
responsibility for contesting a claim originates with the employer); (2) how 
the questions are posed to employers; and (3) what types of follow-up mea-
sures are taken to ensure a response. In addition, the decision of individual 
employers to protest the eligibility of VI claims dictates the extent to which 
they participate in the VI system's eligibility determination process. 
Determination Process for Nonseparation Issues 
The number of determinations with respect to nonseparation issues (that is, 
the issues related to an individual's ongoing eligibility, such as that person's 
ability to work, his or her availability for work, and the earning of disquali-
fying income) depends largely on four types of information: (1) the intake 
form; (2) ongoing claims forms, which include information on the claimant's 
job search; (3) Eligibility Review Process (ERP) interviews, which focus on 
detecting potential eligibility issues surrounding the claimant's job-search 
efforts and availability for work; and (4) the claimant's responses to referrals 
and job offers generated by the Employment Service. 
States vary in how frequently they require ongoing claims forms to be 
submitted, as well as in how they interpret and review the information sub-
mitted on the forms. For example, states are more likely to detect an issue if 
they randomly audit some portion of employer contacts required to prove job 
search activity or if they review the ongoing claims forms in detail. States 
that lack review procedures or enforce them poorly would be less likely to 
detect such issues. Similarly, states vary in the frequency with which they 
schedule ERP interviews and office appointments and in their responses to 
these interviews and appointments. In some states, missing one appointment 
with VI staff is considered to be evidence of unavailability for work, where-
as other states are concerned only with repeated broken appointments, and 
still other states never consider this to be a reason to initiate a determination. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE DENIAL PROCESS 
After a determination issue has been identified, a fact-finding process is 
undertaken to gather information from both the claimant and the employer. 
The state's laws and regulations are then applied to those facts, and a deci-
sion is made as to whether ill benefits will be awarded to a claimant. 
Research indicates that the percentage of claims that are denied for nonmon-
etary reasons in any given state is influenced more heavily by the percentage 
of claims in which the state makes a determination than by the percentage of 
determinations that ultimately lead to denials in that state (Corson, Hershey, 
and Kerachsky 1986).5 As a result, the likelihood that any claim will ulti-
mately be denied is a function of both the percentage of claims in which a 
determination is made and the percentage of determinations that lead to 
denial, but the former factor is more the more important of the two. 
Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) identified the following three 
factors which also influence the denial rate: (1) the extent to which all fact-
finding is part of a recognized determination process; (2) the extent to which 
states use in-person interviews; and (3) the extent to which a single staff per-
son conducts both fact-finding and adjudication. 
OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL PROCESS 
The Social Security Act, under which the UI system was established, requires 
that when the determination process results in a denial of UI benefits, each 
state must provide an "opportunity for a fair hearing before an impartial tri-
bunal" (Section 303(a)(3». Every state also allows employers to appeal UI 
benefit awards to claimants, and the state agency may also be involved in an 
appeal. As a result of the 1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision in California 
Department of Human Resources v. Java (402 U.S. 121, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 
L.Ed.2d 666), claimants who have been found eligible for benefits are 
allowed to continue receiving benefits unless and until a decision is made 
that reverses that determination. Thus, an employer's filing an appeal does 
not stop payment of benefits. 
All states allow a claimant or employer at least one administrative appeal, 
usually called a lower-authority or lower-level appeal. The amount of time 
the claimant or employer has to file this appeal varies by state, ranging from 
7 to 30 calendar days after a benefit determination has been made.6 In more 
than one-half of the states, a single hearing officer, generally referred to as a 
referee or examiner, decides the appeal at this stage. In the remaining states, 
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a panel comprised of a referee and two associates may also be used to decide 
the lower-authority appeal. In such cases, the referee is typically an adminis-
trative law judge, and the associates are representatives of the interests of 
employers and claimants. During the appeal, the officer(s) hears evidence 
from both the claimant and employer, conducts a cross-examination, and 
issues a written ruling, called a decision. This decision is final, pending fur-
ther appeal, in all states except four, in which referees are permitted to recon-
sider their decisions within a certain time limit. 7 
Although this is not required by the Social Security Act, all but three 
states also provide claimants and employers the opportunity to file a second 
administrative appeal, usually called a higher-authority or higher-level 
appea1.8 Again, filing time requirements vary across states, ranging from 8 to 
30 calendar days after a lower-authority appeal decision has been made. In 
about half of the states, a board of review or board of appeals is specifically 
formed to decide UI higher-authority appeals. These boards are appointed by 
the governor and consist of between three and seven members, who represent 
labor, employers, and the public.9 In the other states, an existing commission 
or agency head serves as the higher-appeal authority. All states allow these 
decisions to be appealed to the state courts for judicial review. 
TRENDS IN DETERMINATIONS AND DENIALS 
Determination Rates 
According to data submitted by the states, 37 percent of all new claimant 
unemployment spells in the United States in 1994 resulted in some form of a 
nonmonetary determination. 'o The total number of nonseparation determina-
tions (3.4 million) was slightly higher than the number of separation deter-
minations (3.2 million). Nonseparation determinations, however, have gen-
erally been decreasing, and separation determinations have been increasing 
as a share of total determinations since 1978. 
Determination Rates for Separation Issues 
In 1994, approximately 18 percent of new claimant unemployment spells 
resulted in a separation determination. The ratio of separation determinations 
to new claimant spells has fluctuated over time, but has been increasing since 
its low of 11 percent in 1982 (see column 1 in Table 8-1). Approximately half 
TABLE 8-1. U.S. Determination and Denial Rates for Separation 
and Nonseparation Issues, 1971-1994 
separation Issues Nonseparation Iss-'::l~s 
Determination Denial Determination Denial 
Rale per Denials per Rale per Rate per 10 Denials per Rate per 10 
Initial Claim Determination Initial Claim Claimant Contacls Determination Claimant Contacts 
(percenl) (percent) (percenl) (percenl) (percent) (percenl) 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1971 15 51 8 34 39 13 
1972 17 53 9 39 38 15 
1973 18 54 10 43 37 16 
1974 15 55 8 35 38 13 
1975 15 54 8 29 38 11 
1976 18 54 10 41 37 15 
1977 19 53 10 43 37 16 
1978 20 53 11 49 36 18 
1979 18 55 10 42 37 15 
1980 14 57 8 31 41 13 
1981 14 56 8 31 43 13 
1982 11 55 6 23 46 11 
1983 13 53 7 24 45 11 
1984 14 53 7 27 46 13 
1985 14 52 7 25 51 13 
1986 15 53 8 25 56 14 
1987 16 53 9 26 57 15 
1988 17 54 9 27 57 15 
1989 17 54 9 25 60 15 
1990 16 55 9 23 62 14 
1991 15 56 8 20 61 13 
1992 16 56 9 20 61 12 
1993 18 56 10 21 61 13 
1994 18 56 10 21 60 13 
~".-.-----~. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b). 
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of the separation determinations in 1994 were for issues related to voluntary 
leaving, and the other half related to misconduct. 
Given the wide range of state procedures for detecting nonmonetary eli-
gibility issues, it is to be expected that determination rates vary significantly 
by state, as shown for separation issues in Table 8-2. (The table shows the 
number of separation determinations per new UI spell as well as the state 
rank; Nebraska has the highest determination rate, with a rank of 1.) The 
1994 ratio of separation determinations to new claimant spells ranged from a 
low of 8 percent in the Virgin Islands and Kentucky to a high of 89 percent 
in Nebraska." As mentioned previously, significant differences in determina-
tion rates across states are likely to arise from different detection procedures 
as well as from varying definitions of what constitutes a determination. 
Determination Rates (or Nonseparation·/ssues 
Because claimants may become ineligible at any time while receiving VI, non-
separation issues are usually expressed as a percentage of weekly claimant con-
tacts (that is, of all weeks that UI benefits are claimed by active VI claimants). 
In this chapter, nonseparation determinations are expressed per 10 weekly 
claimant contacts. In 1994, of every 10 claimant contacts, 2.1 (or 21 percent) 
resulted in a nonseparation determination (see column 4 of Table 8-1). 
In 1994, 38 percent of nonseparation determinations related to "able and 
available" issues, 25 percent to claimants earning potentially disqualifying 
income, 21 percent to reporting requirements, and 5 percent to refusal of suit-
able work; the remaining 11 percent related to "other" issues. Over time, the 
determination rate for able-and-available issues has decreased, becoming a 
much smaller proportion of total nonseparation determinations. 
By state, the 1994 rate of nonseparation determinations per 10 claimant 
contacts ranged from a low of 2 percent in Tennessee to a high of 84 percent 
in Utah (see Table 8-3). 
Denial Rates 
Two related measures 12 can be used to describe the frequency with which 
denials occur: (1) the ratio of denials to determinations and (2) the ratio of 
denials to either new claimant unemployment spells (for separation issues) or 
weekly claimant contacts (for nonseparation issues). Table 8-1 displays both 
measures and shows that in 1994, 56 percent of all separation determinations 
resulted in denials and 60 percent of all nonseparation determinations result-
ed in denials. 
TABLE 8-2. Determination and Denial Rates for Separation 
Issues, by State, 1994 
Determination Denial 
Rate per Denials per Rate per 
Initial Claim Determination Initial Claim 
State Rate Rank Rat. Rank Rate Rank 
Alabama 12% 48 78% 2 9% 28 
Alaska 16 30 73 8 12 18 
Arizona 30 7 57 30 17 8 
Arkansas 18 26 75 5 13 13 
California 15 34 47 41 7 42 
Colorado 43 2 70 9 30 2 
Connecticut 21 16 26 53 5 49 
Delaware 19 25 74 6 14 12 
District of Columbia 14 41 64 16 9 31 
Florida 25 13 64 15 16 11 
Georgia 21 18 63 18 13 15 
Hawaii 17 28 50 37 8 34 
Idaho 15 33 60 24 9 29 
Illinois 20 20 57 29 11 21 
Indiana 35 4 57 27 20 3 
Iowa 19 22 57 28 11 23 
Kansas 25 12 43 47 11 25 
Kentucky 8 52 65 14 5 50 
Louisiana 35 3 55 33 20 4 
Maine 15 37 40 49 6 48 
Maryland 27 9 70 10 19 5 
Massachusetts 14 39 56 31 8 36 
Michigan 21 17 60 23 13 16 
Minnesota 16 29 45 46 7 41 
Mississippi 23 14 75 4 17 7 
Missouri 27 10 60 22 16 9 
Montana 16 32 62 20 10 27 
Nebraska 89 83 74 1 
Nevada 33 5 56 32 18 6 
New Hampshire 26 11 48 40 12 17 
New Jersey 12 49 68 13 8 37 
(continued) 
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Determination Denial 
Rate per Denials per Rate per 
Initial Claim Determination Initial Claim 
State Rate Rank Rate Rank Rate Rank 
---~.~ 
New Mexico 20% 19 59% 25 12% 20 
New York 15 36 51 36 8 40 
North Carolina 12 45 69 12 9 32 
North Dakota 14 40 47 43 7 46 
Ohio 13 43 62 19 8 38 
Oklahoma 23 15 59 26 13 14 
Oregon 19 21 42 48 8 35 
Pennsylvania 11 50 47 42 5 51 
Puerto Rico 12 47 35 52 4 52 
Rhode Island 12 46 49 39 6 47 
South Carolina 14 42 77 3 11 26 
South Dakota 19 23 63 17 12 19 
Tennessee 10 51 69 11 7 43 
Texas 32 6 50 38 16 10 
Utah 28 8 40 50 11 22 
Vermont 15 35 73 7 11 24 
Virgin Islands 8 53 46 45 4 53 
Virginia 16 31 53 35 8 33 
Washington 17 27 53 34 9 30 
West Virginia 13 44 61 21 8 39 
Wisconsin 15 38 46 44 7 45 
Wyoming 19 24 36 51 7 44 
NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank. 
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems 
with some data reported by Nebraska. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b). 
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TABLE 8-3. Determination and Denial Rates for Nonseparation 
Issues, by State, 1994 
Determination Denial 
Rate per 10 Denials per Rate per 10 
Claimant Contacts Determination Claimant Contacts 
State 
----"-- "-----,---
~"Rank-Rate Rank Rate Rank 
Alabama 53% 3 84% 10 45% 2 
Alaska 30 13 70 25 21 13 
Arizona 44 7 70 26 30 8 
Arkansas 20 24 85 7 17 16 
California 21 23 63 32 13 26 
Colorado 38 10 90 4 34 6 
Connecticut 22 22 48 49 10 34 
Delaware 10 46 88 5 8 40 
District of Columbia 7 52 75 20 5 50 
Florida 8 48 78 16 6 45 
Georgia 13 43 94 2 12 31 
Hawaii 17 35 75 19 13 27 
Idaho 35 11 99 35 5 
Illinois 18 30 51 48 9 38 
Indiana 18 31 85 8 15 19 
Iowa 17 34 58 37 10 36 
Kansas 26 18 65 30 17 17 
Kentucky 8 49 68 27 5 49 
Louisiana 30 14 86 6 26 11 
Maine 50 5 59 36 30 9 
Maryland 24 20 58 38 14 24 
Massachusetts 15 39 55 41 9 39 
Michigan 19 27 54 44 10 35 
Minnesota 19 26 82 13 16 18 
Mississippi 23 21 53 45 12 30 
Missouri 38 9 84 12 32 7 
Montana 12 44 56 39 6 44 
Nebraska 76 2 79 15 60 
Nevada 18 29 84 11 15 20 
New Hampshire 52 4 55 43 28 10 
New Jersey 13 41 55 42 7 42 
(continued) 
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TABLE 8-3. (continued) 
Determination Denial 
Rate per 10 Denials per Rate per 10 
Claimant Contacts Determination Claimant Contacts 
State Rate Rank Rate Rank Rate Rank 
New Mexico 16% 38 39% 52 6% 46 
New York 25 19 47 50 12 32 
North Carolina 17 36 74 21 12 28 
North Dakota 20 25 75 17 15 21 
Ohio 13 42 61 33 8 41 
Oklahoma 11 45 60 35 7 43 
Oregon 18 32 79 14 14 23 
Pennsylvania 27 17 18 53 5 51 
Puerto Rico 16 37 72 22 12 33 
Rhode Island 17 33 70 24 12 29 
South Carolina 9 47 63 31 6 48 
South Dakota 49 6 75 18 37 4 
Tennessee 2 53 67 29 53 
Texas 27 15 53 46 14 22 
Utah 84 1 53 47 44 3 
Vermont 14 40 68 28 10 37 
Virgin Islands 7 50 84 9 6 47 
Virginia 27 16 92 3 25 12 
Washington 19 28 71 23 13 25 
West Virginia 7 51 56 40 4 52 
Wisconsin 30 12 61 34 18 15 
Wyoming 41 8 45 51 18 14 
NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank. 
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems 
with some data reported by Nebraska. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b). 
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Denial Rates for Separation Issues 
In 1994, approximately 10 percent of all new claimant unemployment spells 
resulted in a separation denial (see column 3 in Table 8-1). The ratio of sep-
aration denials to new claims has fluctuated over time, but has been increas-
ing since a low of 6 percent in 1982. 
In 1994, the percentage of determinations that resulted in denial was 72 
percent for issues related to voluntary leaving, and 41 percent for issues relat-
ed to misconduct. Thus, determinations related to voluntary leaving are more 
likely to result in a denial of benefits than are misconduct determinations. In 
the majority of states, these denials resulted in disqualification for benefits 
for the duration of the individual's unemployment spell. 
By state, the 1994 percentage of new claimant unemployment spells that 
resulted in a separation denial ranged from a low of 4 percent in Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands to a high of 74 percent in Nebraska (see note 11). The 
last two columns of Table 8-2 display the number of separation denials per 
initial claim and the state rank. 
Denial Rates for Nonseparation Issues 
In 1994, of every 10 claimant contacts, 1.3 (or 13 percent) resulted in a non-
separation denial (see column 6 in Table 8-1). Although the nationwide rate 
of nonseparation denials per determination has increased significantly over 
time, the rate of nonseparation determinations per 10 claimant contacts has 
decreased (see column 4 in Table 8-1). Over time, this has resulted in a fair-
ly steady rate of nonseparation denials per claimant contact. In 1994, 37 per-
cent of denials were related to able-and-available issues, 25 percent to dis-
qualifying income, 22 percent to reporting requirements, and 2 percent to 
refusal of suitable work; the remaining 14 percent related to "other" issues. 
In 1994, nonseparation denials were most likely to occur in determina-
tions involving violations of reporting requirements (66 percent of such 
determinations were denied), the earning of disqualifying income (61 percent 
denied), or being unable to work or unavailable for work (59 percent denied). 
Denials for these issues resulted in a temporary denial of benefits; as soon as 
the claimant's condition changed, he or she regained VI benefits. Only 28 
percent of determinations related to refusing suitable work resulted in a 
denial of benefits. (In most states, an individual disqualified for this issue 
would subsequently be ineligible for benefits for the remainder of his or her 
unemployment spell). Over time, the rate at which denials are made per 
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determination has increased significantly for able-and-available issues and 
for reporting requirements. The rate has remained fairly stable in regard to 
other issues. 
Table 8-3 shows that the 1994 rate of nonseparation denials per 10 
claimant contacts ranged from a low of 1 percent in Tennessee to a high of 
60 percent in Nebraska (see note 11). 
TRENDS IN APPEALS 
Because of data limitations, all trends in appeals are examined for this report 
using data on lower- and higher-authority appeals decisions, rather than data on 
the number of appeals filed. Consequently, the terms "appeals" and "decisions" 
are used interchangeably throughout this section to refer to appeal decisions. 13 
lower- and Higher-Authority Appeals 
Total appeals increased substantially between 1971 and 1994, with 1.2 mil-
lion total appeals decisions in 1994-more than 3 times the total in 1971. 
Lower-authority appeals constitute the majority of all appeals. They also 
were responsible for most of the increase in the number of total appeals. The 
number of lower-authority appeals decisions in 1994 was almost 1 million-
also more than 3 times the number in 1971. 
The number of lower-authority appeals increased during recessionary peri-
ods between 1971 and 1994, in large part because of the increased number of 
initial claims for UI benefits filed during recessions. However, recession-
induced increases in lower-authority appeals do not entirely account for the 
overall increase. Lower-authority appeals as a percentage of initial claims 
increased steadily, from l.8 percent in 1971 to 5.6 percent in 1994 (see Figure 
8-1).14 Similarly, lower-authority appeals expressed as a percentage of total 
denials increased sharply, from 11 percent in 1971 to 26 percent in 1994. 15 
Higher-authority appeals comprise a much smaller proportion of total 
appeals than do lower-authority appeals, but higher-authority appeals also 
displayed a steady upward trend between 1971 and 1994. The number of 
higher-authority appeals in 1994 was 180,000-almost 4 times greater than 
in 1971. However, as a proportion of lower-authority appeals decisions, high-
er-authority appeals remained relatively constant, fluctuating between about 
15 percent and 20 percent between 1971 and 1994. 









SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b). 
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By state, the numbers of lower- and higher-authority appeals vary greatly. 
Table 8-4 displays the percentage of initial claims that were denied and 
appealed in each state in 1994. Tennessee had the lowest percentage of denials 
per initial claim at 8 percent, while Nebraska had the highest at 123 percent. 16 
Total lower-authority appeals as a percentage of initial claims ranged from 2 
percent in Idaho to 14 percent in Colorado. Appeals as a percentage of denials 
ranged from 4 in Nebraska to 73 percent in the District of Columbia. 17 
Lower-Authority Appeals Decisions, by Issue 
Between 1971 and 1994, appeals of separation determinations accounted for, 
on average, about 60 percent of all lower-authority appeals, whereas appeals 
of nonseparation determinations accounted for about 40 percent of the total. 
The share of separation appeals increased slightly throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s, amounting to 67 percent of total decisions in 1994. Separation 
appeals as a percentage of separation denials increased from about 15 percent 
in 1971 to about 38 percent in 1994, whereas nonseparation appeals as a per-
centage of nonseparation denials increased from 8 percent to 16 percent. 
Furthermore, substantial changes occurred in the issues involved in lower-
authority appeals during the years examined. Appeals of misconduct disputes 
almost doubled. By 1994, misconduct appeals made up the largest proportion 
of total lower-authority appeals, at 38 percent. Appeals of voluntary quit dis-
putes, on the other hand, decreased from 40 percent of total lower-authority 
appeals in 1971 to 30 percent in 1994. As a percentage of totallower-author-
ity appeals, appeals related to refusal of suitable work, able-and-available 
issues, and labor dispute issues were significantly lower in 1994 than in ] 971 
(amounting to 2 percent, 6 percent, and less than 1 percent, respectively, of 
total lower-authority appeals in 1994). Other nonseparation appeals, which 
include issues of receiving disqualifying income and failing to comply with 
reporting requirements, were almost 2 times greater in 1994 than in 1971, 
amounting to 24 percent of total lower-authority appeals in 1994.18 
Lower- and Higher-Authority Appeals, by Claimants and Employers 
Overall, claimants file a greater number of lower- and higher-authority 
appeals than do employers. 19 Claimant appeals made up about 74 percent and 
68 percent of lower- and higher-authority appeals, respectively, in 1994. 
However, employers' lower-authority appeal rates have increased more than 
claimants' have in the past 10 years. The employer rate of lower-authority 
TABLE 8-4. Lower-Authority Denials and Appeals as a Percentage 
of Initial UI Claims, by State, 1994 
Denials as a Appeals as a Appeals a •• 
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
Initial Claims Denials Initial Claims 
State Rate Rank Rale Rank Rale Rank 
Alabama 37% 8 13% 47 5% 32 
Alaska 30 16 10 49 3 48 
Arizona 49 3 24 29 12 2 
Arkansas 26 19 21 36 5 27 
California 18 36 25 26 5 35 
Colorado 62 2 23 30 14 
Connecticut 17 41 38 10 6 21 
Delaware 22 26 34 14 7 17 
District of Columbia 16 44 73 1 11 3 
Florida 23 22 43 7 10 10 
Georgia 20 30 28 20 6 25 
Hawaii 20 31 22 32 4 36 
Idaho 34 11 5 50 2 51 
Illinois 21 29 40 8 8 15 
Indiana 32 12 27 24 9 12 
Iowa 19 33 54 3 11 4 
Kansas 26 17 40 9 10 6 
Kentucky 8 50 37 12 3 47 
Lousiana 43 5 24 28 10 5 
Maine 31 14 16 44 5 30 
Maryland 34 10 29 19 10 8 
Massachusetts 18 39 32 16 6 26 
Michigan 21 28 16 45 3 46 
Minnesota 24 20 25 27 6 22 
Mississippi 26 18 31 18 8 16 
Missouri 41 6 18 42 7 18 
Montana 16 42 11 48 2 50 
Nebraska 123 1 4 51 5 28 
Nevada 31 13 27 23 9 13 
New Hampshire 35 9 17 43 6 24 
New Jersey 16 43 38 11 6 23 
(continued) 
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Denials as a Appeals as a Appeals as a 
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
Initial Claims Denials Initial Claims 
State Rale Rank Rale Rank Rate Rank 
New Mexico 18% 38 56% 2 10% 7 
New York 22 25 23 31 5 31 
North Carolina 14 46 26 25 4 43 
North Dakota 18 37 28 22 5 29 
Ohio 15 45 14 46 2 49 
Oklahoma 19 34 43 6 8 14 
Oregon 19 35 21 34 4 41 
Pennsylvania 9 49 46 4 4 39 
Rhode Island 17 40 19 40 3 45 
South Carolina 14 47 28 21 4 42 
South Dakota 37 7 18 41 7 20 
Tennessee 8 51 46 5 4 44 
Texas 30 15 32 15 10 9 
Utah 48 4 20 39 10 11 
Vermont 21 27 21 37 4 37 
Virginia 23 21 20 38 5 34 
Washington 22 24 21 35 5 33 
West Virginia 12 48 37 13 4 38 
Wisconsin 20 32 22 33 4 40 
Wyoming 22 23 32 17 7 19 
NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank. 
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems 
witb the denial rates reported by Nebraska. It is possible, however, for denials as a percentage of ini-
tial claims to exceed 100 percent in tbis table because tbe denominator of tbis ratio does not include 
the number of weeks that ill benefits are claimed by active ill claimants (tbat is, weekly claimant 
contacts). Therefore, exclusion of the weeks of claimant contacts from the denominator causes the 
denial rate to be overestimated. Measuring total denials as a proportion of total initial claims, how-
ever, allows tbis ratio to be directly compared with the ratio of total appeals to initial claims. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b). 
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appeals doubled over this period, from almost 5 percent in 1983 to almost 10 
percent in 1994, whereas the claimant rate leveled off (see Figure 8-2). In 
contrast, the trend in the ratio of higher-authority appeals to unfavorable 
lower-authority appeals was similar for claimants and employers between 
1971 and 1994. 
In addition, the difference in success rate by employers and claimants has 
changed over time. Currently, employers win a slightly higher percentage of 
the lower-authority appeals that they file than do claimants. Employer appel-
lants, however, won a smaller percentage of decisions at the lower appeals 
levels between 1971 and 1994, whereas claimant appellants won a larger per-
centage (see Figure 8-3). Similar trends are observed for higher-authority 
appeals. The gap between appellant success rates for employers and 
claimants at both levels of appeals declined substantially, with success rates 
converging around 32 percent for appellants in lower-authority appeals and 
18 percent in higher-authority appeals. Thus, the success rate of employer 
appellants is falling at both the lower- and higher-authority appeals, while at 
the lower authority, their appeal rate is increasing. 
SUMMARY 
Overall, the number of times a state denies benefits to UI claimants on the 
basis of nonmonetary eligibility issues is more dependent on the number of 
determinations than on the percentage of determinations that lead to denials. 
Currently, 10 percent of all new claimant unemployment spells result in sep-
aration denials, and 1.3 percent of all claimant contacts result in nonsepara-
tion denials. There have not been large shifts in the nationwide denial rates, 
but the rate of determinations and the percentage of determinations resulting 
in denials differ for separation and nonseparation issues. In cases involving 
separation issues, both rates have been increasing slightly, although in cases 
involving nonseparation issues, the determination rate has been increasing 
but the percentage of determinations resulting in a denial has been decreas-
ing. In addition, some nonmonetary issues are more likely to result in denials 
than are others. Most notably, voluntary leaving issues and violations of 
reporting requirements are most likely to result in denials, and issues related 
to misconduct and refusal of suitable work are least likely to result in denials. 
There is large variation across states in their reported determination and 
denials rates. 
Between 1971 and 1994, the number of both lower- and higher-authority 
appeals increased. Lower-authority appeals as a percentage of both initial 
;;:; 
FIGURE 8-2. Claimant and Employer Rates of Lower-Authority UI Appeals, 1971-1994 
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claims and denials also increased. Furthermore, within lower-authority 
appeals, separation appeals as a percentage of separation denials and non-
separation appeals as a percentage of nonseparation denials both increased. 
In particular, appeals of misconduct issues increased substantially, whereas 
appeals of voluntary quit, refusal of suitable work, and able-and-available 
issues decreased. 
For the period examined, the number of appeals filed by claimants was 
higher than the number filed by employers. Employers, however, were 
appealing at an increasing rate over time. The success rate of employers in 
winning the appeals that they filed decreased at both lower and higher 
authorities, whereas the success rate of claimant appellants increased. In 
1994, both employers and claimants who filed appeals were winning about 
32 percent of the lower-authority appeals and about 18 percent of the higher-
authority appeals. 
NOTES 
1. For more information on monetary eligibility, see Chapter 7 of Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1995). 
2. Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) is the source of the information on how non-
monetary determinations and denials are made. 
3. For more information on nonmonetary eligibility definitions, see Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1995, 101-123). 
4. In addition, some of these factors could affect the number of individuals who apply 
for benefits. 
5. Stated somewhat differently, there is significantly more variation across states in 
determinations per initial claim than in the ratio of denials to determinations. 
6. Specific state information on filing time and hearing officers for lower- and higher-
authority appeals was obtained from U.S. Department of Labor (1995d). 
7. Referees in Hawaii, Ohio, and Tennessee have up to 30 days to reconsider a decision; 
in Michigan, referees have up to 10 days to reconsider. 
8. Hawaii, Nebraska, and the Virgin Islands do not provide a second administrative 
appeal. Appeals of lower-authority decisions in these states are taken directly to the state 
courts for judicial review. 
9. Exceptions are Mississippi, where the board is appointed by the Employment Security 
Commission, and New Jersey, where the board is appointed by the Director of 
Employment Security. 
10. Data for the analysis of trends in determinations, denials, and appeals were extract-
ed from the Unemployment Insurance Required RepOlts (UIRR) database, which contains 
statistics provided by the states. 
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11. According to the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems with some 
data reported by Nebraska. 
12. The denial rate pel' initial claim (column 3 in Table 8-1) is the mathematical product 
of the determination rate pel' initial claim (column 1) and the denials per determination 
(column 2). 
13. The states report UI appeals information monthly by filing Report 5130 ofthe UIRR. 
Other than the number of appeals filed each month, Report 5130 provides information in 
terms of decisions made on higher- and lower-authority appeals. Therefore, to remain con-
sistent, the analysis reported here uses "decisions" to approximate "appeals." 
Between 1971 and 1994, the percentage of lower-authority appeals decided ranged 
from 83 percent to 100 percent, and was below 93 percent in only four of those years. The 
percentage of higher-authority appeals decided ranged from 84 percent to 100 percent, 
and was below 93 percent in only six of those years. Therefore, the number of decisions 
closely approximates the number of appeals and is adequate to analyze trends in UI 
appeals. 
14. The number of initial claims has increased 15 percent between 1971 and 1994. 
15. In contrast to the increase in initial claims, the number of denials has remained rela-
tively constant between 1971 and 1994. 
16. According to the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems with the 
denial rates reported by Nebraska. It is, however, possible for this ratio to exceed 100 per-
cent because the denominator of the ratio does not include the number of weeks that ur 
benefits are claimed by active UI claimants (that is, weekly claimant contacts). Therefore, 
exclusion of the weeks of claimant contacts from the denominator in Table 8-4 causes the 
denial rate to be overestimated. Measuring total denials as a proportion of initial claims, 
however, allows this ratio to be directly compared with the ratio of total appeals to initial 
claims. 
17. Again, misreporting of data by Nebraska may make this figure artificially low. 
18. Because the UIRR Report 5130 does not separate the "other" category by issue, 
changes over time in appeals decisions with respect to specific issues within this catego-
ry cannot be determined. 
19. The figures in this section include only lower- and higher-authority appeals involv-
ing claimants and employers. Appeals in which the UI agency was a party are excluded. 
They represent an average of 0.1 percent of total lower-authority appeals and 1 percent of 
higher-authOlity appeals during the peliod 1971 to 1994. 
9 / Analysis of Denials 
and Appeals 
THIS CHAPTER FOCUSES ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS that may affect the declining 
receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) among the unemployed. The next 
major section, "Explaining Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal Out-
comes," examines the following: (1) the rates at which state agencies deny 
benefits to UI claimants, (2) the rates at which employers and claimants 
appeal those decisions, and (3) the success rates of employers and claimants, 
or the rates at which they win the appeals they bring. (The trends discussed 
in the section were considered in detail in Chapter 8.) Using aggregate state 
data from 1978 to 1990, the section entitled "Analysis of Appeal-Level Data" 
then provides some explanation for the variation across states in the three 
measures. Using 1994 appeal-level data from Texas and Wisconsin, addition-
al research is conducted on the rates at which appeals are made and the par-
ties that are likely to win their appeals. The final section, "Case Study of 
Lower-Authority Appeals," discusses the ACUC case study of the appeals 
system in eight states. 
EXPLAINING DENIAL RATES, APPEAL RATES, 
AND APPEAL OUTCOMES 
In its discussion of trends in denial rates and appeal rates, the preceding 
chapter indicates that there are significant differences in these rates, both 
across states and over time. Awareness of these trends is important because 
more appeals require more financial resources and time-and, as pointed out 
in Chapter 8, the number of appeals has been increasing in recent years. 
While claimants clearly have a right to appeal their Ul decisions, the increase 
in the number of appeals could signal problems elsewhere in the overall UI 
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program. Such problems may be related to changes in state administration 
and eligibility criteria. Because the denial and appeal rates are directly linked 
to UI eligibility and to the receipt of UI benefits, understanding the denial 
and appeal rates may improve understanding of the process of eligibility 
determination and how it affects VI claimants. 
To understand the trends in denial rates, lower-authority appeal rates, 
and appeal outcomes over time and across states, the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation conducted regression analyses on these 
issues. Details of the research methodology are reported in Appendix B. 
This section discusses the empirical analyses using annual, state-level panel 
data from 1978 to 1990, and the next section presents the empirical research 
on appeal rates and success rates for both employers and claimants using 
rnicrolevel data on appeals in two states-Wisconsin and Texas-for which 
data were available to the Advisory Council. 
Factors Influencing Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal 
Outcomes 
For the regression analyses, the following variables were selected to describe 
the denial rates, appeal rates, and appeal outcomes: trust fund solvency, state 
tax collections, penalties associated with nonmonetary eligibility require-
ments, the efficiency of state administration, VI benefit generosity, and labor 
force characteristics.! The regressions included dummy variables representing 
each state, to determine which states had denial rates, appeal rates, or appeal 
outcomes that were higher or lower than would have been expected from the 
regression analysis.2 The remainder of this section presents the results from 
the regressions and includes maps that display geographic pattems in denial 
rates. Only statistically significant results are discussed below. 
Empirical Results 
Separation and Nonseparation Denial Rates 
To analyze denial rates, different equations were estimated for separation 
issues (issues raised by employers regarding claimants' separation from work) 
and nonseparation issues (raised by state agencies regarding claimants' ongo-
ing eligibility for VI benefits). The variables used in this analysis explained 
more of the differences across states and time for separation issues than they 
explained for nonseparation issues. 
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The regression results indicate that high separation denial rates are asso-
ciated with the following: (1) nonmonetary eligibility penalties for separa-
tion issues which disqualify individuals from receiving benefits for less than 
the full duration of unemployment (that is, more lenient penalties for volun-
tary quits and misconduct than are assessed by most states);3 (2) lower 
weekly benefit amounts; (3) lower percentages of job losers; and (4) lower 
rates of unemployment. High nonseparation denial rates are associated with 
the following: (1) lower reserve ratios, (2) shorter duration of UI benefits,4 
(3) lower rates of unemployment, and (4) lower rates of unionization. 
A large amount of state variation in denial rates could not be explained 
by the policy variables in the models discussed above.5 An examination of 
the patterns of denial rates across the United States reveals geographic clus-
ters of high and low rates. Figure 9-1 maps the average separation denial 
rate between 1978 and 1990, and Figure 9-2 maps the nonseparation denial 
rate for the same period. These maps indicate that states' denial rates display 
distinct geographical patterns. For example, Figure 9-2 displays a group of 
contiguous states in the East that have particularly low nonseparation denial 
rates, and it shows a large group of states in the West that have high nonsep-
aration denial rates. These patterns could be the result of various factors-
including cooperation among states or competition among states. In the case 
of either cooperation or competition, neighboring states may be adopting 
similar state laws or similar state administrative procedures, particularly in 
the area of eligibility. 
The statistical significance of many of the coefficients of the state dummy 
variables from the regressions (presented in Appendix B) demonstrates that 
the state variation that remains unexplained has an impact on denial rates. An 
examination of the geographic patterns of the significant state coefficients 
(see Figures 9-3 and 9-4) finds clusters similar to those of the denial rates 
illustrated in Figures 9-1 and 9-2. For example, Figure 9-4 shows that the 
group of states in the West with high nonseparation denial rates (Figure 9-2), 
also has state coefficients that are positive and statistically significant. This 
indicates that the denial rates in these states are higher than would be expect-
ed, given the effects of the other independent variables included in the analy-
sis. (All effects of the state dummy variables are relative to Pennsylvania.) 
Employer and Claimant Appeal Rates 
Separate regression equations were estimated for employer and claimant 
appeal rates. The variables used in these equations explained more of the 
FIGURE 9-1. Average Rates at Which States Denied Benefits to UI Claimants on the Basis of 
Separation Issues, 1978-1990 
SOURCE: u.s. Department of Labor (1995b). 
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FIGURE 9-2. Average Rates at Which States Denied Benefits to UI Claimants on the Basis of 
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FIGURE 9-3. Statistically Significant State Coefficients from Regression Results for Separation 
Denials, 1978-1990 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments 
(1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (l995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993). 
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FIGURE 9-4. Statistically Significant State Coefficients from Regression Results for 
Nonseparation Denials, 1978-1990 
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SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments 
(1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993). 
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differences across states and time for claimant appeal rates than they 
explained for employer appeal rates. The regression results indicate that 
high employer appeal rates are associated with the following: (1) higher 
state taxable wage bases, (2) more stringent penalties for misconduct dis-
charges, (3) higher denial rates, (4) longer durations of UI benefits, (5) lower 
weekly benefit amounts (see note 4), (6) lower rates of unemployment, 
(7) lower rates of unionization, and (8) higher percentages of job losers (see 
note 4). High claimant appeal rates are associated with the following: 
(1) higher effective tax rates, (2) more lenient penalties for refusal of suit-
able work, (3) more stringent penalties for misconduct, (4) higher denial 
rates, (5) longer durations of VI benefits, (6) lower weekly benefit amounts 
(see note 4), and (7) lower rates of unionization. 
The statistical significance of most of the state coefficients from the 
regressions (presented in Appendix B) indicates that unexplained state vari-
ation has a substantial impact on employer and claimant appeal rates. The 
results indicate that a group of contiguous states in the Midwest and 
Southwest has higher claimant appeal rates than would be expected (relative 
to those of the reference state, Pennsylvania). The significant state coeffi-
cients from the employer appeal rate equation, however, showed no strong 
geographic patterns. 
Employer and Claimant Success Rates 
Separate regression equations were estimated for employer and claimant suc-
cess rates. Although individual variables in these regressions were signifi-
cant, the overall models had low explanatory power (almost none of the vari-
ation across states and time was explained in either equation when the state 
dummy variables were excluded). The results indicate that among employer-
initiated appeals, high employer success rates are associated with only the 
following variables: (1) lower effective tax rates and (2) lower rates of 
employer appeals. These results suggest that when states have low tax collec-
tions, employers are more likely to win their appeals at the lower authority. 
A number of variables were significant predictors of claimant appeal suc-
cess. The results indicate that, among claimant-initiated appeals, high 
claimant success rates are associated with the following: (1) lower effective 
tax rates, (2) lower state taxable wage bases, (3) more lenient penalties for 
voluntary quit and misconduct issues, (4) more stringent penalties for refusal 
of suitable work, (5) Democratic state government, (6) lower quality of non-
monetary determinations, (7) higher denial rates, (8) lower rates of unioniza-
ANALYSIS OF DENIALS AND APPEALS /143 
tion, and (9) higher percentages of appeals filed by employers. Although the 
explanatory power of the model was low, most of the significant variables 
were anticipated. 
Most of the states have insignificant coefficients in the employer success 
rate equation (presented in Appendix B), whereas in the claimant success 
rate equation, most have significant coefficients. Thus, the state dummy 
variables were better able to explain claimant success rates than to explain 
employer success rates.6 The significant state coefficients indicate little geo-
graphic clustering of states with higher- or lower-than-expected employer or 
claimant success rates. 
Summary 
All of the regression equations presented in this section, especially the suc-
cess rate equations, performed relatively poorly, for two primary reasons: 
(1) A number of variables were unavailable, although they could have added 
significant explanatory power to the model. For example, information on the 
administrative processes of the state UI programs and definitions of the non-
monetary eligibility requirements might have improved the regression equa-
tions' prediction of state variation (when the state dummy variables were 
excluded). (2) States are probably not the best unit of measurement, espe-
cially in the equations estimating the appeal behavior of claimants and 
employers. Appeal-level microdata-such as those presented in the next 
section-provide a better framework for answering these questions. 
ANALYSIS OF APPEAL-LEVEL DATA 
The following questions can more appropriately be answered with appeal-
level data than with state-level data: (1) Does the current structure that 
finances UI benefits encourage employers to appeal legitimate cases or not? 
(2) What factors predict which party will win an appeal? This section provides 
background information on these two issues, and presents the results from an 
analysis of 1994 appeal-level data from Texas and Wisconsin. 
Effect of Experience Rating on Appeal Rates and Success Rates 
In most states, VI benefits are financed exclusively through employer pay-
roll taxes that are assessed by the state.7 States are currently required by the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act to finance program benefits through an 
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"experience-rated" tax structure. Under experience rating, the rate of taxa-
tion for a given tax schedule varies with an individual employer's unem-
ployment experience.8 In other words, employers who create the most cost 
for the system are assessed the highest tax rates. 9 It is often argued that 
experience-rated taxes allow state governments and the federal government 
to influence employers' behavior in socially beneficial ways. Economists, 
however, often assert that the entity on which a tax is legislatively imposed 
(in this instance, employers) may be different from the entity that actually 
pays the tax. 10 
Recent research by Anderson and Meyer (1994), which focused specifi-
cally on the experience-rated UI tax that firms pay, indicates that firms are 
able to shift flat taxes (for example, the minimum tax rate within that firm's 
industry) to their employees, but that they are much less able to shift the 
portion of their taxes that is experience-rated. Thus, a significant percentage 
of experience-rated taxes are absorbed by the individual firm (see Chapter 7 
on this subject). 
As a result, an experience-rated UI tax (rather than a flat tax) is likely to 
promote UI program goals by affecting a firm's decision making. One such 
VI program goal is to provide a financial incentive for employers to police 
the VI program by protesting ineligible claims. l1 This program goal, how-
ever, may result in negative consequences-for example, inappropriate 
employer involvement in the eligibility determinations and appeals processes 
if some employers respond to the financial incentives by contesting legiti-
mate UI claims. 
Since their VI taxes are directly related to the extent to which their former 
employees receive UI benefits, employers have an incentive to contest UI 
claims. In 1994, employers were responsible for 26 percent of lower-authority 
appeals (a total of approximately 256,000 employer appeals). As previously 
discussed, the rate of employer appeals has grown more rapidly than that of 
claimant appeals (U.S. Department of Labor 1995b). 
Description of Data from Texas and Wisconsin 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation obtained 1994 
microlevel data from two states-Texas and Wisconsin-that provided infor-
mation on employer tax rates (in both states) and on the use of representation 
by employers and claimants at appeals hearings (in Wisconsin only).12 The 
data from Texas were a random sample consisting of 20 percent of all experi-
ence-rated employers in 1994. These data were merged with the correspond-
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ing lower-level appeals data for nonmonetary separation issues (3,561 hear-
ings). The Wisconsin data included all lower-level appeals resulting from a 
nonmonetary separation issue in 1994 (11,746 hearings). 
Empirical Results: Appeal Rates 
The Texas and Wisconsin data confirm earlier findings that employers at the 
maximum tax rate are less likely to file appeals than are employers at other 
tax rates (see U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General 
1985). In Texas, employers brought 45 percent of all the appeals that 
involved employers at the maximum tax rate and 55 percent of all appeals 
involving employers at a tax rate other than the maximum. In Wisconsin, 
employers brought 19 percent of all appeals involving employers at the 
maximum tax rate and 31 percent of all appeals involving employers at a tax 
rate other than the maximum (see Table 9-1). This finding does not neces-
sarily indicate that employers are making excessive use of the appeals sys-
tem. Such a conclusion might be valid, however, if there was evidence that 
employer (or claimant) win rates vary systematically with an employer's 
level of experience rating. 
Empirical Results: Success Rates 
Tabulations of the data from Texas and Wisconsin do not provide evidence 
that employer success rates (that is, the number of appeals won by employ-
ers as a percentage of all appeals brought by employers) vary with experi-
TABLE 9-1. Employer Appeal and Success Rates, by Employer Tax 
Rate, in Texas and Wisconsin, 1994 (percent) 
Tax Rate 
Less Than Maximum 
Maximum Rate 
Texas Data Wisconsin Data 
Appeal Rate Success Rat. Appeal Rate Sucre .. Rale 
55 14 31 26 
45 14 19 28 
NOTE: Data are based on 3,561 lower-authority appeal hearings from Texas and 11,746 lower-
authority appeal hearings from Wisconsin in 1994. 
Employer success rate is defined as the number of appeals that employers win as a percentage of 
all appeals filed by employers. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human 
Resources, State of Wisconsin; and Texas Employment Commission. 
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ence rating. Of the appeals filed by employers in Wisconsin, employers at 
the maximum tax rate won 28 percent and employers at all other tax rates 
won 26 percent. Of the appeals filed by employers in Texas, employers at 
the maximum tax rate won 14 percent and employers at all other tax rates 
also won 14 percent (see Table 9-1). Thus, this preliminary analysis of suc-
cess rates by the level of experience rating does not provide evidence that 
employers are making excessive use of the appeals system. 
It is important to note that at least two main factors influence the out-
come of an appeal. The first is which parties participated in the hearing, and 
the second is which, if any, parties were represented (either by an attorney 
or by an advocate who is not an attorney, such as a union official or a third-
party employer representative). The regression results for Wisconsin pre-
sented later in this chapter provide additional information on how tax rates 
influence employer success rates when important variables such as partici-
pation and representation are included. This more sophisticated analysis of 
employer success also indicates that these rates do not vary significantly 
with the experience-rated tax rate. 
Finally, one might conclude that employers were making excessive use 
of the appeals system if they won a substantially lower percentage of the 
appeals that they filed compared to the percentage of appeals won by 
claimants who file them. (This could indicate that employers were filing 
appeals with less merit than the appeals filed by claimants.) There is no evi-
dence that this is the case on a national level. In 1993, nationwide, employ-
ers won 34 percent of the appeals that they filed and claimants won 31 per-
cent of the appeals that they filed (U.S. Department of Labor 1995b). 
There is, however, considerable variation across states in the percentages 
of appeals won by employers and claimants. Wisconsin data indicate that, 
during 1994, employers won 28 percent of the appeals that they filed and 
claimants won 29 percent of the appeals they filed. In Texas, however, data 
indicate that employers won 14 percent of the appeals they filed and 
claimants won 67 percent of the appeals they filed. Texas employers filed a 
disproportionately higher share of appeals (55 percent compared to a nation-
al average of 26 percent), and claimants won a disproportionately higher 
share of appeals (78 percent compared to a national average of 31 percent). 
These statistics from Texas, while by no means conclusive, would be consis-
tent with the hypothesis that employers in that state make excessive use of 
the appeals system. 13 
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Other Factors Influencing Appeals Outcomes 
Little research has been devoted to understanding the VI appeals process 
and the factors which affect the probability that either the employer or 
claimant will win. This section discusses two relevant factors relating to 
how well each side is able to present its case. The first factor is the impor-
tance of both parties participating in the hearing. The second is that repre-
sentation may have a bearing on the effectiveness of case presentation. (See 
the section below, "Case Study of Lower-Authority Appeals," for additional 
information on these factors.) 
The importance of participation depends on which separation issue is in 
question. The burden of proof is placed on employers for misconduct issues 
and on claimants for "voluntary quit" issues. Thus, if an employer did not 
attend a hearing for a misconduct issue, the claimant would most likely win. 
If an employer did not attend a hearing for a voluntary quit issue related to 
good cause, however, the verdict would depend on whether the claimant 
could prove he or she had good cause for leaving the job. 
Participation 
In both Texas and Wisconsin, claimants are more likely than employers are 
to participate in lower-authority appeals. In Wisconsin, claimants participat-
ed in 66 percent of the total hearings (participation by telephone is includ-
ed), and employers participated in only 16 percent. The claimant was some-
what more likely to participate in the hearing when he or she was the appel-
lant (68 percent) than when the employer was the appellant (59 percent). 
Employers participated in 16 percent of hearings in both circumstances. 
In Texas, claimants participated in 70 percent of the total hearings (partic-
ipation by telephone is included), and employers participated in 59 percent. 
When the claimant was the appellant, claimants participated in 86 percent of 
the hearings, whereas employers participated in 53 percent. When the 
employer was the appellant, however, claimants participated in 58 percent of 
the hearings, whereas employers participated in 65 percent. As expected, par-
ticipation in a hearing increased the party's likelihood of winning when the 
other party did not participate. Table 9-2 displays these results. 
Representation 
A second factor that increases the likelihood that one side or the other will 
win an appeal is the use of representation (either an attorney or an advocate 
TABLE 9-2. Lower-Authority Appeals Hearings: Appearance and 
Success Rates in Texas and Wisconsin, 1994 
Who Appears at Hearing 
State Only Claimant Only Employer Both Parties Neither Party 
Texas 
Percent Appearing 
All Hearings 20 9 50 21 
Claimant Appellant 36 3 50 12 
Employer Appellant 7 14 51 28 
Success Rate (number) 
Claimant 87 N.A. 73 N.A. 
Employer 4 46 12 2 
Number of observations 712 320 1,792 737 
Wisconsin 
Percent Appearing 
All Hearings 53 3 13 32 
Claimant Appellant 55 3 13 29 
Employer Appellant 46 3 13 38 
Success Rate (number) 
Claimant 43 1 33 2 
Employer 23 59 33 30 
Number of observations 6,168 324 1,508 3,746 
NOTE: N.A. indicates that the information is not available because sample sizes were too small to 
estimate. Success rate is defined as the number of appeals claimants (employers) win as a percent-
age of all appeals brought by claimants (employers). Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using 1994 data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and 
Human Resources, State of Wisconsin; and Texas Employment Commission. 
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who is not an attorney). A recent process analysis of lower-authority appeals 
hearings in Wisconsin addressed this issue (Kritzer 1995).14 Kritzer finds that 
representation in general can have a significant effect on VI appeals hearings. 
Representatives often perform one or more of the ,following functions: pre-
pare a client for the ill hearing; help to frame the issue being appealed in a 
manner that best serves the client; ensure that necessary witnesses and docu-
mentation are brought to the hearing; and ask relevant questions of the par-
ties and their witnesses. In most states, representation of claimants and 
employers can be by attorneys or by advocates who are not attorneys. There 
are, however, some differences in the type of representatives that claimants 
are likely to use and those that employers are likely to use. 
Kritzer (1995) notes that claimant representatives are often union offi-
cials, or law students, or lawyers. Because the fees that attorneys earn when 
representing claimants in UI cases are limited in most states (including 
Wisconsin), lawyers represent claimants relatively infrequently, and often 
only when the case is connected in some way to another proceeding (for 
example, an allegation of harassment or discrimination). In contrast, 
claimants are more frequently represented by union officials or law students. 
Union officials usually represent claimants as part of their union duties, and 
law students are usually acting as volunteers when they represent claimants. 
Because of the necessarily low fees that attorneys can charge claimants 
and the limited availability of most "voluntary" claimant representatives, 
claimants may be more likely to have representation when they have a strong 
case. Thus, it is possible that some portion of claimants with representation 
are more likely to win their cases because of the basic strength of the case 
than because of the actual contribution by advocates to the hearing process. 
In general, employers are likely to be more familiar with the unemploy-
ment compensation appeals process than claimants are. Employers frequent-
ly are represented either by someone from inside the firm or by an agent 
outside the firm; this representative mayor may not be an attorney. Larger 
firms are more likely to have either internal legal staff or human resources 
personnel who are familiar with the UI appeals system. Many firms also 
rely on third-party employer representatives-agents who specialize in 
monitoring and controlling firms' payroll costs, including costs associated 
with workers' compensation and unemployment compensation. Part of the 
responsibility of third-party representatives is to file appeals and represent 
firms at the actual hearings. As a result of the use of third-party representa-
tives and because of the unrestricted fees that lawyers can charge employers 
(unlike claimants), employers are more likely than claimants to make use of 
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some type of representation in VI hearings. Additionally, firms that are 
large, have in-house experience with VI hearings, or contract with third-
party representatives are more likely to bring a representative because of 
their easy access to these resources. 
As a result of his observations of VI hearings in Wisconsin, Kritzer 
(1995) suggests that attorneys are not necessarily the most effective repre-
sentatives in VI hearings for either claimants or employers. He finds that the 
most effective advocates are those that are most familiar with VI hearings 
procedures. Effective legal representatives, therefore, typically specialize in 
employment law and appear at VI hearings frequently. Effective representa-
tives who are not attorneys are generally knowledgeable about specific VI 
rules, regulations, and procedures, and also specialize in providing represen-
tation at VI hearings. 
In the appeal-level data used for this ACVC analysis, representation 
information was available only for Wisconsin. In 1994 in Wisconsin, parties 
(employer and/or claimant) were represented in only 6 percent of all appeals. 
When one party or the other was represented, that party increased its chance 
of winning the appeal. In addition, claimants were helped slightly more than 
employers when they were represented by an attorney (see Table 9-3).15 The 
following subsection discusses a more sophisticated analysis using the 
Wisconsin data to determine how various factors influence the outcome of an 
appeals hearing. 
Empirical Results 
Vsing the appeal-level data from Wisconsin, two categories of factors were ana-
lyzed to determine their influence on the success rates of claimants and employ-
ers.16 These categories include variables describing characteristics of the employ-
er and variables describing characteristics of the appeal hearing. Appendix B 
contains a detailed discussion of the variables and· the statistical technique used. 
The regression results are discussed in the following subsections. 
Results: Employer Success Rate. The results on the success rates of employers 
indicate that they were more likely to win appeals when (1) the fIrm had more 
than 100 employees, (2) the employer appeared at the hearing, and (3) the 
employer was represented at the hearing. Employers were less likely to win 
their appeals when (1) the claimant appeared at the hearing, (2) multiple issues 
were contested (see note 4), and (3) the hearing was conducted by telephone. 
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TABLE 9-3. Lower-Authority Appeals Hearings: Success Rate, by 
Representation, Wisconsin, 1994 
Only Claimant Only Employer Both Parties Neither Party 
Represented Represented Represented Represented 
Success Rate (2.2%) (3.2%) (0.4%) (94.1%) 
Observations (number) 260 380 52 11,054 
Claimant (percent) 55 24 46 28 
Employer (percent) 25 41 N.A. 28 
NOTE: N.A. indicates that the information is not available because sample sizes were too small to 
estimate. Success rate is defined as the number of appeals that claimants (employers) win as a percent-
age of all appeals brought by claimants (employers). Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using 1994 data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and 
Human Resources, State of Wisconsin. 
Two variables that were not significant in this equation were the individ-
ual employer's tax rate and whether the claimant had legal representation. 
These two results are important, indicating that individual employer tax 
rates do not affect the employers' success in winning the appeals they bring, 
and that when an employer files the appeal, a claimant's use of legal repre-
sentation does not significantly affect the outcome. 
Results: Claimant Success Rate. The results on the success rate of employ-
ees indicate that a claimant was more likely to win an appeal when (1) he or 
she appeared at the hearing, (2) he or she was represented at the hearing, 
and (3) the employer was taxed at a higher rate. A claimant was less likely 
to win an appeal when (1) the employer had 20 or more employees, (2) the 
employer appeared at the hearing, (3) the employer was represented at the 
hearing, (4) the employer was in the manufacturing industry, (5) multiple 
issues were contested, and (6) the hearing was conducted by telephone. 
Both employers and claimants were less likely to win appeals that they 
filed when there were multiple issues involved in the appeal and when the 
hearing was conducted by telephone instead of in person. These factors, 
however, had more of a negative effect on claimants than they did on 
employers. Claimants were only about half as likely to win appeals when 
mUltiple issues were involved, whereas employers were just a little more than 
three-fourths as likely to win, all else being equal. This difference was small-
er for telephone hearings. 17 
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It is important to note that when claimants bring appeals, legal represen-
tation for both the claimant and the employer affects the outcome of the 
appeal. In addition, unlike employer appeals, higher employer tax rates do 
affect the success rates of claimants when claimants file the appeals. 
CASE STUDY OF LOWER-AUTHORITY APPEALS 
Research Design 
In order to supplement existing data on lower-authority appeals and to col-
lect otherwise unreported qualitative data about the hearing process, the 
Advisory Council undertook a case study of appeals hearings that were 
held in eight states-California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Texas, and Virginia-over the summer of 1995. 18 An effort was made to 
select states that differed from one another with regard to a number of char-
acteristics, including the volume of lower-authority appeals processed each 
year, the location of the state, whether the state was primarily rural or 
urban, and whether the state conducted the majority of its hearings by tele-
phone or in person. 
Researchers attended a total of 284 hearings l9 between May and August 
1995 (approximately 35 hearings were attended in each of the 8 states).20 
Primary issues of research interest included the following: (1) the nature of 
the hearing process, including its complexity, the role of the administrative 
law judge, and the relative ability of claimant and employer to participate 
effectively; (2) the role of representation and its effect on appeal outcomes 
and the hearing process; and (3) issues of due process of law under the U.S. 
Constitution and the statutory "fair hearing" requirement.21 
Description of Observed Appeals 
Of the hearings observed, 70 percent were for appeals filed by the claimant. 
This percentage is similar to that of claimant appeals in the overall UI sys-
tem. More than three-fourths of the hearings (77 percent) involved a separa-
tion issue.22 Just over half of the hearings (52 percent) were conducted in 
person, and the remaining 48 percent were conducted with at least one per-
son participating by phone. 
Employers appealed less frequently than claimants (30 percent of the 
time); overall, however, 41 percent of the decisions were decided in the 
employer's favor and 42 percent were decided in the claimant's favor. 23 
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Employers and claimants each won roughly 42 percent of the time when 
they appealed. For additional information on outcomes, see Table 9-4. A 
number of factors affected the hearing process, including participation by 
the parties and the presence of representation. These factors are explored in 
additional detail below. 
Participation by the Parties 
Lack of participation was noteworthy in the observed hearings.24 In most 
states, appeals are automatically dismissed when neither side appears for the 
hearing. Even having excluded such cases, however, at least one side failed 
to appear in 37 percent of the separation hearings observed. The claimant 
failed to appear for the hearing 14 percent of the time. The employer failed 
to participate 23 percent of the time (see Table 9-5).25 
As would be expected, participation in the hearing significantly affected 
the outcome of appeals for both claimant and employer. Of the separation 
hearings observed, claimants who participated achieved favorable outcomes 
52 percent of the time, but those who did not participate won only 26 per-
cent of the time. Similarly, employers who participated in hearings won 54 
percent of the time, but those who did not participate won only 39 percent 
of the time. 26 Similarly, both parties also prevailed more frequently when the 
other side failed to appear. 
Representation 
Although the representation of employers and claimants at the hearings was 
observed less frequently than their failure to participate, representation also 
affected the observed lower-authority appeals. 27 It took various forms, 
including legal representation28 and representation by nonattorneys, which 
includes so-called "third party" representation, usually in the form of a pay-
roll service or VI claims management firm. Legal representation was quite 
infrequent, occurring in only 4 percent of cases. 
Overall, claimants were represented in only 6 percent of the hearings in 
which they participated, although 92 percent of their representation was 
legal in nature. Employers, on the other hand, were represented in 28 per-
cent of hearings they attended, usually by a payroll or claims management 
firm (83 percent of the cases in which they were represented). Thus, when 
representation was observed in this study, it was most frequently employer 
representation in the form of payroll services or UI claims management 
firms (see Table 9-6). 
TABLE 9-4. Summary of Outcomes of Lower-Authority Appeals 
Hearings in Eight States, Summer 1995 
Number of 
Percentage of Cases Won by: 
Description of Hearing Cases Observed Claimant Employer 
OveralP 284 42 41 
Appeal Initiated by: 
Claimant 183 42 58 
Employer 72 58 42 
Issue Appealed 
Separation 198 49 51 
Nonseparationb 58 40 28 
Appeal ConductedC 
In Person 42 52 48 
Phone 99 52 48 
Participation 
Both Parties Present 142 52 48 
Claimant Presentd 173 52 48 
Claimant Not Presentd 23 26 74 
Employer Presentd 155 46 54 
Employer Not Presentd 41 61 39 
Representation of ClaimantsC 
Overall 12 33 67 
Attorney 10 30 70 
Representation of Employers 
Overall 31 55 45 
Attorney 9 55 45 
------~--
SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995). 
a In 17 percent of the cases, decisions were either unavailable or in favor of the state. 
h Decisions in 32 percent of nonseparation cases were either unavailable or in favor of the state. 
crncludes only those separation hearings in which both parties participated. 
d Participation in separation hearings only. 
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TABLE 9-5. Frequency and Effect of Parties' Participation in 





















NOTE: The number of cases in which claimants did not participate and employers did not partici-
pate are additive, because there is no overlap between these cases. Thus, in 37 percent of the hear-
ings, only one party participated. 
SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995). 
Effect on Outcomes 
The lack of any statistically significant impact of representation on out-
comes for employers is noteworthy.29 Whether considering overall employer 
representation or representation by a third-party firm, employers were not 
statistically more likely to win cases in which they were represented. 30 
Controlling for who participated in the hearing and for whether a separation 
or nonseparation issue was at stake, employers were as likely to win a case 
when they were represented by a payroll firm or claims management firm 
(they won 50 percent of the time) as when they were when unrepresented 
(they won 51 percent of the time in this situation). Overall, the results of the 
ACUC study suggest that the predominant form of representation observed 
had no significant effect on appeal outcomes. 
Because the frequency of claimant representation was so low (14 out of 
284 cases), no statistically significant effect of representation on outcomes 
is observable.31 Similarly, because the absolute level of legal representation 
in the hearings observed was so low for both claimants and employers,32 no 
generalizable findings with respect to the effect of legal representation on 
outcomes based on this study are possible.33 
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TABLE 9-6. Frequency and Effect of Parties' Representation at 




Effect on Process When: 
Documents Were Used 
Witnesses Were Used 
Objections Were Raised 
Employer 
Overall 
Represented by VI Firm 
Represented by Other 
Effect on Process When: 
Documents Were Used 
Witnesses Were Used 























NOTE: Only statistically significant results are reported. N.A. indicates that the result was not sta-
tistically significant. 
SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995). 
Effect on Process 
Although representation appeared to have no effect on outcomes in the cases 
observed, it did appear to affect the hearing process. When claimants were 
represented, they were far more likely to bring documents and witnesses to 
the hearing than when they were unrepresented. For example, unrepresented 
claimants brought witnesses to only 9 percent of hearings; represented 
claimants brought witnesses to 57 percent of hearings. Claimants who were 
represented were also more likely to register objections than were unrepre-
sented claimants.34 
Employers were also more likely to bring witnesses and to register objec-
tions when represented than when unrepresented. For example, unrepresent-
ed employers registered objections in only 3 percent of cases, whereas repre-
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sented employers registered objections in 17 percent of cases.35 Employers 
were not statistically more llkely, however, to bring documents when they 
were represented. This result was expected, because employers routinely 
arrived at hearings with paperwork such as personnel and other records. 
Hearings were longer when parties were represented than when they 
were unrepresented. The average hearing length when neither claimant or 
employer was represented was 29 minutes. The average hearing length 
when at least one side had representation increased to 39 minutes, a statisti-
cally significant difference. These results suggest that, in the hearings 
observed, represented parties asserted more rights than nonrepresented par-
ties did, although the represented did not achieve more favorable results. 
Telephone Hearings 
The ACUC case study also examined the impact of conducting hearings by 
telephone compared to the impact of holding hearings with all participants 
attending in person. Each of the eight states in the case study conducts a 
portion of its hearings by telephone. The percentages of observed hearings 
in which at least one party participated by telephone varied among states, 
ranging from a high of 75 percent to a low of 12 percent. Overall, 48 per-
cent of observed hearings were conducted to some extent by telephone.36 
The criteria for conducting appeals hearings in person or by telephone 
varies by jurisdiction. Interstate hearings or other situations in which the 
employer and claimant are separated by a substantial geographical distance 
(generally 30 miles or more) are usually held by telephone in all of the sur-
veyed states. 
Two of the eight states sampled conduct telephone hearings by default. 
That is, the hearing would be by telephone unless at least one party request-
ed an in-person hearing.37 The other six states conduct hearings in person 
unless a formal request for a telephone hearing is made in advance. Policies 
vary by state regarding whether parties are informed in advance as to how 
the other party will be participating. 
The nature and complexity of the case also playa role in determining 
how a hearing is conducted. Those that involve extensive documentation, 
hearings in which attorneys or a number of witnesses are scheduled to par-
ticipate, and those for which the claimant was allegedly separated from 
employment for a violent offense are also generally conducted by telephone. 
All surveyed states intend to maintain if not expand the use of telephones 
for appeals hearings. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages 
There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting hearings by tele-
phone. It is easier to maintain the safety of all parties when direct physical 
confrontation is avoided. It is often logistically easier to participate if a 
party has the option to do so by telephone. In addition, outcomes may be 
less likely to be biased by how well a participant presents himself or herself 
physically. At the same time, however, the use of telephone hearings may 
cause difficulties or even inequities, as discussed here. 
When a hearing is scheduled to take place by telephone, a substantial 
amount of advance preparation must be undertaken to assure that all parties 
have received copies of any documentation that will be referred to during 
the hearing. This may pose difficulties for parties going through the process 
for the first time. 
Nonverbal cues, often an integral part of an in-person hearing, are not 
available to the referee to assess credibility. It is virtually impossible for a 
referee to verify whether or not a witness who is participating by telephone 
has been sequestered. Parties that are not comfortable using the telephone 
may be at a disadvantage. Finally, the hearing may be perceived as being 
less formal and may not be taken as seriously if participants are not com-
pelled to show up and confront the other participants face to face. 
Effect on Process 
Employers tended to participate in hearings by telephone more often than 
claimants did.38 It was found that the longest average hearings (50 minutes) 
occurred when both parties participated in person. Hearings in which the 
claimant participated in person and the employer participated by telephone 
had the shortest average duration (28 minutes). 
There is evidence that parties participating in in-person hearings are 
more likely to bring documentation, and there is also some evidence that 
parties participating by telephone may be less likely to raise questions about 
the hearing process. Claimants were twice as likely (33 percent of the time) 
to bring documentation to be used as evidence when both parties participat-
ed in person than they were when both parties participated by telephone. 
Similarly, employers were more likely to bring documentation when partici-
pating in person than by telephone. In separation cases (in which it is more 
likely that both sides participate), it was found that claimants who partici-
pated by telephone tended to raise fewer questions about the process than 
did claimants who participated in person. 
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The results of a subjective evaluation of how prepared each party was 
for an observed hearing are also consistent with these findings. On a five-
point scale, which took into consideration factors such as the use of support-
ing documentation and the use of relevant witnesses, both claimants and 
employers received their highest scores when they both participated in per-
son. 
One additional consideration was evident in observing telephone hear-
ings. Nearly 20 percent of hearings that involved the telephone were charac-
terized as having vruious technical difficulties. This was defined as either a 
poor-quality connection, or as situations where the referee had trouble estab-
lishing or maintaining telephone contact among all parties. Procedures vary 
by state as to how long a referee will wait for an in-coming call from a par-
ticipant before starting proceedings. They also vary as to how many times the 
referee will attempt to reach a party if the initial attempt is unsuccessful. 
Overall, therefore, as with the presence of representation, the use of 
telephone participation did have some clear impact on the nature of the indi-
vidual hearing process itself, although there is no evidence that it affected 
the actual outcomes of the observed lower-authority appeals hearings. 
NOTES 
1. Appendix B contains a detailed discussion of the specific variables used in the analy-
sis and an explanation of their expected effects on the dependent variables. 
2. Pennsylvania was omitted from the regression equations as the reference state. 
3. This is presumably because more individuals are being denied benefits at an early 
stage in the application process. 
4. This result was not expected. See Appendix B for a discussion of the expected effects 
of the independent variables on denial and appeal rates. 
5. This suggests that the variables available for this analysis could not adequately 
explain the reasons for variations in denial rates across states. Other variables that may 
explain some variation, but that could not be quantified for use in the regression analyses 
include the following: actual definitions of nonmonetary eligibility conditions, the ability 
of states to detect and investigate nonmonetary eligibility issues, and state administrative 
practices. 
6. Sixty-six percent of the variation in claimant success rates was explained when the 
state dummy variables were included, whereas 35 percent of variation in employer suc-
cess rates was explained when the state dummy variables were included. 
7. Employees are also required to pay payroll taxes in four states. See Advisory Council 
on Unemployment Compensation (1995, 51) for more information. 
8. In addition, the tax schedule in effect in a given state often varies depending on state 
trust fund solvency and economic conditions. 
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9. See Chapter 6 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) and 
Chapter 7 of this report for additional information on experience rating and a detailed 
discussion of the types of experience rating. 
10. For example, some or all of the ultimate burden of UI taxes could be shifted from 
employers to workers in the form of lower wages or benefits, or to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. 
11. Such involvement could include a firm's scrutinizing former employees' UI claims, 
reviewing charges to the firm's UI account, and participating in the appeals process. 
12. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation thanks Council member 
William D. Grossenbacher (Administrator, Texas Employment Commission) and Council 
alternate Carol Skornicka (Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor, and 
Human Relations) for providing these data. 
13. When compared to other states, Texas has a higher-than-average rate of denial per 
initial claim (see Table 8-4 in Chapter 8). This may explain, in part, why claimants have 
such high success ratcs in winning the appeals they bring in Texas. 
14. Much of the information provided in this section is taken from Kritzer (1995). 
15. Representation included only attorneys (not other agents) in these data. 
16. The Texas data were not used because the state's appeals are very different from the 
national average; in Texas, employers comprised a large proportion of all appellants, and 
claimants won a large percentage of all appeals. In addition, information on representa-
tion was not available. 
17. Claimants were only 0.68 times as likely to win these appeals, whereas employers 
were 0.71 times as likely to win, all else being equal. 
18. The Advisory Council expresses its thanks to all of the individuals who work in the 
appeals offices of the eight states that participated in the case study. In particular, this 
project would not have been possible without the assistance of the following individuals: 
Mike DiSanto, Ron Kammann, and Tim McArdle in California; Betty Graham, Lyle 
Seebaum, and Dennis Zerlan in Colorado; Victor Napolitano in Illinois; Dan Anderson 
and Steve Beasley in Iowa; Allan Toubman in Maine; Marvin Pazornick, Henry 
Rutledge, and Louis Steinwedel in Maryland; Gordon Doig and Lee Hartman in Texas; 
and David Breme and David Latham in Virginia. 
19. Most of the hearings (90 percent) were observed live; the remaining 10 percent were 
selected at random from hearings tape recorded during roughly the same time period. 
20. Because of the relatively small number of hearings observed in each state, the 
capacity to find statistically significant differences was generally limited. Unless other-
wise noted, this section only reports results that are statistically significant at the 95 per-
cent confidence level. 
21. For additional detail on the findings and conclusions of this study, see Gallagher 
and Ralph (1995). 
22. See Chapter 8 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) for 
additional infonnation on nonmonetary eligibility, including separation issues. 
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23. In the remaining 17 percent of the cases, the decision was either unavailable, or it 
was more favorable to the state ill agency than to the claimant or employer. These deci-
sions were most often issued in cases where the state found the claimant ineligible or dis-
qualified after a nonseparation hearing to which the employer was not a party. 
24. Analysis of participation in appeals hearings was limited to those hearings involving 
a separation issue, in order to avoid underestimating employer participation. Employers 
generally have less incentive to attend nonseparation hearings, both because the state 
often appears as a party and because a relatively short period of disqualification or ineligi-
bility is often at stake. Further, the state does not always consider the employer a party to 
a nonseparation hearing and may therefore not notify the employer about the hearing. 
25. Because the observations in the study were based solely on hearings actually held, 
no statements can be made about the number of times both sides failed to appear. Under 
such circumstances, most states would dismiss the appeal without a hearing. 
26. This result was statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
27. Employers were considered to be "represented" when either an outside agent or in-
house legal counsel attended the hearing for purposes of presenting the employer's case 
and conducting questioning and cross-examination. Human resource professionals who 
may have acted in part as representatives were not treated as "representation." 
28. "Legal" representation was defined in the ACUC study to include attorneys, para-
legals, law students, and law clerks. "Nonlegal" representation was a catch-all term for 
all other categories, including payroll firms for employers, or union representatives, 
friends, or family for claimants. 
29. Analysis of the impact of representation on appeals hearing outcomes was limited 
to separation hearings in which both parties participated in order to exclude the indepen-
dent effect of nonparticipation on outcomes. 
30. In observed appeals, employers actually won more frequently when they were rep-
resented (17 out of 31 cases) than when they were unrepresented (48 out of 99 cases). As 
noted, however, these results were not statistically significant. 
31. Of separation hearings where both parties participated, claimants actually lost more 
frequently (8 out of 12) when they were represented than when they were unrepresented 
(58 out of 119). As noted, however, these results were not statistically significant. 
32. Overall, legal representation was observed in only 19 of 284 cases. 
33. In other words, when looking at the overall UI appeals system, repr.esentation may 
have a measurable impact that could not be discerned through observation of the small 
sample of cases at issue here. 
34. Unrepresented claimants registered objections in only 7 percent of cases, whereas 
represented claimants registered objections 64 percent of the time. Claimants who were 
unrepresented also brought documents to the hearing only 20 percent of the time, but 
represented claimants brought documents 50 percent of the time. 
35. Employers also brought witnesses in 37 percent of cases when unrepresented, and 94 
percent of cases when represented. The greater prevalence of witnesses among employers 
may be, in part, due to definitional issues in the case study, as claimants who were repre-
162/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
sented were not considered to be acting primarily as witnesses, in contrast to any individ-
uals who gave testimony for a represented employer, who were considered witnesses. 
36. In addition to hearings in which both parties participated by telephone, these per-
centages also include hearings in which one party participated in person at the local 
office in the presence of the referee, while the other party participated by telephone 
(hereafter referred to as mixed hearings). 
37. If this request was made, a heming would then be scheduled at a local office most 
convenient for the party who did not request the in-person hearing. 
38. When both claimant and employer attended, hearings were classified on the basis of 
the manner in which the primary spokesperson for either the claimant or the employer 
participated. Both parties participated in a total of 105 hearings. 
Appendix A/ 
Technical Issues in the Evolution 
of Unemployment Insurance 
THIS APPENDIX CONTAINS additional technical information regarding the quan-
titative and statistical methods that were used in the following three analyses 
discussed in Chapter 4: (1) the analysis of eligibility and benefit levels 
through the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP); (2) the 
analysis of state cost-shifting between Unemployment Insurance and other 
social programs; and (3) the analysis of interstate tax competition. 
SIPP ANALYSIS 
This section describes in detail how the eligibility and benefit simulations 
discussed in Chapter 4 were performed, using the SIPP. The SIPP analyses 
were performed by using a matched combination of the 1990 Full Panel 
Research File, Waves 1 through 8 Core Data Files, and the Wave 2 Personal 
History Topical Module. The Full Panel Research File provides a window of 
two and one-half years (between 1989 and 1992) for identifying unemploy-
ment spells. The file provides monthly information for that time period on 
individuals' demographic characteristics, employment and earnings history, 
school attendance, and source and amount of income received (including 
Unemployment Insurance benefits). The Core Data Files provide historical 
information on labor force activity, earnings and employment history, reason 
for separating from employment, and the source and amount of income from 
other programs. The Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module was used to 
identify the starting month and year of the most recent job. 
Only individuals who experienced unemployment at some point during 
their participation in the full research panel were included in the database 
developed for these analyses. ' These individuals could have been unem-
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ployed for the entire panel. Individuals who reported that they were not 
looking for work were not considered to be unemployed; rather, they were 
considered to be out of the labor force. 
Unemployment spells were included in the analyses only when there was 
sufficient information available on base period earnings and employment 
history to allow the simulation of UI eligibility. Some individuals with par-
tially incomplete information in their base period, however, were included 
in the sample, if the missing information could be interpolated. 
Individuals were excluded from the analysis on the basis of the base 
period definition in their state. When the base period was defined as the first 
four of the last five completed calendar quarters, unemployment spells that 
occurred in the first 15 months of the Full Panel Research File were exclud-
ed. When the base period was defined as the last four completed calendar 
quarters, spells that occurred in the first 12 months of the Full Panel 
Research File were excluded. In addition, individuals who identified them-
selves as being employed but who provided no corresponding information 
on earnings or employment in the base period were excluded. As a result, 
more than half of the unemployment spells in the file were not considered 
for the purposes of the SIPP analysis in Chapter 4 because of missing or 
unavailable data. The final number of unweighted unemployment spells 
used in the analyses was 8,158 (32.6 million when weighted). 
For ease of analysis and comparison, all unemployment spells were 
adjusted slightly so that they could be treated as 1990 spells. The portion of 
each spell that occurred outside of 1990 was converted by inflating (or 
deflating) the earnings and income data to 1990 dollars by the Employment 
Cost Index (ECI) for private industry, which is published in the Economic 
Report of the President (Council of Economic Advisors 1995). 
In order to examine the effects of changes in monetary eligibility since 
1978, all spells were also converted to 1978 spells-a more complicated con-
version. Ideally, the deflation of 1990 earnings to 1978 should account for the 
significant changes in the distribution of earnings that occurred during that 
time period. Detailed earnings information was available from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in unpublished tables for 1979 (the earliest year for which 
these data were available) and 1990. These tables were then used to create 10 
separate gender-specific indices for deflating wages from 1990 to 1979. The 
ECI was used to deflate earnings and income from 1979 to 1978.2 
A series of calculations was performed to determine whether an individ-
ual would have been monetarily eligible for Unemployment Insurance in 
either 1978 or 1990. Detailed information from each state's law, as pub-
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Ii shed in U.S. Department of Labor (1995a), was used as the basis for simu-
lating program eligibility. Several variables were necessary for each unem-
ployment spell before monetary eligibility could be determined. These 
included the definition of the base period, base period earnings, high earn-
ings, weeks worked, the number of quarters during which wages were 
earned, the number of hours worked per week, and the average hourly wage 
rate.3 Based on the state of residence, the simulations calculate UI program 
eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential duration of benefits. The 
eligibility determination retlects the individual state laws, including provi-
sions for dependent allowances and deductions for other income received 
during the period of unemployment (for example, Worker's Compensation 
and Social Security). 
These simulations were used in the discussions of monetary eligibility 
and replacement rates in Chapter 4. The monetary eligibility calculations, 
which were presented in Table 4-1, include individuals who report receiving 
UI in a given month, but were simulated as ineligible. These individuals 
represent approximately 3 percent of the UI spells examined. This discrep-
ancy in eligibility may be a result of incorrect underreporting of earnings in 
the SIPP. The weekly benefit amounts that were used to calculate replace-
ment rates were the simulated amounts rather than the amounts that individ-
uals reported in the SIPP. (These weekly benefit amounts are not reduced 
when other income is received.) The replacement rates reported in Table 4-5 
were calculated by dividing the simulated weekly benefit amount by the 
individuals' average weekly earnings during the base period. 
Two problems with the SIPP data should be noted. First, the state law 
used for determining eligibility was based on the individuals' state of resi-
dence, although UI is based on the state in which the individual worked. 
This information, however, was not available in the SIPP. As a result, calcu-
lations were incorrect for individuals who work in a state other than their 
state of residence. Second, the SIPP groups some "small" states together. In 
these cases, simulations were conducted using the UI laws of the state in the 
group with the most liberal monetary eligibility laws.4 
COST-SHIfTING ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that "cost-shifting" 
behavior by the states has contributed to the decline in UI recipiency among 
the unemployed since the late 1970s. The analysis focused primarily on the 
effects of the federal matching rate for the Aid to Families with Dependent 
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Children (AFDC) program and federal per capita Food Stamps expenditures 
on 01 recipiency. In theory, federal subsidies for income support programs 
such as AFDC and Food Stamps may create incentives for states to shift 
unemployed low-income workers from UI benefits, which are fully financed 
by the states, to federally subsidized means-tested programs. Such a shift 
could be achieved through increases in monetary eligibility requirements or 
through changes in nonmonetary eligibility requirements. 
Dependent Variable 
The IV/TO, the ratio of the number of 01 claimants to the total number of 
unemployed, was used as the dependent variable. The means and standard 
deviations of all variables used in the analysis are reported in Table A-I. 
AFDC and Food Stamp Variables 
The econometric model that was used to examine the effects of cost-shifting 
included measures of federal subsidies in means-tested programs as well as 
a number of economic and other external variables that might be expected to 
affect a state's IO/TO. Three measures were used to evaluate the impact of 
AFDC and Food Stamps benefit payments on UI recipiency: the federal 
AFDC matching rate, federal Food Stamp expenditures per capita, and fed-
eral AFDC expenditures per capita. Larger federal subsidies would be 
expected to result in lower 01 recipiency rates. 
The first two variables, the federal AFDC matching rate and Food Stamp 
expenditures per capita, describe the rate and level of federal contributions 
to the programs. The third, federal AFDC expenditures per capita, captures a 
combination of the federal matching rate, the number of AFDC recipients, 
and the level of benefit generosity in the state. As a result, the effect of fed-
eral AFDC expenditures per capita on 01 recipiency cannot be attributed 
solely to federal subsidization. This variable is included in order to deter-
mine if states with more generous AFDC programs substitute these pro-
grams for UI. All three variables were lagged one year to allow for the like-
ly delay between federal action and responses by the states. 
UI Policy Variables 
Five vmiables that m'e generally used in recipiency regressions were includ-
ed in the model. They are as follows: (1) the employer tax rate, measured as 
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TABLE A-1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from 
Regression, 1979-1990 
levels First Differences 
- -----~--- --------
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
IUrrURatio 33.69 9.78 -0.16 5.08 
Federal AFDC 
Subsidy Rate (lagged) 59.90 8.54 0.12 2.16 
Food Stamps 
Expenditures 
per Capita (lagged) 79.57 37.02 1.02 9.97 
Federal AFDC 
Expenditures 
per Capita (lagged) 92.83 55.26 -2.98 8.21 
Employer UI Tax Rate 2.45 0.98 -0.06 0.48 
State Taxable Wage Base 
over Federal Level 1,913.72 2,717.75 166.41 594.75 
Percent of Labor 
Force Unionized 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.02 
Required Base Period 
Earnings for 
Minimum Benefits 1,584.05 732.37 16.69 320.38 
Change in Total 
Unemployment Rate -0.01 1.27 0.10 1.67 
Denial Rate per 
Initial Claim 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.05 
Percent of Employment 
Covered by UI 0.99 0.08 0.00 0.02 
Benefit AmountlWages 0.37 0.05 0.00 0.02 
IUffU of 
Contiguous States 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.04 
IUrrU of Nearby States 0.34 0.07 0.00 0.03 
IUrrU ofthe 
Balance of States 0.35 0.04 0.00 0.03 
Per Capita Income 22,641.67 3,754.66 222.99 787.83 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A. 
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the ratio of total employer taxes paid divided by taxable wages; (2) the state 
taxable wage base, measured as the difference between the state taxable 
wage base and the required federal wage base; (3) base period earnings 
required for minimum benefits; (4) the benefit denial rate; and (5) ill benefit 
generosity, measured as the ratio of the average weekly benefit to average 
weekly wages.5 
Labor Force Variables 
Three variables were used to control for variation in workplace and econom-
ic conditions: (1) the percentage of the workforce that is unionized, (2) the 
percentage of the workforce that is in ill-covered employment, and (3) the 
change in the unemployment rate between the current and the previous year. 
Interstate Competition Variables 
Results reported in the next major section, "Interstate Tax Competition 
Analysis," illustrate the influence of interstate competition on employer tax 
rates. In response to the findings on interstate competition, three variables 
representing UI recipiency in other states were included in the model with 
the expectation that they would control for the effects of interstate competi-
tion, as reflected in recipiency. As detailed in the next major section, states 
were divided into two groups: "contiguous states" (those sharing a border 
with the observed state) and states from the "balance of the country." For 
each state, the mean IU/TU was calculated for each group of states and 
included as independent variables in the model. 
Data Sources 
Data for the cost-shifting analysis were obtained from a variety of sources. 
Information on AFDC and Food Stamp expenditures was obtained from the 
Economics and Statistics Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
AFDC matching rates are contained in the various editions of The Green Book, 
produced by the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. U.S. Department of Labor (1995d) provided data on employer 
ill tax rates, the state taxable wage base, ill benefit levels, ill coverage and 
recipiency, and average wages. State taxable wage base information was 
obtained from the Council of State Governments. Unemployment and popula-
tion data were provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unionization rates 
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were drawn from two papers based on Current Population Survey data: 
Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) and Curme et al. (1990). 
Data and Model Specifications 
The cost-shifting analysis used annual state data from 1978 to 1990. These 
years were selected on the basis of considerations related to the availability 
of data. Only data for the 48 contiguous states were used in order to allow the 
inclusion of the interstate competition variables. The District of Columbia 
was also excluded because of a lack of data on a number of measures. 
The model was estimated using both levels data (using a fixed effects 
estimator) and first differences. As can be seen in the regression results pre-
sented in Table A-2, some of the regression coefficients vary between the 
two specifications. The analysis reported in Chapter 4 is based on the first 
differences specification. This specification is used because its underlying 
assumptions are less restrictive than those of the fixed effects model. If, 
however, the fixed effects model were used, the estimated effect of Food 
Stamp spending would only be about 58 percent of the effects reported for 
the first differences model. 
Regression Results 
The regression results shown in Table A-2 indicate that decreases in ill 
recipiency follow increases in the federal AFDC subsidy rate and per capita 
Food Stamp expenditures. According to the first differences results, a state's 
IUlTV ratio would be expected to fall by 0.48 percentage points after a $10 
increase in per capita Food Stamp expenditures. Similarly, a 1.00 percentage 
point increase in the federal AFDC matching rate would be followed by a 
decrease in the IV/TV ratio of 0.14. Per capita federal AFDC benefit expen-
ditures are not significant in explaining variation in VI benefit recipiency. 
The first differences regression model also suggests that additional vari-
ables are significant predictors of VI recipiency. Decreases in recipiency are 
associated with the following: increases in the base period earnings require-
ment, increases in the change in unemployment rate, increases in the benefit 
denial rate, decreases in the ratio of average weekly VI benefits to average 
weekly wages, and decreases in the IV/TV of contiguous states. 
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TABLE A-2. Generali_z_ed L,=ast-~quares Regression Results 
Explanatory Variables Levels First Differences 
Federal AFDC Subsidy Rate (lagged) -0.060 (0.26) -0.14 (0.03) 
Food Stamps Expenditures per Capita (lagged) -0.035 (0.01) -0.066 (0.00) 
Federal AFDC Expenditures per Capita (lagged) 0.015 (0.12) 0.0069 (0.72) 
Employer UI Tax Rate -0.26 (0.45) -0.41 (0.21) 
State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level 0.000019 (0.91) -0.00042 (0.08) 
Percent of Labor Force Unionized 12.69 (0.08) -6.7 (0.32) 
Required Base Period Eamings 
for Minimum Benefits -0.0013 (0.00) -0.0014 (0.00) 
Change in Total Unemployment Rate -0.21 (0.30) -1.13 (0.00) 
Denial Rate per Initial Claim -9.46 (0.00) -9.92 (0.00) 
Percent of Employment Covered by UI -0.47 (0.94) -11.33 (0.09) 
Benefit AmountlWages 39.34 (0.00) 68.01 (0.00) 
IU/TU of Contiguous States 51.03 (0.00) 37.17 (0.00) 
IUrrU of Nearby States 5.92 (0.39) 12.53 (0.10) 
IU/TU of Balance of States 1.59 (0.91) 23.21 (0.15) 
Per Capita Income 0.00028 (0.07) 0.00046 (0.06) 
R' .45 .36 
NOTE: Significance levels are reported in parentheses. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A. 
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National Effects 
Given that the first differences estimator is likely to control for unmeasured 
heterogeneity better than a levels estimator is, the regression coefficients 
produced by the first differences analysis were used to simulate the effects 
on the IU/TU of changes in Food Stamps spending and the federal AFDC 
matching rate on the IU/TU. The lagged changes in the annual national 
mean for these two variables were multiplied by the corresponding regres-
sion coefficients to calculate the predicted change in the IUITU. The mean 
values of these variables for 1972-1993 and their effects on the IUITU are 
reported in Table A-3, along with means for the IUITU.6 This table indicates 
that the AFDC matching rate has varied little over time. Consequently, it 
cannot explain variation in the IUITU. 
Figure 4-4 (in Chapter 4) uses these calculations to compare the actual 
IUITU to the IUITU that would have occurred without cost-shifting from UI 
to Food Stamps. According to these calculations, the IU/TU in 1993 would 
have been 0.04 percentage points higher that the actual IU/TU of 0.32 if 
cost-shifting from ill to Food Stamps had not occurred. These results sug-
gest that cost-shifting from UI to Food Stamps accounts for almost 64 per-
cent of the 0.12 percentage point decline in the IUITU between 1971 and 
1993.7 
INTERSTATE TAX COMPETITION ANALYSIS 
The existence and potential impact of interstate competition in the UI sys-
tem discussed in Chapter 4 was examined through regression analysis. In 
particular, the impact that tax rates in other states have on the tax rate of any 
given individual state was analyzed, taking into account several factors 
including the following: the proximity of the other states, whether their prior 
tax rates were higher or lower than the prior tax rate in the state being con-
sidered, the population of the other states, and the years being examined. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in all regressions for the interstate tax competi-
tion analysis was the measure of UI taxes as a percentage of total wages in a 
given state. Tax rate data are routinely reported by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, and are available by state from 1938 to 1993. 
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TABLE A-3. Annual Means of Federal AFDC Subsidy Rates and 
Food Stamp Benefit Expenditures and Effects of Changes on UI 
Recipiency (IU/TU) 
,---"-_._--- ,,--
Effect on IU!TU 
----~-
IU!TU AFDC Subsidy Rate Food Stamp Benefit Expenditures 
Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative 
Year Mean Mean Change Change Mean Change Change 
1972 0.38 58.30 -0.02 -0.02 44.92 -0.86 -0.86 
1973 0.37 58.30 0.03 0.01 48.00 -0.29 -1.16 
1974 0.44 57.29 0.00 0,01 65.75 -0.20 -1.36 
1975 0.50 57.29 0.14 0.15 80.24 -1.17 -2.53 
1976 0.40 56.06 0.00 0.15 75.03 -0.96 -3.49 
1977 0.38 56.32 0.17 0.32 67.43 0.34 -3.14 
1978 0.38 56.24 -0.04 0.28 64.92 0.50 -2.64 
1979 0.40 56.33 0.01 0.30 78.80 0.17 -2.48 
1980 0.44 56.50 -0.01 0.28 85.84 -0.92 -3.39 
1981 0.37 56.68 -0.02 0.26 96.22 -0.46 -3.86 
1982 0.38 56.64 -0.03 0.23 88.31 -0.68 -4.54 
1983 0.32 57.00 0,01 0.24 95.46 0.52 -4.02 
1984 0.29 56.76 -0.05 0.19 88.19 -0.47 -4.49 
1985 0.31 56.82 0.03 0.22 84.45 0.48 -4.01 
1986 0.32 57.31 -0.01 0.21 82.45 0.25 -3.76 
1987 0.31 57.61 -0.07 0.15 79.20 0.13 -3.63 
1988 0.31 58.D7 -0.04 0.10 79.92 0.21 -3.42 
1989 0.33 57.90 -0.06 0.04 80.94 -0.05 -3.47 
1990 0.37 58.44 0.02 0.06 88.79 -0.07 -3.53 
1991 0.39 57.43 -0.08 -0.01 102.34 -0.52 -4.05 
1992 0.35 57.49 0.14 0.13 114.08 -0.89 -4.94 
1993 0.32 57.31 -0.01 0.12 114.40 -0.77 -5.72 
NOTE: The effect on IU/TU is calculated as the lagged change in the specified variable multiplied 
by the regression coefficient for that variable. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A. 
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Interstate Tax Variables 
The econometric model that was examined in testing for the effects of inter-
state competition included interstate tax variables, as well as a number of 
economic and other external variables that might be expected to affect the 
VI tax rate of a given state. 
In calculating interstate tax variables, two geographic categories of states 
were created for each observed state. Those states that share a border with 
the observed state were designated "contiguous" states. States have, on 
average, slightly more than 4 contiguous states, with the number ranging 
from 0 to 8. Those states that do not share a border with the observed state 
were designated "balance of the country" states. States had, on average, 45 
balance-of-the-country states, with the number ranging from 41 to 49. 
A database was created in which the tax rates of each state's contiguous 
and balance-of-the-country states were included for each state-year observa-
tion. Various interstate tax measures were then created using these geo-
graphic categories (for example, two unweighted average tax rates, one for 
all states contiguous to the observed state and one for all balance-of-the-
country states).s 
These variables were then lagged for different numbers of years, reflect-
ing the hypothesis that if states' tax rates respond in some way to the tax 
rates of other states, the impact would be observed in subsequent years. 
Preliininary regressions indicated that one-year lags maximized the model's 
explanatory power. Consequently, all subsequent analysis focused on one-
year lags. 
In order to test whether an observed state responded differently to a 
given category of other states when the tax rates were lower, not higher, 
than that of the observed state, each of the three categories was further 
divided into two categories. Thus, a total of four interstate tax variables was 
examined in each of the regressions reported in Chapter 4. For both of the 
geographic categories, there are two variables, indicated by "A" or "B." For 
example, with regard to the contiguous state variables, if the lagged average 
contiguous tax rate (that is, the lagged tax rate of all contiguous states) was 
higher than or equal to the lagged tax rate of the observed state, then the 
"A" value is the value of the lagged average contiguous tax rate, and the 
"B" value is zero. If the lagged average contiguous tax rate is lower than the 
lagged tax rate of the observed state, then the "A" value is zero and the "B" 
value is the value of the lagged average contiguous tax rate. Similar calcula-
tions were made for the balance-of-the-country states. In this way, the 
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potentially different responses of state tax rates when the tax rates of other 
states are lower, rather than higher, were separated and could be captured in 
the regression. 
Economic and Other Variables 
Seven other variables were included in the regressions on interstate compe-
tition. These variables would be expected to have a direct effect on the set-
ting of a state's tax rate and, therefore, need to be controlled in the regres-
sion. The total unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment rate 
were included because of their expected direct effect on the level of ur tax 
rates, since tax rates would be expected to be higher if the unemployment 
rate either (1) is at a relatively high level or (2) is decreasing (given counter-
cyclical funding). The reserve ratio, a measure of ur trust fund solvency, 
was included because it would be expected that tax rates would be higher 
when the reserve ratio has been lower. Analysis indicated that a three-year 
lag of the reserve ratio had the greatest predictive power; this measure of the 
reserve ratio was used. 
In order to control for the effect of politics at the state level, a measure 
of the number of state political institutions (that is, the governorship and the 
two bodies of the state legislature) controlled by the Democrats was also 
included. A measure of state tax capacity was included to control for the 
level of states' general tax bases. Unionization rates were included because 
they are often found to have an effect on a number of UI-related measures. 
Preliminary regressions included the ratio of the observed state's population 
to the average population of all of its contiguous states. This was done in 
order to test the hypothesis that larger states are more able to resist competi-
tive pressures on tax rates.Y 
Data Sources 
These data were derived from a variety of sources. The total unemployment 
rate variables and population ratios were drawn from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data. The reserve ratio was drawn from Unemployment Insurance 
Service data. The state political variable was derived from Conference of 
State Legislatures data. Unionization rates were obtained from two papers 
based on Current Population Survey data, Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) 
and Curme et al. (1990). 
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Regression Results 
Regression analysis was performed on the data for the years 1977 to 1990 in 
order to determine the responsiveness of state tax rates to tax rates in other 
states. 10 Analysis was limited to those years because of data restrictions. In 
particular, state-level unemployment rates are not available for all states 
before 1976 (and, as a result, unemployment rate change is not available 
before 1977), and unionization rates by state are not available after 1990. 
Because both of these variables are highly significant in predicting tax rates, 
the decision was made to limit the analysis to those 14 years. Observations 
for Alaska and Hawaii were excluded from the analysis because they have 
no contiguous states. 
The results suggest that, all else being equal, state tax rates are affected 
by the previous year's tax rate levels in other states, and that the impact is 
statistically significant. The R2 of the regression that does not include the 
interstate tax rate variables is 0.34. When the interstate variables are includ-
ed, the R2 increases to 0.57. 
Further, the results indicate that an average individual contiguous state 
has a larger impact than an average individual balance-of-the-country state. 
In addition, the evidence suggests that state tax rates respond more to the tax 
rates in states where tax rates are lower than they are in the observed state. 
For example, the regression results reported in Table A-4 indicate that, if 
the lagged average of all contiguous states is lower than the lagged tax rate 
of the observed state, then a 1.00 percent decline in the lagged average tax 
rate of all contiguous states would result, on average, in a 0.33 percent 
decline in the tax rate of the observed state. The comparable result for bal-
ance-of-the-country states is 0.44. In cases in which the average interstate 
tax rate is higher than in the observed state, the overall response of the 
observed state to changes in the interstate averages is significantly less 
(between 54 and 80 percent of the response that occurs when the interstate 
averages are lower than the rate in the observed state).11 
The results discussed above can also be interpreted to indicate the aver-
age effect of a single state located in the contiguous or balance-of-the-coun-
try categories. The discussion in this paragraph refers to situations in which 
the relevant average tax rate is lower than the tax rate in the observed state. 
Since there are, on average, 4.2 contiguous states per state, a 1.00 percent 
decline in the lagged average tax rate of anyone of those contiguous states 
would result in a 0.08 percent decline in the tax rate of the observed state. 
With an average of 44.76 balance-of-the-country states, a 1.00 percent 
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TABLE A-4. Interstate Competition Regression Results 
Does No! Include 
Interstate 
Variables, 
Explanatory Variables 1977·1990 
Constant 0.483 (0.00) 
State Government -0.003 (0.87) 
Tax Capacity -0.001 (0.10) 
Unionization 2.330 (0.00) 
Population Ratio 
Lagged Reserve Ratio -0.073 (0.00) 
Unemployment Rate (lJ,) 7.238 (0.00) 
Change in 
Unemployment Rate (fJ,) -10.947 (0.00) 
"A" Contiguous Tax., (fJ3) 
"A" Nearby Tax., (fJ.) 
"A" Balance Tax., (fJ5) 
"B" Contiguous Tax., (fJ6) 
"B" Nearby Tax., (fJ,) 





Includes Includes Includes 
Interstate Interstate Interstate 
Variables, Variables, Variables, 
1977·1990 1977·1986 1987·1990 
-0.214 (0.07) 0.364 (0.06) -0.579 (0.01) 
0,015 (0.17) 0.019 (0.17) -0.005 (0.82) 
0.0001 (0.86) -0.0006 (0.42) 0.002 (0.21) 
1.202 (0.00) 1.014 (0.00) 1.196 (0.00) 
-0.021 (0.00) -0.024 (0.00) -0.004 (0.63) 
0.027 (0.02) 0.014 (0.29) 0.050 (0.02) 
4.208 (0.00) 3.555 (0.00) 1.773 (0.13) 
-6.375 (0.00) -7.453 (0.00) -4.298 (0.10) 
0.086 (0.04) 0.094 (0.07) 0.020 (0.75) 
0.215 (0.00) 0.142 (0.04) 0.234 (0.00) 
0.131 (0.08) -0.102 (0.33) 0.372 (0.02) 
0.319 (0.00) 0.301 (0.00) 0.382 (0.00) 
0.360 (0.00) 0.297 (0.00) 0.318 (0.00) 







NOTE: Significance levels are reported in parentheses. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A. 
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decline in the lagged average tax rate of any state located in the balance of 
the country would result in a 0.01 percent decline in the observed state's tax 
rate. Thus, among categories of states that have a lower tax rate than that in 
an observed state, average individual contiguous states have an impact that 
is eight times larger than the impact of individual balance-of-the-country 
states. 
Regressions were also run using alternative specifications of interstate 
tax variables. In particular, the tax rates of the most populous one or two 
contiguous states were included individually, with the contiguous variables 
then comprised of the mean tax rate of only the remaining contiguous states. 
The results of these regressions were consistent with the results discussed 
above. Further, they suggest that the effects of contiguous averages are 
largely a function of the tax rates of the two most populous contiguous 
states. The coefficients of tax rate variables for these states tend to be larger 
than the coefficients of the variables that then contain only the remaining 
contiguous states. 
In addition, attention was also given to the effect of using weighted 
means for contiguous and balance-of-the-country variables, rather than 
unweighted means. These specifications yielded results that were similar to 
the unweighted regressions. 
NOTES 
1. Individuals from the SIPP with more than one spell of unemployment appear multi-
ple times in the database. 
2. It was expected that the significant change in the earnings distribution between 1978 
and 1990 might affect the monetary eligibility calculations. For that reason, 10 deflators 
for each gender group were calculated. An alternative 1978 model was also run to deter-
mine the impact of using a simple deflator between 1990 and 1978. The results indicated 
only slight differences in the calculations of monetary eligible (63.3 percent versus 63.6 
percent overall). It is possible that this difference is understated because of the small 
number of individuals (22) in the SIPP whose hourly earnings data were affected. 
3. The base period definition for 1990 was used in the 1978 simulations so that only 
changes in the earnings requirements would generate differences in eligibility and benefit 
amounts. 
4. Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming were grouped together (Alaska was used); 
Maine and Vermont were grouped together (Maine was used); and Iowa, North Dakota, 
and South Dakota were grouped together (South Dakota was used). 
5. See Chapter 5 of this report, which reports evidence that increases in the state tax rate 
or taxable wage base are associated with increases the IUITU, and that the base period 
earning required for minimum benefits and the benefit denial rate are associated with 
decreases in the IUITU. 
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6. The annual means are weighted by states' total unemployment in order to account for 
changes in the distribution of unemployment over time. However, the state-level unem-
ployment data needed to produce the weighted averages were not available for the years 
1970-1975. Instead, the weights for 1976 were applied to these years. 
7. Alternatively, calculations based on unweighted means produce a cumulative change 
in the IUfTU of 0.036 percentage points, which accounts for 69 percent of the decline in 
the IUfTU. 
8. Regressions using averages weighted by state population were also examined. Both 
weighted and unweighted averages were found to have similar effects in the regressions. 
Therefore, a decision was made to use unweighted tax rates. 
9. Although the results provided evidence in support of this hypothesis, the variable 
was ultimately dropped from the analysis. This was done because the Hausman specifi-
cation test indicated that a fixed effect estimator, rather than a random effects estimator, 
should be used. The state population variable proved to be too highly correlated with the 
state fixed effects, and, as a result, it was necessary to drop the population variable. 
10. The results reported here are based on a fixed effects, generalized least squares 
model. 
11. This was determined by dividing the regression coefficients of average interstate tax 
rates that are higher than the rate in the observed state by the coefficients for the aver-
ages when they are lower than the rate in the observed state. 
Appendix BI 
Technical Issues in Analyzing 
Denials and Appeals 
THIS APPENDIX CONTAINS technical information about the statistical methods 
used in the "Analysis of Denials and Appeals," Chapter 9. 
DENIAL RATE, APPEAL RATE, AND APPEAL OUTCOME ANALYSES 
Factors Influencing Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal 
Outcomes 
Factors that may influence denial and appeal rates were considered in the 
statistical analysis presented in Chapter 9. These factors are grouped in four 
categories: policy variables, benefit variables, labor force characteristics, 
and state dummy variables. Each is discussed below. 
Policy Variables 
The policy variables considered in the analysis included those in the general 
categories of solvency, nonmonetary eligibility rules, and state administration. 
Solvency Variables. Three variables were used to measure the impact of 
state solvency on denial and appeal rates. Two of these variables measure a 
state's current ability to raise taxes-(1) the effective employer VI tax rate 
as a percentage of taxable wages and (2) the state taxable wage base (as 
measured by the difference between the state taxable wage base and the 
required federal taxable wage base). A third factor, the reserve ratio (net 
reserves as a share of total covered wages), was used to measure the health 
of the state VI trust fund. 1 
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Lower state tax collections (as described by the combined effect of the 
tax rate and tax base) would be expected to result in higher rates of denial 
(and consequently appeal). Similarly, the lower the reserve ratio, the higher 
the anticipated rate of denials and appeals. Denial rates and claimant appeal 
rates would be expected to be higher when states are facing solvency prob-
lems, presumably because fiscal factors can create pressures to deny bene-
fits and to establish (legislatively or administratively) more restrictive eligi-
bility rules. Employer appeal rates, however, may be lower when states are 
facing financial problems. This result is anticipated because when states 
deny benefits at higher rates, there are fewer claims that employers can con-
sider appealing. 
Nonmonetary Eligibility Rules. Three variables were used to measure the 
severity of the penalty imposed for nonmonetary eligibility disqualification. 
State law regarding the length of time an eligibility disqualification is 
imposed (either for the entire spell of unemployment or for a shorter period 
of weeks) was used for the issues of voluntary leaving, discharge due to 
misconduct, and refusal of suitable work. 2 As noted in Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1995), a number of states increased the 
severity of their penalty in these areas between 1978 and 1994.3 On the one 
hand, for each issue, a more severe penalty (that is, a durational disqualifi-
cation) could result in increased denials (provided that states are able to 
detect the eligibility problems which may result in a determination of ineli-
gibility).4 On the other hand, a more severe penalty may discourage poten-
tial claimants from filing for benefits, thereby reducing the denial rate. 
Similarly, the relationship between these nonmonetary eligibility measures 
and appeal rates is difficult to predict a priori. 
Measures of State Administration. Four variables were used to measure state 
administration: (1) the quality of a state's nonmonetary determinations, 
(2) the timeliness with which a state makes nonmonetary determinations, 
(3) the extent to which Democrats control a state's legislature, and (4) the 
denial rate of UI claims of a state. The quality and timeliness with which 
nonmonetary determinations are decided should affect the rates at which 
employers and claimants appeal decisions. If employers or claimants per-
ceive that the state is doing a poor job in administering UI claims, then they 
may be more likely to appeal eligibility decisions made by the state. The 
extent to which Democrats are in control of the state legislature and the gov-
ernor's office was also included in the model. This variable might serve as a 
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proxy for measuring the state UI administration's attitude toward individu-
als applying for VI benefits. Presumably, a more Democratic state govern-
ment could bring a more claimant-oriented perspective to the administration 
of the program, and a more Republican state government could bring a more 
employer-oriented perspective. Finally, when predicting appeal rates, the 
denial rate was also included to control for differences in the percentage of 
claimants for whom an appeal is an option; and when predicting appeal out-
comes, information on denial rates and the rate at which employers file 
appeals were used to control for these program differences across states. 
Benefit Variables 
Two measures of benefit generosity-(l) actual duration of benefits and 
(2) the ratio of average weekly benefit amount to state average weekly 
wage-were included in the analysis.5 The more generous benefits are per-
ceived to be, the more attractive the VI program appears to potential 
claimants. Thus, more generous benefits would be expected to result in 
higher denial rates, since more claimants are enticed to apply. Similarly, 
claimant and employer appeal rates would be expected to be higher when 
benefits are more generous because of an increased application rate for UI 
benefits and an increased desire on the part of claimants to receive benefits. 
Labor Force Characteristics 
Three variables were used to control for differences in the labor force across 
states and over time: (1) the total unemployment rate, (2) the percentage of 
the unemployed who are job losers, and (3) the unionization rate. There are 
higher unemployment rates and higher percentages of job losers during 
times of recession, when individuals are more likely to be laid off, less like-
ly to quit their jobs, and more likely to accept work. As a result, during peri-
ods of higher unemployment (and when a higher portion of the unemployed 
are job losers), there are likely to be fewer separation denials and fewer 
appeals. Higher rates of unionization are likely to be associated with fewer 
separation denials and appeals, since unions are often concentrated in indus-
tries that rely on temporary layoffs (for example, construction, manufactur-
ing) and unionized employees are more likely to be eligible for VI benefits 
than are non-union employees.6 
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State Dummy Variables 
In addition to the policy variables, benefit variables, and labor force charac-
teristics already discussed, dummy variables for each state were included in 
the model to determine the fixed effect of each state with respect to denial 
rates, appeal rates, and appeal outcomes. Pennsylvania was omitted as the 
reference state, because it has average denial and appeal rates. In general, a 
state coefficient that is statistically significant and positive (or negative) indi-
cates that the state has a higher (or lower) denial, appeal, or success rate rela-
tive to the reference state (Pennsylvania), holding all other factors constant. 
Data and Model Specification 
The model was estimated using annual, state-level data from 1978 to 1990. 
These 13 years were the only years for which data were available for all vari-
ables. Data were excluded for the state of Nebraska, because its denial rates 
are extremely high, and knowledgeable individuals in the Unemployment 
Insurance Service indicated that data submitted by Nebraska may not be con-
sistent with data from other states. Similarly, Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands were excluded from the analysis because of issues regarding data 
reliability. Table B-1 displays the means for all the variables used. 
Given the panel nature of the data (that is, multiple observations for each 
state over a given number of years), the model was estimated using general-
ized least squares regression (GLS). Unlike ordinary least squares regres-
sion (OLS), the GLS model does not assume that the observations are inde-
pendent of one another. Consequently, it is the preferred estimation tech-
nique for panel data, resulting in more reliable estimates both of standard 
errors and of the model's overall explanatory power. 
Discussion of Empirical Results 
Results for Separation and Nonseparation Denial Rates 
The denial rate results from the GLS regressions are presented in Table B-2. 
Different equations were estimated for separation issues (raised by an 
employer regarding a claimant's separation from work) and nonseparation 
issues (raised by a state agency regarding a claimant's ongoing eligibility 
for UI benefits). In these equations, the separation denial rate is expressed as 
a percentage of initial claims and the nonseparation denial rate is expressed 
APPENDIX B /183 
as a percentage of claimant contacts. The model had higher explanatory 
power for differences across states and time for separation issues (29 per-
cent of variation was explained when the state dummy variables were 
excluded) than for nonseparation issues (only 7 percent of variation was 
explained when state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically sig-
nificant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9. 
TABLE B-1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from 
Regressions, All States, 1978-1990 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables 
Separation Denial Rate 0.093 0.046 
Nonseparation Denial Rate 0.153 0.098 
Employer Appeal Rate 0.010 0.008 
Claimant Appeal Rate 0.036 0.018 
Employer Success Rate 0.360 0.147 
Claimant Success Rate 0.280 0.Q71 
Explanatory Variables 
Denial Rate 0.211 0.099 
Effective Tax Rate 0.012 0.010 
State Tax Base over Federal Level (1993 dollars) 2,269 3,474 
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years) 1.09 1.04 
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit (percent) 0.90 0.30 
Disqualification for Refusing Work (percent) 0.69 0.46 
Disqualification for Misconduct (percent) 0.71 0.45 
State Government 2.02 0.97 
Performance of Nonmonetary Determinations 0.82 0.19 
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Determinations 0.75 0.17 
Actual Benefit Duration (Weeks) 13.6 2.7 
Benefit AmountlWages 0.37 0.05 
Total Unemployment Rate 0.068 0.023 
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized 0.17 0.07 
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed 0.48 0.08 
Percentage of Appeals Filed by Employers 0.199 0.097 
-"----------
NOTE: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except 
Nebraska. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Govern-
ments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1993). 
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TABLE B-2. Regression Results for Separation and Nonseparation 
Denials, All States, 1978-1990 
Separation Denial Nonseparation Denial 
Explanatory Variables Rate/Initial Claim Rate/Claimant Contact 
Effective Tax Rate 0.051 (0.88) -0.600 (0.49) 
State Tax Base over Federal Level -0.0000002 (0.83) -0.000001 (0.57) 
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years) 0.002 (0.22) -0.010 (0.01) 
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit -0.022 (0.00) 
Disqualification for Refusing Work 0.007 (0.50) 
Disqualification for Misconduct -0.020 (0.00) 
State Government -0.002 (0.22) -0.001 (0.77) 
Actual Benefit Duration 0.0008 (0.36) -0.007 (0.00) 
Benefit Amount/Wages -0.106 (0.01) 0.004 (0.97) 
Total Unemployment Rate -0.349 (0.00) -0.468 (0.05) 
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized 0.023 (0.48) -0.257 (0.00) 
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed -0.148 (0.00) -0.043 (0.40) 
State Dummy Variables 
Alabama 0.007 (0.58) 0.171 (0.00) 
Alaska 0.000 (1.00) 0.149 (0.00) 
Arizona 0.045 (0.00) 0.144 (0.00) 
Arkansas 0.045 (0.00) 0.032 (0.32) 
California 0.014 (0.18) 0.082 (0.00) 
Colorado 0.119 (0.00) 0.221 (0.00) 
Connecticut 0.005 (0.57) 0.045 (0.07) 
Delaware 0.011 (0.21) -0.033 (0.17) 
District of Columbia 0.072 (0.00) 0.013 (0.66) 
Florida 0.086 (0.00) 0.052 (0.08) 
Georgia 0.039 (0.00) -0.056 (0.07) 
Hawaii 0.029 (0.01) 0.103 (0.00) 
Idaho 0.025 (0.03) 0.231 (0.00) 
Illinois 0.038 (0.00) 0.046 (0.05) 
Indiana 0.038 (0.00) 0.022 (0.48) 
Iowa 0.050 (0.00) 0.031 (0.20) 
Kansas 0.025 (0.02) 0.071 (0.01) 
Kentucky 0.017 (0.09) -0.033 (0.20) 
Louisiana 0.089 (0.00) 0.047 (0.09) 
Maine 0.005 (0.56) 0.108 (0.00) 
Maryland 0.069 (0.00) 0.030 (0.25) 
Massachusetts 0.001 (0.93) -0.028 (0.28) 
Michigan 0.024 (0.01) 0.051 (0.05) 
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APPEN DIX B / 185 
TABLE B-2. (continued) 
------
Separation Denial Nonseparation Denial 
Explanatory Variables Rate/Initial Claim Rate/Claimant Contact 
----
Minnesota 0.031 (0.00) 0.063 (0.01) 
Mississippi 0.027 (0.04) 0.D38 (0.26) 
Missouri 0.050 (0.00) 0.118 (0.00) 
Montana 0.039 (0.00) -0.016 (0.51) 
Nevada 0.110 (0.00) 0.100 (0.00) 
New Hampshire 0.011 (0.33) 0.110 (0.00) 
New Jersey 0.010 (0.34) 0.041 (0.11 ) 
New Mexico 0.074 (0.00) -0.008 (0.79) 
New York -0.002 (0.86) 0.131 (0.00) 
NOlth Carolina. -0.010 (0.43) -0.103 (0.00) 
North Dakota 0.016 (0.09) 0.029 (0.24) 
Ohio 0.025 (0.00) 0.047 (0.04) 
Oklahoma 0.073 (0.00) -0.071 (0.01) 
Oregon 0.023 (0.02) 0.135 (0.00) 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 0.009 (0.30) 0.022 (0.34) 
South Carolina 0.000 (0.98) -0.065 (0.04) 
South Dakota -0.003 (0.75) 0.154 (0.00) 
Tennessee -0.017 (0.11) -0.093 (0.00) 
Texas 0.126 (0.00) 0.042 (0.15) 
Utah 0.023 (0.03) 0.255 (0.00) 
Vermont 0.019 (0.07) -0.076 (0.00) 
Virginia -0.010 (0.39) 0.002 (0.94) 
Washington 0.013 (0.21) 0.103 (0.00) 
West Virginia 0.027 (0.01 ) 0.008 (0.77) 
Wisconsin 0.019 (0.03) 0.019 (0.40) 
Wyoming -0.003 (0.78) 0.090 (0.00) 
Constant 0.217 (0.00) 0.306 (0.00) 
R2 Statistic 0.82 0.72 
NOTES: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except 
Nebraska. 
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations. 
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state. 
Significance levels are noted in parentheses. 
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy 
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models, the R' of the separation 
denial rate equation was 0.29 and of the nonseparation denial rate equation was 0.07. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Govern-
ments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (l995a, b, c, d); and the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (1993). 
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Results for Employer and Claimant Appeal Rates 
The employer and claimant appeal rate results from the GLS regressions are 
presented in Table B-3. In these equations, the employer (claimant) appeal 
rate is defined as the number of appeals brought by employers (claimants) 
as a percentage of all initial claims. The model had higher explanatory 
power for differences across states and time for claimant appeal rates (34 
percent of variation was explained when the state dummy variables were 
excluded) than for employer appeal rates (17 percent of variation was 
explained when the state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically 
significant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9. 
Results for Employer and Claimant Success Rates 
The employer and claimant success rate results from the GLS regressions 
are presented in Table B-4. In these equations, success rate is defined as the 
number of appeals that employers (claimants) won as a percentage of all 
lower-authority appeals brought by employers (claimants). These models 
had very low predictive power (none of the variation was explained in either 
equation when the state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically 
significant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9. 
ANALYSIS OF APPEAL-LEVEL DATA FROM WISCONSIN 
Variables Used in the Analysis 
Using the appeal-level data from Wisconsin,7 two categories of factors were 
analyzed to determine their influence on the success rates of claimants and 
employers: employer characteristics and characteristics of the appeal hear-
ing. Table B-5 displays the means for all variables used. 
Employer Characteristics 
Three variables were used to describe characteristics of the employer. The 
first measured the size of the firm and was divided into four groups: firms 
with fewer than 20 employees, firms with between 20 and 99 employees, 
firms with between 100 and 499 employees, and firms with 500 or more 
employees. It is anticipated that larger employers are more likely to win a 
hearing, since they have more resources to devote to managing unemploy-
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ment compensation costs. The second variable measured the experience-
rated tax of the employer.8 The expected effects of employer tax rates on 
employer success rates are discussed above. A third measure of whether the 
employer was in the manufacturing industry was included to describe the 
type of employer further. 
Characteristics of the Appeal Hearing 
Six variables were used to describe characteristics of the hearing. The first 
two were whether the claimant appeared at the hearing and whether the 
employer appeared at the hearing. The second two were whether the 
claimant was represented at the hearing and whether the employer was rep-
resented at the hearing.9 Representation refers only to legal representation; 
unfortunately, the data do not include any other form of representation. With 
regard to employers, the attorney could either work internally for the firm or 
be hired as outside counsel. As discussed earlier, participation and represen-
tation are generally expected to increase the likelihood that the party wins. 
The fifth variable was whether the hearing involved consideration of multi-
ple issues. Employers are more likely to win appeals involving multiple 
issues than are claimants, because the issues that have been raised by the 
employer in these appeals are more complex and require more preparation 
and familiarity with VI laws and the appeals system. The final variable was 
whether the appeal hearing was conducted by telephone or in person. The 
effect of this variable is difficult to predict. 
The issue being appealed was an important characteristic of the hearing that 
was not available in these data and therefore not used in the equations. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 9, this is an important variable because the party who has the 
burden of proof in a given appeal hearing varies with the issues being disputed. 
Model Specification 
Because the success rate variables that are being estimated are dichotomous 
(that is, they equaled one if the claimant or employer won the appeal and 
zero if the claimant or employer did not win the appeal), the model was esti-
mated using a logistic regression. 1o The results of these regressions are pre-
sented in Table B-6. The numbers displayed in this table are the log odds 
ratios associated with each variable. The log odds ratio indicates the change 
in the likelihood of an event occurring (in this case whether the employer or 
claimant won the appeal) caused by each explanatory variable, holding all 
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TABLE B-3. Regression Results for Employer and Claimant 
Appeals, All States, 1978-1990 
Employer Appeal Rate/ Claimant Appeal Rate/ 
Explanatory Variables Initial Claim Initial Claim 
Effective Tax Rate -0.018 (0.73) 0.178 (0.06) 
State Tax Base over Federal Level 0.0000003 (0.01) 0.000000002 (0.99) 
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years) -0.0002 (0.22) 0.0003 (0.50) 
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit -0.0002 (0.80) 0.002 (0.24) 
Disqualification for Refusing Work -0.003 (0.04) 
Disqualification for Misconduct 0.005 (0.00) 0.010 (0.00) 
State Government -0.0004 (0.13) -0.0004 (0.44) 
Performance of Nonmonetary Determinations -0.0006 (0.47) -0.002 (0.15) 
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Determinations -0.001 (0.21) 0.0004 (0.83) 
Denial Rate per Initial Claim 0.017 (0.00) 0.052 (0.00) 
Actual Benefit Duration 0.0003 (0.06) 0.0006 (0.02) 
Benefit AmountlWages -0.017 (0.01) -0.019 (0.09) 
Total Unemployment Rate -0.049 (0.00) -0.040 (0.12) 
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized -0.030 (0.00) -0.023 (0.02) 
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed 0.007 (0.04) -0.004 (0.46) 
State Dummy Variables 
Alabama 0.006 (0.00) 0.001 (0.70) 
Alaska -0.006 (0.04) -0.003 (0.53) 
Arizona 0.001 (0.79) 0.020 (0.00) 
Arkansas -0.001 (0.79) 0.014 (0.00) 
California -0.001 (0.45) -0.010 (0.00) 
Colorado 0.020 (0.00) 0.044 (0.00) 
Connecticut 0.024 (0.00) 0.006 (0.03) 
Delaware -0.004 (0.01) 0.006 (0.02) 
District of Columbia 0.013 (0.00) 0.030 (0.00) 
Florida 0.004 (0.03) 0.019 (0.00) 
Georgia 0.012 (0.00) -0.007 (0.05) 
Hawaii 0.000 (0.90) 0.002 (0.51) 
Idaho -0.010 (0.00) -0.025 (0.00) 
Illinois 0.010 (0.00) 0.007 (0.01) 
Indiana -0.001 (0.54) 0.003 (0.40) 
Iowa 0.019 (0.00) 0.Dl8 (0.00) 
Kansas 0.010 (0.00) 0.023 (0.00) 
Kentucky 0.001 (0.42) 0.006 (0.04) 
Louisiana 0.016 (0.00) 0.034 (0.00) 
Maine -0.002 (0.22) -0.006 (0.02) 
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APPENDIX B /189 
TABLE B-3. (continued) 
Employer Appeal Rate/ Claimant Appeal Rate/ 
Explanatory Variables Initial Claim Initial Claim 
Maryland 0.007 (0.00) 0.024 (0.00) 
Massachusetts 0.001 (0.45) -0.003 (0.25) 
Michigan 0.002 (0.15) -0.011 (0.00) 
Minnesota 0.003 (0.03) 0.004 (0.15) 
Mississippi -0.001 (0.72) 0.008 (0.06) 
Missouri 0.004 (0.04) 0.011 (0.00) 
Montana -0.003 (0.04) -0.014 (0.00) 
Nevada 0.006 (0.00) 0.Q28 (0.00) 
New Hampshire -0.007 (0.00) 0.010 (0.00) 
New Jersey 0.002 (0.27) 0.012 (0.00) 
New Mexico 0.009 (0.00) 0.021 (0.00) 
New York -0.004 (0.04) -0.006 (0.04) 
North Carolina -0.003 (0.13) -0.007 (0.03) 
North Dakota -0.003 (0.10) 0.006 (0.02) 
Ohio -0.002 (0.12) -0.017 (0.00) 
Oklahoma 0.004 (0.01) 0.024 (0.00) 
Oregon -0.003 (0.11) -0.005 (0.11) 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island -0.004 (0.00) -0.006 (0.02) 
South Carolina 0.001 (0.59) -0.001 (0.76) 
South Dakota 0.001 (0.78) 0.009 (0.00) 
Tennessee -0.002 (0.33) -0.007 (0.02) 
Texas 0.010 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00) 
Utah -0.002 (0.40) 0.007 (0.03) 
Vermont 0.001 (0.53) 0.001 (0.68) 
Virginia -0.001 (0.49) -0.006 (0.08) 
Washington -0.002 (0.20) -0.003 (0.32) 
West Virginia 0.008 (0.00) 0.013 (0.00) 
Wisconsin 0.003 (0.03) -0.002 (0.46) 
Wyoming 0.004 (0.01) -0.005 (0.07) 
Constant 0.010 (0.01) 0.020 (0.00) 
R2 Statistic 0.86 0.90 
NOTES: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except 
Nebraska. 
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations. 
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state. 
Significance levels are noted in parentheses. 
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy 
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models, the R' of the employer 
appeal rate equation was 0.17 and of the claimant appeal rate equation was 0.34. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Govern-
ments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1993). 
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TABLE B-4. Regression Results for Lower-Authority Appeal 
Success, All States, 1978-1990 
Lower-Authority Appeal Success Rate 
Explanatory Variables Employer Claimant 
Effective Tax Rate -4.209 (0.04) -2.286 (0.00) 
State Tax Base over Federal Level -0.000002 (0.64) -0.000006 (0.00) 
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years) -0.011 (0.22) -0.004 (0.18) 
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit 0.017 (0.63) -0.027 (0.04) 
Disqualification for Refusing Work 0.025 (0.01) 
Disqualification for Misconduct 0.004 (0.88) -0.015 (0.14) 
State Government 0.008 (0.40) 0.009 (0.01) 
Performance of Nonmonetary Detenninations -0.026 (0.38) -0.017 (0.10) 
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Detenninations -0.024 (0.55) -0.003 (0.81) 
Denial Rate per Initial Claim -0.105 (0.33) 0.069 (0.07) 
Actual Benefit Duration 0.004 (0.49) 0.003 (0.14) 
Benefit AmountlWages -0.020 (0.93) 0.068 (0.42) 
Total Unemployment Rate -0.522 (0.34) -0.015 (0.94) 
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized 0.132 (0.54) -0.238 (0.00) 
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed 0.053 (0.66) 0.047 (0.27) 
Percentage of Appeals Filed by Employers -0.304 (0.01) 0.101 (0.02) 
State Dummy Variables 
Alabama 0.203 (0.01) -0.033 (0.25) 
Alaska 0.149 (0.15) 0.105 (0.00) 
Arizona 0.072 (0.31) -0.116 (0.00) 
Arkansas 0.016 (0.84) -0.070 (0.01) 
California 0.017 (0.79) 0.041 (0.l0) 
Colorado 0.182 (0.02) 0.016 (0.56) 
Connecticut -0.060 (0.37) -0.111 (0.00) 
Delaware 0.326 (0.00) 0.044 (0.03) 
District of Columbia 0.089 (0.19) -0.024 (0.32) 
Florida 0.041 (0.56) -0.102 (0.00) 
Georgia 0.303 (0.00) -0.163 (0.00) 
Hawaii -0.014 (0.85) 0.027 (0.28) 
Idaho 0.137 (0.06) 0.042 (0.09) 
Illinois 0.004 (0.95) -0.126 (0.00) 
Indiana 0.064 (0.34) -0.042 (0.07) 
Iowa 0.154 (0.01) 0.050 (0.02) 
Kansas 0.005 (0.93) 0.083 (0.00) 
Kentucky 0.028 (0.64) -0.076 (0.00) 
Louisiana 0.093 . (0.16) -0.055 (0.02) 
Maine -0.038 (0.49) -0.004 (0.84) 
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TABLE B-4. (continued) 
Lower-Authority Appeal Success Rate 
Explanatory Variables Emr>loyer Claimant 
Maryland 0.112 (0.09) 0.118 (0.00) 
Massachusetts -0.091 (O.l 0) 0.009 (0.68) 
Michigan -0.050 (0.41) 0.100 (0.00) 
Minnesota -0.006 (0.92) -0.031 (0.05) 
Mississippi -0.035 (0.67) -0.122 (0.00) 
Missouri 0.101 (0.15) -0.078 (0.00) 
Montana 0.082 (0.14) -0.061 (0.00) 
Nevada 0.107 (0.08) -0.013 (0.54) 
New Hampshire 0.038 (0.56) -0.035 (0.16) 
New Jersey -0.044 (0.49) 0.007 (0.76) 
New Mexico 0.123 (0.07) -0.007 (0.77) 
New York -0.172 (0.01) -0.050 (0.03) 
North Carolina 0.215 (0.00) -0.056 (0.02) 
North Dakota 0.130 (0.02) 0.041 (0.04) 
Ohio 0.044 (0.42) -0.001 (0.95) 
Oklahoma 0.036 (0.56) -0.101 (0.00) 
Oregon 0.059 (0.36) 0.078 (0.00) 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island -0.004 (0.94) 0.080 (0.00) 
South Carolina 0.213 (0.01) -0.114 (0.00) 
South Dakota 0.050 (0.46) -0.060 (0.01) 
Tennessee 0.069 (0.30) -0.115 (0.00) 
Texas 0.052 (0.47) -0.047 (0.06) 
Utah 0.055 (0.43) 0.059 (0.02) 
Vermont -0.005 (0.93) -0.071 (0.00) 
Virginia 0.128 (0.06) -O.l09 (0.00) 
Washington 0.028 (0.65) 0.045 (0.04) 
West Virginia 0.100 (0.12) 0.051 (0.03) 
Wisconsin -0.062 (0.25) -0.048 (0.01) 
Wyoming 0.137 (0.03) -0.055 (0.01) 
Constant 0.395 (0.01) 0.287 (0.00) 
R' Statistic 0.35 0.66 
---~ .. 
NOTES: Success rate is defined as percentage of appeals won by party who appealed. 
Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except Nebraska. 
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations. 
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state. 
Significance levels are noted in parentheses. 
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy 
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models the R' of both equations 
was 0.00. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Govern-
ments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1993). 
192/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
other factors constant. A log odds ratio greater than 1 denotes an increase in 
the likelihood of the event, whereas a log odds ratio less than 1 denotes a 
decrease in the likelihood of the event. For example, according to the results 
of the regressions in Table B-6, an employer who appeared at a hearing was 
2.027 times more likely to win the appeal than an employer who did not 
appear. In contrast, an employer was only 0.623 times (about two-thirds) as 
likely to win an appeal when the claimant appeared at the hearing than when 
the claimant did not appear. 
TABLE B-5. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from 
~egressions, Wisconsin, 1994 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
-----"""---------------------------
Dependent Variables 
Employer Received Favorable Decision* 
Claimant Received Favorable Decision* 
Explanatory Variables 
Employer Size 
Fewer Than 20 Employees 
Between 20 and 99 Employees 
Between 100 and 499 Employees 
500 or More Employees 
Tax Rate 
Manufacturing Industry* 
Employer Appears at Hearing* 
Claimant Appears at Hearing* 
Employer Is Represented at Hearing* 
Claimant Is Represented at Hearing* 






























NOTES: Data are based on 11,746 lower-authority appeal hearings from Wisconsin in 1994. The 
means of variables with an asterisk (*) are percentages of the total sample. For example, the mean 
value of 0.58 for the first dependent variable indicates that employers received a favorable decision 
in 58 percent of all appeals brought. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human 
Resources, State of Wisconsin. 
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Results 
The model for employers correctly predicted whether the employer would win 
or lose an appeal that the employer brought in 72 percent of the cases and was 
statistically significant, as indicated by the model chi square of 117. It was 
significantly better at predicting when an employer would lose an appeal than 
when an employer would win an appeal, however. It correctly predicted when 
an employer would lose an appeal in 99 percent of the cases, but it correctly 
TABLE B-6. Regression Results for Employer and Claimant Success 
Rates, Wisconsin, 1994 




Fewer Than 20 Employees 
Between 20 and 99 Employees 
Between 100 and 499 Employees 
500 or More Employees 
Tax Rate 
Manufacturing Industry 
Employer Appears at Hearing 
Claimant Appears at Hearing 
Employer Is Represented at Hearing 
Claimant Is Represented at Hearing 
Multiple Issues Contested 
Telephone Hearing 
N 
Percent Correctly Classified 
Model Chi Square 
Employers Claimants 
1.090 (0.44) 0.813 (0.01) 
1.355 (0.01) 0.845 (0.03) 
1.345 (0.01) 0.742 (0.00) 
0.986 (0.53) 1.046 (0.00) 
1.125 (0.19) 0.873 (0.03) 
2.027 (0.00) 0.666 (0.00) 
0.623 (0.00) 30.143 (0.00) 
1.698 (0.00) 0.642 (0.01) 
0.872 (0.63) 2.288 (0.00) 
0.769 (0.00) 0.533 (0.00) 
0.711 (0.00) 0.678 (0.00) 
3,583 8,132 
72.17 71.84 
117 (0.00) 1,906 (0.00) 
NOTES: Data are based on lower-authority appeals hearings ti'Om Wisconsin in 1994. 
A logistic regression model was used to estimate the equations. 
"Fewer Than 20 Employees" was omitted as the reference group. 
Significance levels are noted in parentheses. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human 
Resources, State of Wisconsin. 
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predicted when an employer would win an appeal in only 4 percent of the 
cases. Employers in Wisconsin lose 72 percent of their appeals, and the model 
was able to correctly predict 72 percent of the outcomes. 
The model for claimants correctly predicted whether the claimant would 
win or lose his or her appeal in 72 percent of the cases and was statistically 
significant, as indicated by the model chi square of 1906. Like the employer 
model, this model was significantly better at predicting when a claimant 
would lose an appeal than when a claimant would win an appeal. It correctly 
predicted when a claimant would lose an appeal in 94 percent of the cases, 
but it correctly predicted when a claimant would win an appeal in only 17 
percent of the cases. Claimants in Wisconsin lose 71 percent of their 
appeals, and the model was able to correctly predict 72 percent of the out-
comes. The results of both regressions are discussed in Chapter 9. 
NOTES 
1. This measure was lagged 3 years in the regression equation. The 3-year lag structure 
had the most statistically significant impact on the denial and appeal rates. Statistically, 
the lag structure reflects the notion that it takes a few years for state policy decisions 
prompted by the status of the trust fund balance to affect a state's law or a state's admin-
istration of the program. 
2. Since refusal of suitable work is not a factor in determining initial eligibility, it was 
not included in the equations for the separation denial rate, employer appeal rate, or 
employer success rate. 
3. Between 1978 and 1994, 9 states imposed durational disqualifications for voluntary 
leaving, 12 states imposed durational disqualifications for misconduct discharges, and 15 
states imposed durational disqualifications for refusing suitable work. (Advisory Council 
on Unemployment Compensation 1995, 111). 
4. For example, a state that is not adept at identifying nonmonetary eligibility violations 
would be paying benefits to recipients who are actually "ineligible"; this would result in 
low determination rates and consequently low denial rates. By contrast, a state that is 
good at detecting eligibility violations would conduct more determinations that would 
result in more denials. 
5. There are some disadvantages with the use of these two particular measures. For 
example, the report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) 
noted that the wage replacement rate (that is, the average weekly UI benefit divided by 
average weekly wage) is an inaccurate measure because the denominator is not available 
for UI recipients. (See, for example, Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(1995, 126).) Similarly, variations in the actual duration of benefits are more dependent 
upon the characteristics of the unemployed and the labor market in a given state and year 
than on the potential duration for which a claimant is eligible to receive benefits. 
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6. Tabulations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicate 
that while 61 percent of unemployed union members receive DI benefits, only 29 percent 
of unemployed non-union workers receive benefits (Bassi and Chasanov, forthcoming). 
7. As discussed in Chapter 9, these data include 11,746 lower-authority appeal hearings 
resulting from nonmonetary separation issues. 
8. A dummy variable measuring whether the firm was paying the maximum tax rate 
was also considered. It was not statistically significant in either the employer or the 
claimant regression equations. However, only 1.6 percent (183) of the hearings in this 
sample involved firms at the maximum tax rate, which may make conclusions about the 
lack of significance of this variable inappropriate. Therefore, it was dropped from the 
analysis. 
9. A dummy variable measuring whether both the claimant and the employer had repre-
sentation at the hearing was also considered. It was not statistically significant in either 
the employer or claimant regression equations. However, only 0.4 percent (52) of the 
! hearings in this sample were those in which both parties were represented, which may 
make conclusions about the lack of significance of this variable inappropriate. Therefore, 
it was dropped from the analysis. 
10. The model was also run using OLS and probit regressions. However, the models 
did not correctly account for the error distribution of the data using any of the regression 
techniques, and only the logistic regression results are presented here. 

Appendix C / 
Financing: Background 
Figures and Table 
THIS COLLECTION OF FIGURES and a table contains historic and state-by-state 
information related to the financing of the Unemployment Insurance system. 
Included are data on the high cost multiple, the relationship between trust 
fund solvency and benefit recipiency, the reserve ratio, state tax rates and 
tax collections, and federal loans to state UI trust funds. 
197 













1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Year 
NOTES: Data are for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Data are included for Puerto Rico 
beginning in 1961 and for the Virgin Islands beginning in 1978. 
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FIGURE C-2. States with Adequate Reserves as Measured by High Cost Multiple, 1955-1994 
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NOTES: Data are for aliSO states and the District of Columbia. Data are included for Puerto Rico beginning in 
1961 and for the Virgin Islands beginning in 1978. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (199Sd); U.S. General Accounting Office (1988). 
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NOTES: The reserve ratio is net reserves as a percentage of total covered wages_ The FUTA wage base is rela-
tive to total covered wages. 
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TABLE C-1. Reserve Ratios, by State, 1994 
State Reserve Ratio State Reserve Ratio 
Puerto Rico 7.54 Tennessee 1.62 
Virgin Islands 6.67 Kentucky 1.55 
Vennont 4.51 North Dakota 1.55 
Wyoming 4.15 Nebraska 1.51 
Oregon 3.86 Rhode Island 1.51 
Alaska 3.81 Pennsylvania 1.48 
Washington 3.45 Florida 1.47 
Iowa 3.23 West Virginia 1.47 
Kansas 3.20 Arizona 1.33 
Delaware 3.14 Colorado 1.21 
Idaho 3.14 South Dakota 1.16 
NcwMexico 3.13 Ohio 1.13 
Wisconsin 3.03 Virginia 1.13 
Mississippi 2.98 Arkansas 1.02 
Louisiana 2.92 Illinois 0.99 
Utah 2.86 Maryland 0.96 
North Carolina 2.49 Michigan 0.90 
Hawaii 2.26 Mainc 0.87 
Oklahoma 2.21 Minnesota 0.80 
New Jersey 2.12 California 0.72 
Indiana 2.11 District of Columbia 0.35 
New Hampshire 2.06 Texas 0.30 
Georgia 1.95 Massachusetts 0.26 
Montana 1.95 Missouri 0.26 
South Carolina 1.79 New York 0.10 
Alabama 1.77 Connecticut 0.01 
Nevada 1.70 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995c). 
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FIGURE C-6. State Unemployment Insurance Tax Collections per Worker, 1940-1994 (constant 
1994 dollars) 
500 














-l---- -- - -- -
r! 
-- rr ----- --, ~ I; V\ IL if , -1---- - K! ----- --- --, V , 
100 ----- -- - -- - ------- -- --- ----- --, 
o 
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Year 
NOTE: Shaded regions represent recession from peak to trough. 































FIGURE C-7. Amount of Federal Loans and Number of States with Outstanding Loans, 
1972-1994 (constant 1994 dollars) 
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Appendix D / 
Benefits: Background 
Figures and Tables 
Tms COLLECTION OF FIGURES AND TABLES contains historic and state-by-state 
infonnation related to Unemployment Insurance benefits and benefit claimants. 
Included are data on demographic characteristics of claimants, percentage of 
unemployed who are job losers, benefit recipiency rates, the ratio of UI 
claimants to job losers, duration of unemployment spells and benefit payments, 
the percentage of claimants who exhaust benefits, total UI benefits paid by pro-
gram type, weekly benefit amounts, and selected eligibility requirements. 
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TABLE D-1. Demographic Characteristics of Civilian Labor Force, 
All Unemployed, and UI Claimants, 1994 (percent) 
Civilian Total 
Characteristic labor Force Unemployed UI Claimants 
Age 
16 to 34 43 60 42 
35 to 54 45 32 48 
55 and over 12 8 10 
Gender 
Men 54 55 59 
Women 46 45 41 
Race 
White 85 74 N.A. 
Black 11 21 N.A. 
Other 4 5 N.A. 
------"" 
NOTE: "N.A." indicates data are not available. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (1995a). 
















SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisors (1995). 
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SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisors (1995). 
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NOTES: Lines denote the average duration of unemployment and the potential duration of benefits. The 1979 
figure for duration of benefits was substituted for erroneous data. 
SOURCES: Council of Economic Advisors (1995); U.S. Department of Labor (l995d). 
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FIGURE D-5. Percentage of UI Claimants Exhausting Benefits, 1940-1994 
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N01E: Shaded regions represent recession from peak to trough. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d). 
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FIGURE 0-6. Unemployment Insurance Benefits Paid, 1948-1994 (constant 1994 dollars) 
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TABLE D-2. \\feekly Benefit Amount, by State, 1994 
Weekly Benefit Weekly Benefit 
State Amount (dollars) State Amount (dollars) 
Hawaii 266 Florida 169 
New Jersey 246 Virginia 169 
Massachusetts 237 Oklahoma 168 
Connecticut 222 Idaho 167 
District of Columbia 220 West Virginia 167 
Rhode Island 220 Vermont 164 
Minnesota 217 Arkansas 161 
Michigan 213 Maine 161 
Pennsylvania 212 North Dakota 160 
Washington 206 Kentucky 159 
New York 203 Indiana 158 
Illinois 199 Montana 156 
Colorado 195 California 154 
Kansas 192 South Carolina 154 
Ohio 191 Georgia 153 
Virgin Islands 191 Missouri 150 
Wisconsin 188 Arizona 148 
Utah 187 New Hampshire 146 
Nevada 185 Tennessee 142 
Texas 185 Nebraska 140 
Delaware 183 New Mexico 140 
Iowa 183 South Dakota 138 
Maryland 180 Alabama 131 
Oregon 179 Mississippi 129 
North Carolina 175 Louisiana 118 
Wyoming 173 Puerto Rico 89 
Alaska 170 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d). 
216/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
TABLE D-3. Minimum Qualifying Requirements for Minimum 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Minimum Duration, by 
State, 1995 
~-- .. ---.. -~--
Minimum Benefits 
-~~~--
Required Earnings Minimum Weekly Benefit Number of 
State in Base Period Work Required' Amountb Weeksc 
--~---~~--
Alabama $1,032 X $22 15+ 
Alaska 1,000 X 44 to 68 16 
Arizona 1,500 X 40 12+ 
Arkansas 1,269 X 47d 9 
California 1,125 40 14+ 
Colorado 1,000 25 13+ 
Connecticut 600 X 15 to 25 26 
Delaware 0 20 24 
District of Columbia 1,950 X 50 20 
Florida 400 X 10 10 
Georgia 1,350 X 37 9+ 
Hawaii 130 X 5 26 
Idaho 1,430 X 44 10 
Illinois 1,600 X 51 26 
Indiana 2,750 X 87 8+ 
Iowa 1,155 X 33 to 40 11+ 
Kansas 1,950 X 65d 10 
Kentucky 1,500 X 22 15 
Louisiana 1,200 X 10 8 
Maine 2,286 X 35 to 52 21+ to 22 
Maryland 900 X 25 to 33 26 
Massachusetts 2,000 14 to 21 10+ to 30 
Michigan 1,340 X 42 15 
Minnesota 1,250 X 38 10+ 
Mississippi 1,200 X 30 13+ 
Missouri 1,500 X 45 11+ 
Montana 1,356 X 57d 8 
Nebraska 1,200 X 20 20 
Nevada 600 X 16 12+ 
New Hampshire 2,800 X 32 26 
New Jersey 2,520 X 75 15 
(continued) 
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TABLE D-3. (continued) 
Minimum Benefits 
Required Earnings Minimum Weekly Benefit Number of 
State in Base Period Work Required' Amountb Weeksc 
New Mexico $1,334 X $41d 19+ 
New York 1,6001l,200e X 40 26 
North Carolina 2,603 X 25 13 to 26 
North Dakota 2,795 X 43 12 
Ohio 2,640 X 66 20 
Oklahoma 1,500 X 16 20+ 
Oregon 1,000 X 70d 4+ 
Pennsylvania 1,320 X 35 to 40 16 
Puerto Rico 280 X 7 26 
Rhode Island 1,780 X 41 to 51 15+ 
South Carolina 900 X 20 15 
South Dakota 1,288 X 28 15+ 
Tennessee 1,560 X 30 12+ 
Texas 1,517 X 42 9+ 
Utah 1,800 X 17 10 
Vermont 1,628 25 26 
Virginia 3,250 X 65 12 
Virgin Islands 1,287 X 32 13+ 
Washington 0 75d 16+ to 30 
West Virginia 2,200 X 24 26 
Wisconsin 1,500 X 50 12 
Wyoming 1,700 X 16 12 to 26 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, 3-27 to 3-29, 3-35 to 3-37, 3-45 to 3-47). 
a An "X" indicates that a state directly or indirectly requires work in at least 2 quarters of the base 
year. States with a dash (-) have the minimum work requirement specified as an earnings amount. 
bWhen two amounts are given, the lower amount is for a single individual and the higher amount 
includes dependents' allowances for 1 dependent child and/or nonworking spouse. 
C A range of weeks is presented when the calculation for minimum weeks varies with qualifying earnings. 
dMinimum benefit amount is computed annually as a percentage of average weekly wage. 
eThe higher amount resulting from two formulas is used to determine an individual's required base 
period earnings. 
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TABLE D-4. Qualifying Requirements for Maximum Potential 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Maximum Duration, by 
State, 1995 
Maximum Benefits 
Required Earnings Weekly Benefit Number of 
State in Base Period Amount Weeks 
Alabama $14,039 $180 26 
Alaska 22,250 212 to 284 26a 
Arizona 14,429 185 26 
Arkansas 20,592 264b 26 
California 11,958 230 26a 
Colorado 28,288 272b 26 
Connecticut 13,400 335 to 385b 26a 
Delaware 13,800 300c 26 
District of Columbia 18,044 347b 26a 
Florida 26,000 250 26 
Georgia 23,318 205 26 
Hawaii 8,944 344b 26a 
Idaho 20,956 248b 26 
Illinois 12,675 242 to 321 b 26 
Indiana 20,150 217 26 
Iowa 17,472 224 to 274b 26 
Kansas 20,280 260b 26 
Kentucky 20,042 238b 26 
Louisiana 17,428 181b 26 
Maine 15,444 198-297b 26 
Maryland 9,000 250 26 
Massachusetts 28,000 336 to 504b 30 
Michigan 15,651 293b 26 
Minnesota 23,634 303b 26 
Mississippi 14,040 180 26 
Missouri 13,650 175 26 
Montana 22,800 228b 26 
Nebraska 14,352 184 26 
Nevada 18,486 237b 26 
New Hampshire 25,500 204 26 
New Jersey 20,650 354b 26 
(continued) 
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TABLE D-4. (continued) 
Maximum Benefits 
Required Earnings Weekly Benefit Number of 
State in Base Period Amount Weeks 
New Mexico $8,883 $205b 26 
New York 11,980 300 26 
North Carolina 23,166 297b 26 
North Dakota 20,218 243b 26 
Ohio 12,740 245 to 328b 26 
Oklahoma 16,055 247b 26 
Oregon 24,080 30l b 26a 
Pennsy 1 vania 13,520 340 to 348b 26 
Puerto Rico 5,320 133b 26a 
Rhode Island 23,480 324 to 404b 26 
South Carolina 16,614 2I3b 26 
South Dakota 14,040 180b 26 
Tennessee 20,800 200 26 
Texas 24,263 252 26 
Utah 24,363 253b 26 
Vermont 9,540 212b 26 
Virginia 20,800 208 26 
Virgin Islands 17,394 223b 26 
Washington 31,500 350b 30 
West Virginia 27,400 290b 26 
Wisconsin 17,290 266 26 
Wyoming 19,417 233b 26 
-_. __ .. 
SOURCE: U.S. Deprutment of Labor (1995a, 3-35 to 3-37, 3-39 to 3-40, 3-45 to 3-47). 
a Benefits are extended when the unemployment rate in the state reaches a specified level. 
b Maximum benefit amount is indexed with the state average weekly wage. 
C Maximum benefit amount varies with trust fund balance. 
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1994 Findings and 
Recommendations 
Note: The material contained in this appendix is reprinted from Chapter 2 
of the first annual report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation, published in February 1994. 
PURPOSE OFTHE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed since the 
inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length of time that 
individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply during recessions, has 
also increased slowly but steadily during non-recessionary times. Workers 
who have been laid off from their jobs are now less likely to return to their 
previous jobs than has historically been the case. This indicates an increase 
in the level of long-term unemployment in the economy. 
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as a means 
of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term unemployment. The system 
was never intended to combat long-term unemployment. The purpose of the 
Unemployment Insurance system, and in particular the Extended Benefits 
program, must be expanded if the system is to deal effectively with the chang-
ing nature of unemployment. In doing so, however, careful consideration must 
be given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expenditures for 
combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the Unemployment In-
surance trust fund reserves. It must also be recognized that while Unem-
ployment Insurance reform is a necessary component of developing effective 
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strategies for dealing with long-term unemployment, other reforms-especial-
ly among programs for dislocated workers-wi11 be needed. 
Recommendation 
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded to 
enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system to pro-
vide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well as short-
term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are long-term 
unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment Insurance 
benefits, provided they are participating in job search activities or in 
education and training activities, where available and suitable, that 
enhance their re-employment prospects. To maintain the integrity of 
the Unemployment Insurance income support system, a separate 
funding source should be used to finance job search and education 
and training activities for long-term unemployed workers. * 
THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits by the 
unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 1947-the first 
year for which data on the system are available. In addition to the long-term 
downward trend in receipt of benefits, there was a pronounced decline in the 
early 1980s, just as the economy entered a recession. 
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance system 
are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused by the chang-
ing demographics of the labor force, the changing industrial and geographic 
composition of employment, and a decline in the solvency of states' 
Unemployment Insurance trust funds. The sharp decline in receipt of bene-
fits in the early 1980s appears to be attributable primarily to changes in fed-
eral policies which encouraged the states to increase the solvency of their 
trust funds by restricting eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits 
and/or increasing employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts 
to improve their trust fund solvency. 
*One member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' payroll taxes should not 
be used as the funding source. Another member emphasizes that such a recommendation must be 
considered in the context of reform of dislocated workers programs. 
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The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured by 
the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of Unem-
ployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of individuals in UI-
covered employment. Since the inception of the Extended Benefits program 
in 1970, states have been required to use the state IUR as a "trigger" that 
determines whether or not individuals who have exhausted their regular UI 
benefits are eligible for Extended Benefits. 
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the Unem-
ployment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less reliable indi-
cator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that Extended Benefits 
will trigger on in states with high unemployment. In addition, just as the IUR 
was experiencing a marked decline during the recession of the 1980s, the 
"trigger" level required to become eligible for Extended Benefits was raised. 
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in the trigger 
level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger on as 
unemployment continued to rise during this most recent recession. As a result, 
Congress found it necessary to pass a series of emergency extensions of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits. The Council finds that emergency exten-
sions of Unemployment Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient since 
they are neither well-timed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary to 
reform the Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next recession, 
in order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation. 
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be used to 
trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect measures exist, the 
best available evidence about the condition of the overall labor market with-
in a state is the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), which indicates the sup-
ply of individuals who are unable to find work. It should be noted, however, 
that beginning in 1994, the TUR rates will be affected by the redesign of the 
Current Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market con-
ditions that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the Adjusted 
Insured Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR adjusted to include 
those individuals who have exhausted their regular Unemployment 
Insurance benefits. 
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are available on 
some measures of local labor market conditions, these data are extremely 
unreliable measures of the true conditions that the unemployed face. 
Furthermore, there would be substantial administrative difficulties in using 
either substate or regional data for triggering Extended Benefits. 
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The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers that 
have been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are available 
within a state, the thresholds built into the biggers have been problematic. 
These thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate (whether mea-
sured by the IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that prevailed over the previ-
ous two-year period (by a factor of 120 percent for the IUR or 110 percent 
for the TUR). 
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number of 
states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. However, 
the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which Extended 
Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest unemployment, as well as 
hastening the point at which such states trigger off the Extended Benefits 
program. As a result, the thresholds have caused dissatisfaction among some 
with the operation of the program since those states suffering the most eco-
nomic hardship are triggered on for the shortest period of time. This prob-
lem could be addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers 
at a slightly higher level. 
Recommendation 
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing need to 
reform the Extended Benefits program. 
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended Benefits 
program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjusted total unem-
ployment rate (STUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured before the 
Current Population Survey redesign. * Two members of the Council rec-
ommend that each state should have the choice of using either the STUR 
trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold requirement of 110 percent above 
either of the two previous years, or an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 per-
cent with a threshold requirement of 120 percent over the previous two 
year period. 
The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms prompt-
ly. Although the Council has reservations about the inefficient target-
ing of emergency benefits, Congress should extend the existing 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six month period to 
provide a bridge program until these Extended Benefits reforms can 
be implemented. ** 
*Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should he set at 6.5 percent regardless 
of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that result from the redesign of the Current 
Population Survey. 
**Two members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency Unemployment Comp-
ensation should be extended. 
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Recommendation 
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the purpose of 
determining whether or not Extended Benefits are available within a 
given area. 
FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance system 
as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing p.ature of unemployment are 
compromised by incorporating its trust funds into the unified federal budget. 
While the flow of funds into the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
account may be adequate to finance the recommended Extended Benefits 
reform, such reform is complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment 
Insurance trust funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members 
of the Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this sit-
uation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts should 
be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires careful consid-
eration within a broader context. The Council intends to revisit this issue in 
its future deliberations. 
Recommendation 
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's recom-
mendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest increase 
in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500.* 
WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended Benefits 
program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, those indi-
viduals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage 
job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. While the Council 
understands that recipients of both regular and extended Unemployment 
Insurance benefits have an obligation to search actively for work and accept 
appropriate job offers, the Council finds the current federal requirements to 
*Two members object to this recommendation. 
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be excessively onerous. All states use a "suitability" test to determine the 
jobs which claimants are required to accept to remain eligible for benefits. 
This test gives states the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by 
claimants, while protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job 
skills by permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The States are in a 
better position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work 
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets. 
Recommendation 
The federal requirement that individuals who are receiving Extended 
Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is offered, or 
become ineligible for benefits should be eliminated. Each state should 
be allowed to determine an appropriate work search test, based on 
the conditions of its labor market. 
STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 
Findings 
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment Insurance 
benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least partially caused by 
the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. During the past decade, 
many states with low or negative trust fund reserves have found themselves 
in the position of either having to increase taxes on employers in the midst 
of an economic downturn, or having to take measures to restrict eligibility 
and benefits for the unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-as-
you-go funding has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment 
Insurance system. 
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation to 
begin to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment Insurance 
system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good economic times 
and a drawing down of reserves during recessions. The Council finds, how-
ever, that any move toward creating federal guidelines for states' Unem-
ployment Insurance trust fund accounts must be carefully weighed. 
Otherwise, there will be a risk of creating undue incentives for the states to 
restrict the eligibility and level of Unemployment Insurance benefits in 
order to achieve the solvency guidelines. The Council intends to make spe-
cific recommendations on this issue in future reports. 
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FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
Findings 
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of alien agri-
cultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. Currently, the 
wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas are exempt from 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This exemption is set to expire 
on January 1, 1995. 
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against continu-
ing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien agricultural workers 
are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on whom FUTA taxes must be 
. paid. This cost differential may create an incentive for substitution of for-
eign workers for U.S. workers, which argues in favor of repeal of the 
exemption. Furthermore, the process of certifying workers and issuing H2-
A visas imposes costs on the federal and state governments that have the 
responsibility for overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of 
the cost of the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since 
FUTA serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification 
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of H2-A 
workers from FUTA taxation. 
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive Unem-
ployment Insurance benefits since their visas require that they return to their 
country of origin within ten days after their employment terminates. 
Consequently, these individuals cannot meet the "available for work" test of 
the Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA taxes would be imposed 
upon the wages of individuals who cannot receive Unemployment Insurance 
benefits, which argues against imposing the FUTA tax on their wages. 
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA taxa-
tion of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against continuing 
that exemption. 
Recommendation 
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers (H2-A 
workers) should be subject to FUTA taxes. 

Appendix F / 
1995 Findings and 
Recommendations 
Note: The material contained in this appendix is reprinted from Chapter 2 
of the second annual report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Benefits, 
Financing, and Coverage), published in February 1995. 
THE PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation finds that, although 
an increasing percentage of the unemployed experience long spells of unem-
ployment, the majority of the unemployed experience relatively short unem-
ployment spells. Similarly, while a growing minority of individuals who 
receive Unemployment Insurance exhaust their benefits without having 
found new employment, the majority of individuals receive Unemployment 
Insurance benefits for a relatively short period of time before returning to 
employment. This reality dictates that the Unemployment Insurance system 
must be designed to deal effectively with a variety of needs. In particular, 
the system must both provide temporary wage replacement to individuals 
and facilitate the productive reemployment of those individuals who experi-
ence longer spells of unemployment. 
The Unemployment Insurance system also serves an important macro-
economic stabilization role by injecting additional money into the economy 
during periods of downturn. This objective, however, can only be achieved 
effectively if the system is forward-funded, thereby accumulating funds dur-
ing periods of economic health. 
These findings lead the Council to a formulation of the following state-
ment of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system. 
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1. Statement of Purpose 
The most important objective of the u.s. system of Unemployment 
Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a 
matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have 
demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor force. This support 
should help to meet the necessary expenses of these workers as they 
search for employment that takes advantage of their skills and experi-
ence. Their search for productive reemployment should be facilitated 
by close cooperation among the Unemployment Insurance system and 
employment, training, and education services. In addition, the system 
should accumulate adequate funds during periods of economic health 
in order to promote economic stability by maintaining consumer pur-
chasing power during economic downturns. 
FUNDING OFTHE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
The Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to promote economic sta-
bility rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding 
of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have been 
responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and conse-
quently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, during periods of 
prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then spent during peri-
ods of economic decline. 
Some members of the Council believe that experience rating is a crucial 
component of the program, providing effective incentives for employers to 
avoid laying off workers. Other members believe that experience rating 
causes employers to make excessive use of the system's appeal mechanism 
in an attempt to keep their experience-rated taxes as low as possible. 
Although the Council was unable to resolve this difference of opinion, it 
intends to address the issue of experience rating in its next annual report. 
The Council unanimously concludes, however, that promoting economic 
stability is an objective that transcends the interests of the states and cannot 
be achieved by states working in isolation. While some states have attempt-
ed to maintain an adequate degree of forward funding, others have not. The 
low reserves in some states' trust funds weaken the Unemployment 
Insurance system's capacity to achieve its economic stabilization function. 
Effectively promoting the forward funding of the Unemployment 
Insurance system requires a coherent federal strategy that includes congres-
sionally stated goals. 
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2. Recommendation 
Congress should establish an explicit goal to promote the forward 
funding of the Unemployment Insurance system. In particular, during 
periods of economic health, each state should be encouraged to accu-
mulate reserves sufficient to pay at least one year of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous "high cost." For 
purposes of establishing this forward-funding goal, previous "high 
cost" should be defined as the average of the three highest annual lev-
els of Unemployment Insurance benefits that a state has paid in any of 
the previous 20 calendar years. 
To complement these forward-funding goals, financial incentives to 
encourage forward funding should be created. This can be done by changing 
the structure of the interest rates that the federal government pays to the 
states on their Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances. A slight reduc-
tion in the interest rate paid on low levels of states' trust funds could be used 
to finance a fairly substantial interest rate premium paid on high levels of 
reserves. While it is difficult to predict with accuracy how many states 
would respond to such incentives, careful management of the interest rate 
structure could ensure that these incentives could be financed without addi-
tional cost to the federal government. 
3. Recommendation 
To encourage further forward funding, an interest premium should be 
paid on that portion of a state's Unemployment Insurance trust fund that 
is in excess of one "high cost" year of reserves. The cost of this interest 
rate premium should be financed by a reduction in the interest rate paid 
on that portion of each state's trust fund that is less than one "high cost" 
year of reserves. The U.S. Department of Labor should be given authority 
to adjust periodically the interest rate structure to ensure that these 
incentives create no additional cost to the federal government. 
The Council finds that the CUlTent federal policy of providing short-term, 
interest-free loans to state trust funds creates a disincentive for states to for-
ward fund their systems. Preferential loan treatment should be available 
only to states that have met, or made satisfactory progress toward, the for-
ward-funding goal. An example of how satisfactory progress might be 
defined is presented in Chapter 5 of this report. 
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4. Recommendation 
Preferential interest rates on federal loans to the states should be 
restricted to those states that have achieved (or made satisfactory 
progress toward) the forward-funding goal. In particular, the current 
system of making interest-free, cash-flow federal loans generally avail-
able to all states should be ended. Rather, these interest-free loans 
should be made available only to those states that have achieved (or 
made satisfactory progress toward) the forward-funding goal prior to 
the onset of an economic downturn. In other states, these loans 
should be subject to the same interest charges that are incurred on 
long-term loans to state Unemployment Insurance trust funds. 
5. Recommendation 
A method is needed for determining whether a state that has not yet 
met the forward-funding goal has made "satisfactory progress" 
toward the goal. This method should be based on an empirical analy-
sis of the rate at which state trust funds must be restored during peri-
ods of economic health in order to achieve the forward-funding goal 
prior to a recession. 
6. Recommendation 
When states have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) the 
forward-funding goal, yet find it necessary to borrow from the federal 
government, the interest rate charged on long-term loans should be a 
preferential rate that is 1 percentage point lower than would other-
wise be charged. 
The Council has discussed the level at which the taxable wage base and 
tax rate established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) should 
be set. This is a complex issue. FUTA revenues are earmarked for financing 
the administration of the nation's Unemployment Insurance system, as well 
as that of the U.S. Employment Service. However, because the bust funds 
are currently held within the unified federal budget, it is not possible for 
these programs to achieve direct access to the funds that are earmarked for 
them. In addition, a two-tenths surcharge that was imposed in 1977 to pay 
off trust fund debts has been extended well beyond the time when the debt 
was repaid. Quite apart from these issues, the Council has not yet made a 
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determination of whether or not additional revenues from FUTA would con-
tribute to more efficient and effective operation of the Unemployment 
Insurance system and the Employment Service. 
Another element of complexity results from the fact that the minimum 
taxable wage base that the states use for financing their Unemployment 
Insurance benefits is tied to the FUTA taxable wage base. On average, those 
states with higher taxable wage bases have a higher level of reserves than do 
states that have set their taxable wage base at the minimum level of $7,000. 
Consequently, raising the FUTA taxable wage base might contribute to the 
overall forward funding of the system. 
Furthermore, a low taxable wage base within a state tends to impose the 
burden of Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes disproportionately on 
employers of low-wage workers. To the extent that employers pass on a por-
tion of the tax to their workers in the form of lower wages, therefore, a dis-
proportionate share of the burden of the tax is ultimately borne by low-wage 
workers. Those low-wage workers who work part-time or part-year, how-
ever, are often ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. As a result, the low 
taxable wage base within the Unemployment Insurance system is both 
regressive and unfair. 
The Council has not yet reached a consensus on how to address these 
interrelated issues most effectively. As it considers the issues of administrative 
funding and efficiency over the course of the next year, however, the issue of 
the FUTA taxable wage base and tax rate will once again be addressed. 
The Council does note, however, that the Unemployment Insurance system 
was intended as a self-contained system of social insurance. Inherent in this 
design is the principle that funds are accumulated and held in trust solely for 
their intended purpose: namely, the payment of benefits to eligible unemployed 
workers, economic stimulus, and the costs of administering the system. 
Inclusion of FUTA accounts and state Unemployment Insurance trust fund 
accounts within the unified federal budget undermines the integrity of the 
Unemployment Insurance system. Since federal budget offsets must be identi-
fied before additional FUTA funds (which are earmarked for program admin-
istration) can be appropriated, some states have found it necessary to divert 
their trust funds to pay for administrative expenses--expenses that should be 
paid out of the FUTA trust fund. This diversion, while perhaps necessary, 
tends to erode the integrity of the system's financing. Employer willingness to 
contribute to the system, state capacity to develop and maintain adequate trust 
funds, and worker confidence in the system are all undermined. 
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Furthermore, when Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances that have 
been explicitly accumulated for countercyclical purposes are used to balance 
the annual federal budget, the system loses its capacity to increase spending 
automatically during recessions. Consequently, unlike other trust funds held 
by the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance trust funds are ren-
dered fundamentally incapable of achieving one of their major objectives-
economic stabilization-through their inclusion in the unified federal budget. 
7. Recommendation 
All Unemployment Insurance trust funds should be removed from the 
unified federal budget. 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TAXATION 
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by Unemployment 
Insurance, and their employers pay taxes into the system accordingly. There 
are, however, two important exceptions. The first exception is that nonprofit 
employers do not pay FUTA taxes, despite the fact that their employees are 
eligible for Unemployment Insurance, use the system, and generate admin-
istrative costs for the system. In calendar year 1992, this exemption cost the 
federal trust funds approximately $300 million. The second exception is that 
agricultural workers on small farms are not covered by Unemployment 
Insurance. The Council finds no justification for either of these exceptions. 
8. Recommendation 
The FUTA exemption for nonprofit employers should be eliminated. 
9. Recommendation 
The exemption of agricultural workers on small farms from Unem-
ployment Insurance coverage should be eliminated.* 
The Council also finds that Unemployment Insurance taxes owed by 
farm labor contractors ("crew leaders") often are not paid. Federal law spec-
ifies that, under most circumstances, these farm labor contractors are the 
*Two members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
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designated employers of their workers and that they are responsible for the 
payment of Unemployment Insurance taxes. It is difficult, however, to 
enforce this provision because of the many obstacles that prevent locating 
crew leaders who have outstanding tax obligations. 
10. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended so that farm owners or operators are 
assigned responsibility for unpaid Unemployment Insurance taxes 
owed by the crew leaders with whom they contract for workers on 
their farms. * 
The Council finds that some employers improperly avoid paying Unem-
ployment Insurance taxes by misclassifying their employees as independent 
contractors. Clear definitions that delineate the conditions under which an 
individual would legitimately be qualified as an independent contractor 
would help to alleviate this problem. 
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 protects businesses that have 
"reasonable basis" for misclassifying employees as independent contractors. 
Businesses that fall under the Section 530 "safe harbor" are not required to 
correct the classification of employees and cannot be assessed back taxes or 
penalties based on the misclassification of workers. Section 530 also prohibits 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the guidelines for deter-
mining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The 
ambiguity of these guidelines is the cornerstone of the misclassification prob-
lem and the tax revenue losses associated with it. In addition, revenue collec-
tion is limited by Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue Code, which caps the 
employment tax liability of those businesses not covered by Section 530. 
The greatest revenue loss results from businesses that do not file infor-
mation returns on independent contractors. These are circumstances under 
which businesses are most likely to misclassify workers, as well as the cir-
cumstances under which independent contractors are least likely to report 
their entire income. Increasing the penalty for failing to file information 
returns would increase the incentive to file, increase the percentage of inde-
pendent contractor income reported, and provide the information needed to 
identify employers that misclassify workers-thereby creating an incentive 
to classify workers correctly. 
*One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
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While the Council recognizes that correcting these problems would have 
ramifications that reach far beyond the Unemployment Insurance system, 
the Council finds that the problems are sufficiently serious to merit action at 
both the state and federal levels. 
11. Recommendation 
States should review and consider adopting the best practices of other 
states to address classification issues which include the following: clari-
fying the definitions of employee and independent contractor; specify-
ing employer liability for payroll taxes; licensing, bonding, or regulat-
ing the employee leasing industry; and strategic targeting of audits. 
12. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the "prior audit" safe 
harbor provision of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. 
13. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the provision of Section 
530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 that bars the IRS from issuing guide-
lines to define the employment relationship. 
14. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to repeal Section 3509 of the Internal 
Revenue Code and to require businesses to pay all taxes owed for 
workers that are misclassified after the enactment of the repeal. 
15. Recommendation 
The $50 penalty for businesses that fail to file information returns 
with the IRS or with the independent contractor they have hired 
should be increased. 
The Council notes that available statistics do not accurately measure the 
level of Unemployment Insurance receipt among the unemployed (that is, 
"recipiency"). The measure of the "insured unemployed" (IU) and the ratio 
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of insured unemployed to the covered labor force (that is, the insured unem-
ployment rate-the IUR) are frequently used for a number of purposes. 
When used as measures of recipiency, however, they are misleading. Both 
statistics consistently overstate the number of individuals who actually 
receive Unemployment Insurance benefits in a given week. In addition to 
counting recipients, the two measures both include individuals who file a 
claim for, but do not receive, benefits in a given week (these include indi-
viduals on a waiting week, individuals whose claims are ultimately denied 
for nonmonetary reasons, and individuals who are disqualified for a given 
week). At the national level, this inclusion has the effect of overstating the 
number of the unemployed who actually receive Unemployment Insurance 
benefits by approximately 10 percent (although there is considerable varia-
tion among the states in the extent to which currently reported statistics 
overstate the actual receipt of benefits). 
16. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should report a measure of Unem-
ployment Insurance recipiency. The measure should be a ratio, with 
the numerator defined as the number of individuals who are actually 
paid Unemployment Insurance benefits, and the denominator defined 
as the total number of unemployed individuals. 
EliGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Five percent of all workers in 1993 reported that they were unable to find 
full-time employment, and 16 percent of the work force held part-time jobs. 
The Council finds that in some states, these individuals are unable to qualify 
for Unemployment Insurance benefits, even when they have substantial 
labor force attachment. This problem is especially pronounced for low-wage 
individuals, many of whom must work in temporary or part-time jobs. 
Welfare reform could result in an increase in the number of low-wage work-
ers who find themselves in this situation. 
Some unemployed workers are unable to qualify for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits because of their state's definition of the "base period." 
The base period is the period of time that is used for calculating whether or 
not unemployed individuals' earnings are sufficient to qualify them for 
Unemployment Insurance. Many states define the base period as the first 
four of the past five completed calendar quarters. In these states, therefore, 
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between three and six months of an individual's most recent work experi-
ence is excluded from consideration in calculating eligibility for benefits. 
This may have the effect of disqualifying some workers who have worked 
continuously, but who need the most recently completed quarter of earnings 
to be included in the base period in order to qualify for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits. To solve this problem, some states now use a "moveable 
base period," which allows the minimum earnings requirement to be met on 
the basis of the four most recently completed quarters of work if it is not 
met using the standard definition. 
The Council finds that advances in technology have made it feasible for 
all states to use the most recently completed quarter when determining ben-
efit eligibility, and that using this quarter is consistent with the legislative 
requirement that states ensure full payment of Unemployment Insurance 
when due. While the Council has been unable to develop sound estimates of 
the cost of implementing such a change, there are reasons to believe that the 
cost may not be prohibitive. First, many of the individuals who are deter-
mined to be eligible using a moveable base period would become eligible 
eventually (as soon as an additional quarter of earnings information 
becomes available). Second, some of the increase in the cost of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits would be offset by a reduction in benefits 
paid under means-tested programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps. 
In some cases, unemployed individuals cannot qualify for Unem-
ployment Insurance benefits because their eligibility is contingent upon 
their earnings in the calendar quarter in which they became unemployed. 
Information about their most recent earnings is typically not available until 
after the quarter has been completed. These individuals often do not realize 
that they can reapply (and often qualify) for benefits when information 
about their most recent quarter of earnings becomes available. This problem 
could be corrected if these individuals were told when they should reapply 
for benefits, as well as what additional earnings they would need to qualify 
for benefits. 
17. Recommendation 
All states should use a moveable base period in cases in which its use 
would qualify an Unemployment Insurance claimant to meet the 
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state's monetary eligibility requirements. When a claimant fails to 
meet the monetary eligibility requirement for Unemployment 
Insurance, the state should inform the individual in writing of what 
additional earnings would be needed to qualify for benefits, as well as 
the date when the individual should reapply for benefits. 
In some states, low-wage workers face an additional impediment in 
qualifying for Unemployment Insurance benefits. In order to meet their 
state's base period and/or high-quarter earnings requirements, low-wage 
individuals must work more hours than workers who earn higher wages. 
For example, an individual who works half-time for a full year (i.e., 1,040 
hours) at the federal minimum wage level would not meet minimum earn-
ings requirements in 9 states. At an hourly wage of $8.00, however, a half-
time, full-year worker would be eligible in all states. Similarly, an individ-
ual who works two days per week for a full year (approximately 800 hours) 
at the minimum wage would not meet the minimum earnings requirements 
in 29 states. At a wage of $8.00 per hour, however, that individual would 
be eligible in all but 2 states. 
The Council finds that any individual who works at least 800 hours per 
year should be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits and that 
states' minimum earnings requirements should be set accordingly. If all 
states set their earnings requirements at this level, the number of individuals 
eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits would increase by approxi-
mately 5.3 percent, and the amount of benefits paid would increase by 
approximately 3.6 percent. Some of the increase in the cost to the system, 
however, would be offset by a reduction in receipt of means-tested benefits 
such as AFDC and Food Stamps. 
18. Recommendation 
Each state should set its law so that its base period earnings require-
ments do not exceed 800 times the state's minimum hourly wage, and 
so that its high quarter earnings requirements do not exceed one-
quarter of that amount. 
Fourteen states preclude workers in seasonal industries from collecting 
Unemployment Insurance except during the season in which work is nor-
mally done within the industry. In addition, twelve of these states disallow 
seasonal workers' earnings from being counted toward their minimum earn-
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ings requirement, even if the individual subsequently works in a nonseason-
al job. The Council finds these exclusions to be problematic. 
19. Recommendation 
States should eliminate seasonal exclusions; claimants who have 
worked in seasonal jobs should be subject to the same eligibility 
requirements as all other unemployed workers. 
In addition to the monetary requirements for qualifying for Unem-
ployment Insurance, each state has a variety of nonmonetary requirements 
that unemployed individuals must satisfy in order to qualify for benefits. 
These requirements include stipulations about availability for suitable work, 
ability to work, work search requirements, voluntary separation for good 
cause, discharges due· to misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and unem-
ployment as a result of a labor dispute. In some cases, part-time workers 
(who meet monetary eligibility requirements) are explicitly precluded from 
receiving Unemployment Insurance. 
20. Recommendation 
Workers who meet a state's monetary eligibility requirements should 
not be precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance benefits 
merely because they are seeking part-time, rather than full-time, 
employment. 
State legislation often does not address the specifics of many of the situ-
ations that Unemployment Insurance claimants face. As a result, interpreta-
tions of nonmonetary eligibility requirements can also be found in adminis-
trative and judicial case law and administrative rules. Testimony presented 
in the Council's public hearings indicates that the complexity of these non-
monetary requirements creates confusion about eligibility requirements. It 
can be difficult for both claimants and employers to understand these 
requirements with a reasonable degree of certainty. These problems can be 
particularly pronounced for multistate employers. 
Not only can this lack of certainty impede the receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance, it may also increase unnecessarily the number of appeals filed by 
both claimants and employers. These problems appear to be particularly 
severe with regard to determinations involving employee misconduct, 
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refusal of suitable work, and voluntary leaving for good cause. Clarifying 
these issues would serve the interests of both groups. 
21. Recommendation 
A state-specific information packet that clearly explains Unemployment 
Insurance eligibility conditions (both monetary and nonmonetary) 
should be distributed by the states to unemployed individuals. 
The Council is particularly concerned about a number of specific non-
monetary eligibility conditions. For example, it is not always clear whether 
an individual who is unavailable for shift work (perhaps due to a lack of 
public transportation or child care) will be found to be eligible for Unem-
ployment Insurance. Consideration needs to be given to situations in which 
individuals quit their jobs because of one of the following circumstances: a 
change in their employment situation (e.g., change in hours of work), sexual 
or other discriminatory harassment, domestic violence, or compelling per-
sonal reasons, including family responsibilities. In addition, the Council is 
concerned about the variability in the definition of misconduct across states, 
and about the treatment of individuals who refuse employment because it is 
temporary or commission work. The Council intends to address these and 
related issues in its third annual report. 
ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
At the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system, much debate was 
devoted to the adequacy of benefits. Many of the founders of the system 
argued that benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings; they believed 
that this percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic 
necessities, but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work. 
A number of presidents, including and following Dwight Eisenhower, 
have endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the 
Unemployment Insurance system. President Richard Nixon advocated that 
the Unemployment Insurance system should seek to replace 50 percent of 
lost earnings for four-fifths of all Unemployment Insurance recipients. 
The level of a state's maximum weekly benefit amount has a direct 
impact upon the percentage of Unemployment Insurance recipients who 
receive benefits that equal or exceed a given replacement rate. Those indi-
viduals whose earnings qualify them for their state's maximum weekly ben-
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efit amount typically have less than half of their wages replaced. Therefore, 
when a state's maximum benefit amount is relatively low as a percentage of 
the state's average weekly wage, the state will not meet the 50 percent 
replacement rate goal for a large percentage of recipients. 
The Council endorses the long-standing goal of 50 percent replacement 
of lost earnings, and notes that a state is likely to be able to achieve this goal 
for a large number of workers by setting the state maximum weekly benefit 
amount equal to two-thirds of state average weekly wages. 
22. Recommendation 
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of 
lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit 
amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wages. * 
The Council also notes that, starting in 1986, all Unemployment 
Insurance benefits became subject to taxation. Taxation of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits results in a reduction of the effective replacement rate. 
23. Recommendation 
Unemployment Insurance benefits should be tax-exempt. ** 
The Council finds that the current system for reporting the average 
replacement rate of lost earnings within the Unemployment Insurance sys-
tem needs to be improved. While the U.S. Department of Labor routinely 
reports the replacement rate, the concept used in the calculation is flawed. 
The reported replacement rate is calculated by dividing Unemployment 
Insurance benefits paid by the wages of all covered workers. To the extent 
that those who receive Unemployment Insurance have lower wages than the 
average covered worker, the reported replacement rate will understate the 
actual replacement rate. Conversely, if those who receive Unemployment 
Insurance have higher wages than the typical covered worker, the reported 
replacement rate will overstate the actual replacement rate. Advisory 
Council calculations using data available from selected states suggest that 
the reported replacement rate significantly understates the actual replace-
ment rate. 
*One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
**Four members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
APPENDIX F /243 
24. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the actual 
replacement rate for individuals who receive Unemployment 
Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated by dividing the 
weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average weekly earnings 
paid to those individuals prior to unemployment. 
REEMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES 
The Council finds that financial incentives (such as reemployment 
bonuses or self-employment subsidies) for facilitating rapid reemployment 
have a positive impact on a small portion of the unemployed. In some cases, 
this positive impact could be offset partially by negative impacts on others 
who find jobs more slowly because they are displaced in the job queue by 
those who receive the incentives. This displacement effect is likely to be 
more pronounced during periods of relatively high unemployment. 
The Council concludes, therefore, that the states should be permitted to 
experiment with reemployment incentives, but it opposes incentives to 
encourage (or require) states to implement such strategies. 
Some members of the Council object to the use of self-employment 
incentives within the Unemployment Insurance system---especially when an 
individual's entire benefit is paid in lump-sum form. 
25. Recommendation 
States should be given broad discretion in determining whether reem-
ployment incentives, such as reemployment bonuses or self-employ-
ment allowances, should be included as a part of their Unemployment 
Insurance systems. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING 
States' administrative costs are financed by the federal government with a 
portion of the revenues generated by FUTA. This situation requires some 
systematic method for allocating these revenues among the states. The 
Council finds that whatever method is chosen, it is important to create 
financial incentives for states to administer their Unemployment Insurance 
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systems efficiently. For example, those states that are able both to adminis-
ter their Unemployment Insurance systems with less money than is allotted to 
them and to achieve U.S. Department of Labor performance requirements 
could be allowed to keep all or part of the surplus for other uses within their UI 
systems. The Council intends to address this issue, in conjunction with the U.S. 
Department of Labor's performance requirements, in its next annual report. 
The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed an Administrative Financ-
ing Initiative (API) that would allocate FUTA funds based on a national unit 
cost with base-level and contingency-level funding. The Council takes no 
position on the API, because the U.S. Department of Labor and the states 
have not yet agreed on the details of this initiative. 
The Council notes that it is inefficient for the federal government to 
require employers to fill out and submit separate forms and payments for their 
FUTA and state Unemployment Insurance taxes. Not only does this impose an 
unnecessary paperwork burden on employers, it also creates redundant tax 
collection units in the federal and state governments. The expense of collect-
ing Unemployment Insurance taxes could be reduced by allowing the states to 
collect FUTA taxes on behalf of the federal government. 
26. Recommendation 
FUTA taxes should be collected with other Unemployment Insurance 
taxes by each of the states and submitted to the federal government for 
placement in the federal trust fund. States' Unemployment Insurance 
taxes should remain in the state trust funds, as is currently the case. 
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Charter 
The Council's Official Designation 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (hereinafter called 
"Council"). 
The Council's Objectives and the Scope of its Activity 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment com-
pensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effective-
ness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State ad-
ministrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the 
program and to make recommendations for improvement. 
Period of Time Necessary for the Council to Carry Out its Purposes 
Four years. 
The Agency and/or Official to Whom the Council Reports 
The President and the Congress. 
The Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support to 
the Council 
The Unemployment Insurance Service of the Employment and Training 
Administration of the Depattment of Labor. 
245 
246/ ADVISORY COUNCil ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Membership 
The Council shall consist of 11 members as follows: 
(A) Five members appointed by the President, to include representa-
tives of business, labor, State government, and the public. 
(B) Three members appointed by the President pro tempore of the 
Senate, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member 
of the Committee on Finance of the Senate. 
(C) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking mem-
ber of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives. 
(D) The President shall appoint the Chairman of the Council from 
among its members. 
(E) In appointing members under subparagraphs (B) and (C), the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives shall each appoint-
(i) one representative of the interests of business, 
(ii) one representative of the interests of labor, and 
(iii) one representative of the interests of State governments. 
A Description of the Duties for Which the Council Is Responsible 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment com-
pensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effective-
ness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State 
administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the 
program and to make recommendations for improvement. Not later than 
February 1, 1995, the Council shall submit to the President and the Congress 
a report setting forth the findings and recommendations of the Council as a 
result of its evaluation of the unemployment compensation program, includ-
ing the Council's findings and recommendations with respect to determining 
eligibility for extended unemployment benefits on the basis of unemploy-
ment statistics for regions, States or subdivisions of States. 
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The Estimated Annual Operating Costs in Dollars and Staff Years 
for Such Council 
It is anticipated that expenditures will be approximately $1,200,000, includ-
ing six PrEs. 
The Estimated Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings 
It is anticipated that the Council will meet five times during each year. 
Termination Date 
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Calendar 
November 15, 1991 
January 24, 1992 
May 11, 1993 
September 20, 1993 
September 21, 1993 
December 9, 1993 
January 10, 1994 
January 11-12, 1994 
April 21-22, 1994 
Establishment of Council by statute 
Chartering of Council 








Focus Groups of UI Claimants 
San Francisco, California 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
San Francisco, California 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Springfield, Oregon 
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June 16-17,1994 
August 18-19, 1994 
September 8, 1994 
September 8-9,1994 
November 30-
December 1, 1994 
January 4,1995 
March 30-31,1995 
April 5-6, 1995 




Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Portland, Maine 
First Council Research Conference 
Portland, Maine 
Focus Groups of UI Claimants 
New York, New York 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
New York, New York 





Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Detroit, Michigan 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Washington, DC 
Second Council Research Conference 
Burlington, Vermont 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Charleston, South Carolina 




THE ADVISORY COUNCIL has held nine sets of public hearings over the course 
of its three-year tenn in order to provide individuals and organizations with an 
opportunity to present their views and recommendations regarding the im-
provement of the Unemployment Insurance system. Members of the public 
were asked to address a variety of topics related to Unemployment Insurance. 
More than 160 witnesses have presented testimony before the Council 
and more have submitted written statements. Both the hearings and the writ-
ten statements have proven to be a rich source of infonnation, providing 
many new perspectives on Unemployment Insurance issues. The Advisory 
Council expresses its appreciation to the members of the public who took 
the time to share their time and ideas with the members of the Council. 
These witnesses are listed below. 
WITNESSES WHO PRESENTED TESTIMONY 
Amanda Afton, Employers Unemployment Compensation Council, Michigan 
Jonathan Baird, New Hampshire Legal Assistance 
Michael Baker, South Carolina 
Jim Barrett, Michigan State Chamber of Commerce 
Milt Bartholomew, Douglas County Fanners Co-op, Oregon 
Mary Frances Bartlett, Maine Welfare Directors Association 
Robert Becker, Raff and Becker, New York 
Lee Beyer, Oregon State Representative 
Stephen Bingham, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance 
Foundation 
Jon Bloom, Workers' Defense League, New York 
251 
252/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Warren Blue, R. E. Harrington, Inc., Ohio 
Malcolm Bonner, California 
John Bourg, Louisiana AFL-CIO 
Christopher Bowlin, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, DC 
Sandra Boynton, Maine 
Deborah Bronow, State of California Employment Development 
Depmtment 
Keith Brooks, New York Unemployed Committee 
Frederic Buse, New York Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance 
Albert Ca1ille, Ameritech, Michigan 
Sally Cansino, Oregon 
Barry Cargille, Small Business Association of Michigan 
Anthony Carnevale, National Commission on Employment Policy, 
Washington, DC 
Don Carrington, John Locke Foundation, North Carolina 
Larry Clark, Gibbens Company, Utah 
Brenda Cochrane, San Francisco State University 
Clarence Cooper, Suffolk University, Massachusetts 
Leighanne N apua Cote, Maine 
Jesse Damesworth, UAW, Michigan 
John Davidson, Chrysler Corporation, Michigan 
Gene Derfler, Oregon State Representative 
Loleta Didrickson, Illinois Department of Employment Security 
Sharon Dietrich, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania 
Mary Dirk, SEW Local 31M, Michigan 
John Dorrer, New England Training and Development Corporation, 
Massachusetts 
Robert Du Val, Unemployment Cost Control, New Jersey 
Robert Edwards, Michigan Employment Security Commission 
Eunice Elton, Private Industry Council of San Francisco 
Maurice Emsellem, National Employment Law Project, New York 
Joan Entmacher, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Washington, DC 
Ron Eskin, Merrimack Valley Legal Services, Massachusetts 
James Evatz, JCPenney Company, Texas 
Terry Evert, Gibbens Company, California 
Arthur Fandel, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Insurance and Seneca Systems & Services 
Gary Fitch, Agricultural Affiliates, New York 
Lloyd Fleming, U.S. Department of Labor, Georgia 
Irv Fletcher, Oregon AFL-CIO 
Roger Gette, Legal Services of North Texas 
Jeff Gilbert, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 
Mary Katherine Gillespie, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Bruce Goldstein, Fannworker Justice Fund, Washington, DC 
Edward Gorham, Maine AFL-CIO 
David Gough, Gibbens Company, Colorado 
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Betty Graham, National Association of Unemployment Insurance Appellate 
Boards, Colorado 
Wayne Graham, Oregon 
John Gray, South Brooklyn Legal Services, New York 
William Griffin, Employment Security Commission, South Carolina 
Monica Halas, Greater Boston Legal Services 
Maurice Hall, Sloan, Montgomery, Gregory & Hall, South Carolina 
Gary Hanamoto, Oregon 
James Handy, Maine State Senate 
William Hannigan, Zagar, Inc., Ohio 
Sandra Hansberger, Lewis and Clark Legal Clinic, Oregon 
Katherine Hansen, National Association of Unemployment Insurance 
Appellate Boards, Michigan 
Robert Harvey, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
Christine Hastedt, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Maine 
Robert Haynes, Massachusetts AFL-CIO 
J ames Holt, Labor Policy Association, Washington, DC 
Charles Howarth, Council of State Chambers of Commerce, California 
John Hudacs, New York State Department of Labor 
John Humphrey, U.S. Department of Labor, California 
Robert Hunter, National Association of Professional Employers 
Organizations, Virginia 
Warren Hysell, Boise Cascade Corporation, Idaho 
Peter Isberg, Automatic Data Processing, Inc., California 
James Jackson, Texas Employment Commission 
Thomas Jackson, California 
Judy Johnson, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Preston Johnson, Employment Security Commission, North Carolina 
Patrick Johnston, California State Senate 
Keir Jorgensen, Amalgated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 
New York 
Bob Kenyon, U.S. Department of Labor, Texas 
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Richard King, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on 
Unemployment Insurance 
Rena Kottcamp, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training 
Steven Kreisberg, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, Washington, DC 
Yvonne Kroll, Job Service, North Dakota 
Erik Lang, Colorado Rural Legal Services 
Laurie Larrea, Private Industry Council of Dallas 
Daniel G. LeBlanc, Virginia State AFL-CIO 
Ed Leslie, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington State 
Hui Lian Chen, Chinese Progessive Association Workers Center, 
Massachusetts 
David Lien, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Leslie Linson, Legal Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts 
Paul Lodico, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, Pennsylvania 
Steve Lund, Minnesota Employers Association 
Tom Mahar, Monitor Sugar Company, Michigan 
Larry Malo, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Walter Mankoff, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Insurance and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union 
Charles Marciante, New Jersey AFL-CIO 
Rodolfo Mares, Jr., Legal Services of North Texas 
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis 
Pamela Mattson, Oregon Employment Department 
Catherine McCuish, Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce 
William McGraw, Michigan AFL-CIO 
Lorrie McKinley, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania 
Harold Meyer, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Georgia 
Eric Millage, Employers Unity, Colorado 
Kathy Moore, Kennebec Valley Technical College, Maine 
Martin Morand, Pennsylvania Center for the Study of Labor Relations 
Suzanne Murphy, Unemployment Tax Control Associates, Massachusetts 
Dave Murrie, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission 
Irv Newhouse, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on 
Unemployment Insurance 
Nils Nordberg, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training 
Larry Norton, Texas Rural Legal Aid 
Margaret O'Riley, Michigan Business Ombudsman 
Ellen Palmer, Lane Community College, Oregon 
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Diana Pearce, Women and Poverty Project, Washington, DC 
Don Peitersen, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 
Manuel Perez, Oregon Legal Services 
Marvin Perry, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training 
Christina Peters, Gates-McDonald and Company, Ohio 
William Petz, USX Corporation, Pennsylvania 
Ted Potrikus, Retail Council of New York 
Donnie Potts, Texas 
Fred Radtke, FAR Management, Michigan 
Norman Raffael, The Weyerhauser Company, Washington State 
Tom Rankin, California AFL-CIO 
Cynthia Rice, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Ted Roberts, Texas Association of Business 
John Rooney, Jr., Jon-Jay Associates, Massachusetts 
Carol Ross-Evans, California Tax Payers Association 
Dominic Rotondi, New York 
Harold Roy, Gallmeyer & Livingston, Michigan 
Paul Rundle, Small Business Association of Michigan 
Rashan Sanchez, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Scott Schapiro, The Frick Company, New York 
Anthony Serrano, GC Services, California 
Isaac Shapiro, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC 
Emmett Sheppard, Texas AFL-CIO 
Bob Shiprack, Oregon State Representative 
Charlotte Sibley, Farmworker Legal Services of New York 
Gary Sorenson, Minnesota Department of Employment Security 
Peter Sorenson, Oregon State Senate 
Richard Stifter, General Motors Corporation, Michigan 
Vernon Stoner, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Richard Studley, Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
Keith Talbot, Camden Regional Legal Services, New Jersey 
Steve Tegger, Oregon Workforce Quality Council 
Gail Thayer, Maine Department of Labor 
Liston Thomasson, Mississippi Employment Security Commission 
David Tilton, Oregon Legal Services 
Allan Toubman, Maine Department of Labor 
Dale Tuvey, United Claims Management, Washington 
Donald Vial, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy 
Judy Villa, BankAmerica Corporation, California 
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Don Villerejo, California Institute for Rural Studies 
Richard Virgili, California 
Eloise Vitelli, Maine Displaced Homemakers Program 
Wayne Vroman, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC 
John Watt, Oregon State Representative 
Patricia Webber, Maine 
Joseph Weisenburger, New Hampshire Department of Employment Security 
Libby Whitley, American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, DC 
Jonathan Wilderman, Wilderman and Linnett, Colorado 
Christine Worthington, Texas 
Mary Ann Wyrsch, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 
Stephen Yelenosky, Legal Aid Society of Central Texas 
Rick Zimmerman, New York Farm Bureau 
David Zurvalec, Michigan Manufacturers Association 
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